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Glossary of terms/abbreviations 
Artefact: a product or output of a network. This product may be tangible 
(e.g. a new building) or intangible (e.g. a decision, a plan; which are 
documented but have no other physical existence). This is a wider use of 
'artefact' than in everyday speech. 
Attenuation factor: Some members in some networks are only linked 
indirectly, through a number of intermediaries. The greater the number of 
intermediate links, the less influence the two people or organisations at the 
ends of the chain of links can be expected to have on each other. An 
attenuation factor states the percentage by which this influence decreases 
with each successive link. (It is more often stated as an assumption than 
calculated from data.) 
Betweenness centrality: the extent to which an organisation (or person) is a 
link on the paths of links connecting other organisations (or people). 
Bonacich power score: A measure of the extent to which each organisation 
(or person) is connected to others who are not highly-connected, so that 
these others depend on the first organisation (or person) for links to the 
rest of the network. 
Brokerage: When one organisation (or person) acts as an intermediary 
between two (or more) others, creating relationships between the other two 
that would not otherwise occur. This property is measured by a brokerage 
score. The higher its brokerage score, the more the organisation fills the 
role of broker (intermediary) between other network members. 
Care network: A network whose goal is to operate complex referral paths, 
so that patients who require care from multiple organisations receive all the 
care they need and in a co-ordinated fashion. Also known as referral 
networks, these networks focus on day-to-day operation of an existing care 
pathway or model of care. 
Centrality: Extent to which a person or organisation is central to the 
network, in contrast to being a marginal 'isolate' or a 'pendant' (see below). 
Connectedness: The existence of stable, repeatedly-used links between 
organisations (or people). 
Culture: The explicit values, tacit norms and artefacts (see above) of an 
organisation or network. 
Degree: The number of links that a network member has to other network 
members. 
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Degree centrality: The centrality of an organisation or person measured in 
terms of the number of links it (or he or she) to others in the network. 
Density: A network in which every member had direct links to every other 
member would have a density of 100%. In practice most networks are less 
dense. Their density is measured as the percentage of the theoretical 
maximum number of links (everyone directly linked to everyone). 
Enclave: A network with an exclusive membership. Some writers (but not 
the present report) also define enclaves as being non-hierarchical. 
Experience network: A network of service users, carers or groups of them 
aiming to influence the availability or quality of care. 
Flow centrality: A measure of the extent to which each network member is 
on the shortest set of links between the other network members. 
Freeman Centrality: A measure of centrality which expresses how closely a 
given organisation or person comes to being the hub in a 'hub-and-spoke' 
structure. 
Flow (betweenness) centrality: A measure of the extent to which each 
network member is on the shortest set of links between the other network 
members. 
Hierarchical reduction: Analysis of the extent to which a network has the 
same structure as a hierarchy i.e. with one 'top' member and links 
branching outwards (or 'downwards'), eventually reaching members who 
have no further links. This last stratum of members are 'pendants' (see 
below). 
Innovation-related activity: Activities which are not innovations in 
themselves, but are intended to or are likely to generate innovations (i.e. 
the introduction of new working practices from outside an organisation or 
network) or inventions (new working practices created for the first time). 
Isolate: Person or organisation who is nominally a network member but in 
practice has no links to any other member. 
Krackhardt GTD (graph-theoretical dimensions): A set of four measures 
which in combination measure how far a network has the structure of a 
hierarchy (see above). 
Node: A single network member (organisation or person). 
Normalised: A measure or score which is calculated or formulated in such a 
way as to make it comparable across networks. 
Pendant: A network member who is linked to only one other network 
member. 
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Programme network: A network whose goal is to implement a new model of 
care (new care technology, new standards, new care pathways, new way of 
organising care delivery). 
Project network: A network whose goal is to complete the installation of a 
new piece of infrastructure (e.g. building, IT system). 
Reach centrality: A measure of centrality expressing what proportion of the 
other network members a given network member is directly linked to 
(rather than linked to via intermediaries). 
Separation: The extent to which groups of links within a network are 
separate, i.e. linked at only one point (as in, say, a hub-and-spoke 
structure). 
Symmetrisation: A link between person A and person B might be directional 
(e.g. A sends messages to B). Such a link may or may not be reciprocated 
(e.g. if B never sends messages to A). A set of data about network links is 
symmetrised by applying the assumption that if A is linked to B, then B 
must be linked to A. This method enables gaps in network maps to be filled, 
but at the price of losing information about which links are reciprocated and 
which are not. 
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Executive summary 
Background 
Networks have increasingly been adopted as a managerial and policy 
solution for co-ordinating health services 'horizontally' across primary, 
secondary and tertiary care, across health and social care and for 'new 
public health' purposes. The GP Commissioning Consortia announced in 
Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS will also be networks of general 
practices and related organisations. Policy-makers and managers therefore 
have reason to be interested in discovering what forms of network 
structure, what network managerial practices and what other conditions are 
most likely to enable a network to realise the policy objectives which policy-
makers and health managers have given it; that is, what factors promote 
the 'effectiveness' of professional and clinical networks. 
Aims 
We aimed to answer the following research questions. 
1. How do networks emerge as rational co-ordination structures? What 
determines the formation of both mandated and non-mandated 
networks? 
2. In mandated networks, what prior social networks pre-exist and how 
do they affect the operation of the new, mandated network? Does re-
organising network structure disrupt or enhance network processes, 
or not affect them at all? How does the inclusion of additional 
occupational groups and other network members (e.g. users) affect 
performance? 
3. What determines the way in which member organisations use 
relational co-ordination structures (or fail to)? What determines the 
effectiveness of member organisations' use of these structures? 
4. What types of co-ordination processes mediate the above effects? 
5. How do the different layers of network, dealing with different media 
or contents, co-exist and influence each other? 
6. How are member organisations within a network tied to organisations 
outside it, how are these relationships structured, and what effect do 
these relationships have on how effectively member organisations use 
relational co-ordinating structures? 
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7. What effects are produced by incentives to cooperate (or not to)? 
What match is there between incentives and network structures? In 
NHS networks for example, how will the shifts to practice-based 
commissioning and payment by results affect network processes? 
8. What determines the performance of mandated and non-mandated 
network structures, and are there systematic differences in the 
performance of the two kinds? 
Methods 
We compared seven health networks. Three were concerned with cardiac 
heart disease and three with health services for children with long-term 
health problems. The seventh network was set up by people with current or 
recent mental health problems to engage in physical self-care. Of these 
networks, two were 'care networks' mainly operating existing care 
pathways. Three were 'programme networks' focused mainly on re-
configuring referral patterns, care pathways and clinical practice. One was a 
'project network' managing a large-scale re-profiling of children's services in 
a large city. The seventh non-NHS 'experience' network focused on self-
care. The latter and one of the NHS networks were voluntary, the rest 
mandated. We compared the networks using: 
1. Social network analysis, mapping and measuring the structure of 
links within each network; and comparing networks in those terms. 
2. Systematic comparison of case studies of each network and the 
outputs ('artefacts') they produced. 
Results 
The following findings are numbered to match the research questions. 
1. We observed two modes of network creation. Voluntary networks 
emerged 'from below' as groupings of individuals and organisations 
interested in performing common tasks, which might include 
producing relatively intangible artefacts such as information or 
guidance, or more tangible tasks such as changing service provision. 
Mandated networks were created 'from above' by NHS management, 
typically by taking control of pre-existing emergent networks and 
then, in some cases, re-structuring them. 
2. In mandated networks the membership tended to include a higher 
proportion of managers, network objectives became focused on 
national guidance, and network activities altered correspondingly. 
Re-organisation of networks' member organisations (especially PCTs) 
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was disruptive, sometimes severely and for a considerable period. 
Inclusion of users in the NHS networks did not have much effect on 
network activity but in the non-NHS experience network users played 
a decisive role because they controlled the network and provided its 
core activities. 
3. Members' engagement with networks partly depended upon whether 
participation in the network appeared to help them meeting targets, 
mandates and incentives generated outside the network (for 
organisations) or in terms of their personal interests and opinions 
(for individuals). Member organisations used the networks we 
studied mainly by linking to each other directly, not just via the 
network's co-ordinating body. We found no evidence that network 
connectedness stimulated innovation-related activity. The most 
highly connected organisations were not necessarily those with the 
internal organisational culture most favourable to inter-professional 
collaboration. 
4. For co-ordination the networks had a central steering group (or 
equivalent) with specialist sub-groups for particular tasks. Although 
the organisations which hosted the networks were well-connected to 
most other organisations in the networks studied, they were not 
uniquely well-connected. To a large extent network co-ordination 
occurred through direct links between network members in pursuit of 
specific tasks. Links between members were generally direct, dense ( 
extensively connected) and deep (i.e. on multiple levels). Network 
co-ordination was non-hierarchical. Knowledge management, in the 
form of evidence-basing of clinical and care practice, became an 
important means of co-ordination, the more medicalised the 
networks were. 
5. The network layer(s) carrying out the core activity of the network 
tended to be the most dense. Network links mediated by money 
were never more dense than other layers of links, and usually much 
less dense. Financial incentives played little part within the networks. 
6. Member organisations had relatively few and weak links to bodies 
outside the network. Member organisations' links to other 
organisations within the networks were more numerous and 
stronger. Links outside the networks tended to be with multi-
disciplinary bodies rather than with (uni-)professional networks. 
7. The main incentives for network members to cooperate were the 
expectation of practical help-in-kind and the legitimacy of evidence-
based practice. Network co-ordinators were able to 'harness' more 
powerful targets and incentives (e.g. Payment by Results) originating 
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outside the networks. Practice-based commissioning had little effect 
on the study networks. 
8. Voluntary and mandated networks differed in the balance between 
national and local objectives; composition of membership (more 
managers in mandated networks); and ability to 'harness' incentives 
external to the networks. Network artefacts were predominantly 
intangibles (guidance, policies etc.) but some tangible service 
changes were also produced, especially by the user-controlled 
'experience' network. There was some evidence that the more 
highly-connected organisations showed a greater reduction in 
referrals susceptible to primary-secondary care co-ordination. 
Generalisation from the networks we studied to others requires caution in 
view of the small numbers of study networks. Routine service outcome data 
could be matched to SNA data only for three networks. Nevertheless our 
study networks do appear qualitatively fairly typical of their kinds. 
The distinctive theoretical contribution of this study is to analyse health 
networks as being processes of production. Its distinctive empirical 
contributions are evidence of what outputs the networks contributed to their 
local health economies; and evidence suggesting that the organisations 
most closely connected with the networks' core process of production were 
also the organisations responsible for the lowest growth in hospital 
admissions preventable by primary-secondary care co-ordination. 
Conclusions 
1. Network managers have to nurture and develop network identity, 
make it explicit and involve the less-connected members so as to 
increase the connectedness and therefore effectiveness of the 
network. This requires skills of relationship-maintenance, diplomacy, 
consultation and negotiation. 
2. Networks can function effectively without all their links and activity 
being mediated by the co-ordinating body. For many purposes it is 
important to establish and conserve direct links between network 
members, not just links to the co-ordinating body. 
3. It is necessary that the member organisations select representatives 
with sufficient status and power within their 'home' organisation to 
implement network decisions. 
4. Engaging potential members becomes easier if the network can 
'harness' the existing incentives which these members already face 
outside the network. 
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5. Mandated networks are liable to make little use of other (external) 
networks or resources. Network co-ordinators should encourage 
network members, and the network collectively, to exploit external 
linkages. 
6. Frequent health system re-structuring is detrimental to networks but 
seemingly a fact of NHS life. Maintaining stable membership and roles 
helps networks continue functioning during these periods. 
7. Because network co-ordination depends heavily on relationality 
(which takes time and continuity to develop) and shared activity it 
would be prudent wherever possible to base GP commissioning 
consortia on PBC consortia and other existing GP networks. 
8. The experience of earlier networks suggest that GP commissioning 
consortia may be liable to become somewhat closed to outside 
resources of knowledge, impervious to patient and carer influence, 
and sedimented with an accumulation of mandates and activities 
leading to 'mission drift'; unless measures to the contrary be taken. 
9. Obviously the effectiveness of the GP consortia as commissioners will 
depend on their ability to influence key actors within secondary care 
providers. Less obvious, but an implication of this research, is that it 
will also depend on their ability to influence the 'hinterlands' within 
their member general-practices, because that is where consortia 
decisions will (or will not) be implemented. 
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1 Policy context 
Networks have been mooted as an alternative governance structure to 
quasi-markets and networks for modern health systems. 'Partnership' forms 
of network have emerged as a particular prescriptive form of network 
governance (1,2) because they are based on cooperation. Networks, it has 
been suggested, are governance structures better adapted for situations of 
complexity and instability than hierarchies are (3,4), and more flexible in 
developing new services (5). They are allegedly an effective mechanism for 
transferring tacit knowledge, and for transferring knowledge across 
organisational and occupational boundaries (6). They have been claimed to 
be based on trust (7), less susceptible to power disparities and more 
democratic than hierarchies (8), and more inclusive and egalitarian than 
markets (9) Networks have also been discussed as a solution to the 
problems of duplicated, fragmentary service provision (10,11) 
Against this, there is little evidence that multi agency working necessarily 
improves service outcomes for children and families (12) and the evidence 
is thin about whether service integration and partnerships benefit adult 
service users (13,14). Aldred (15) warns that even with mandated 
partnerships, collaborative behaviour cannot always be anticipated. Using 
the example of NHS LIFT (Local Improvement Finance Trusts) she highlights 
how networks can become closed and communication chains broken. In the 
USA network-based healthcare integration strategies have met with mixed 
financial success (16). There remains a need for research exploring 
whether, when and how networks produce service benefits for health service 
users. 
 1.1  Networks in the NHS 
Networks have existed in parts of the NHS ever since its inception. Because 
of the tripartite health system architecture adopted in 1947 the NHS has 
always depended on networks (enduring informal, non-contractual inter-
organisational relationships) of referral routes between organisationally 
separate general practices, hospital services (of all kinds) and community 
health services. In effect, these networks provided the first approximation 
of integrated care pathways from primary to secondary to tertiary care and 
back. 
From the 1920s these routes had become increasingly complex within 
primary care with the addition of physiotherapists and other allied health 
professions. From the early 1960s the policy of transferring long-stay 
patients from hospital to community settings (17) created needs for closer 
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integration of NHS community and primary health care with local authority 
(and sometimes third-sector) services. Repeated attempts were made to 
create local (i.e. county, borough and district level) bodies to co-ordinate 
these relationships, often with limited success. At patient level, an 
equivalent approach was to set up what is, in effect, a tailored network for 
each patient in the form of a case management programme (18), including 
non-NHS bodies. 
New public health policies promoted by the WHO and EU from the middle 
1980s focused on inter-sectoral activities (19). The pursuit of, say, smoking 
control required the formation of policy networks advocating health 
promotion policies to national governments and their health sector 
subordinate organisations (including NHS bodies). This approach to public 
health was re-animated in England with publication of the second Wanless 
report. 
From the 1990s networks became increasingly explicitly adopted as an ad 
hoc managerial and policy solution for the problems of co-ordinating 
services or constructing lines of political or managerial influence 
'horizontally' across sectors. Various nomenclatures ('network', 
'partnership', 'collaborative', 'consortia') were adopted. Later, networks 
became a main focus of 'third way' health policies (see below) and therefore 
generated a corresponding level of interest among NHS management. It 
could be argued that the precursor for the pro-network policies of the 1990s 
and later was a perception of how fragmented NHS primary care was. That 
stimulated the desire for 'joined–up government' and whole- system 
working and inter-agency, inter-sectoral working indicated in policy 
documents during 1998 (20-22) and 1999 (23). New Labour initially 
attached great importance to the idea of networks linking ('joining up') 
social care, health care, non-statutory 'third sector' organisations and 
service users themselves (24-27) and in public health (28). 
Cancer networks were the first major extension of acute care networks in 
recent times. The very first can be traced back to the 1970s, but in recent 
times these networks mostly grew out of cancer 'collaboratives'. Their 
conversion to managed cancer networks in the late 1990s (29) had three 
main dimensions: 
1. Reconstruction of care pathways to meet policy targets for admission 
times for patients suspected of having cancer.  
2. Promoting evidence-based clinical practice, with emphasis on clinical 
audit and (re-)education. 
3. A matched programme for commissioning NHS providers to provide 
cancer care on the above lines. 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         23 
The re-patterned cancer networks were increasingly completely specified by 
central government (30,31) and NICE in respect of service organisation, 
clinical guidelines (32), training and anticipated service outcomes. The 
Improving Outcomes guidance (33) was made mandatory in 2000. From 
2004 compliance was verified through repeated peer review audits. From 
2007 NHS commissioners played an increasingly influential role in the 
cancer networks (34). 
The cancer networks served as a template for later managed professional 
and clinical networks (35-43). For care groups such as patients with 
coronary heart disease (CHD), 'Collaboratives' were set up as networks 
linking primary and secondary care for the purpose of disseminating 
knowledge and best practice, besides the co-ordination of services across 
different organisations. Many National Service Frameworks (e.g. the NSF for 
older people (44)) included recommendations for the organisation of inter-
organisational collaboration and care pathways. These networks functioned 
as care networks, managing referrals between primary, secondary and 
tertiary care; but also as programme networks, implementing national 
policies for service standards and co-ordination. 
Local medical audit networks already existed before 1991 but after that date 
became widespread in NHS primary care. From 1991 general practice 
fundholding was gradually extended from individual practices to a system of 
multi-funds in which a network of fundholding general practices pooled and 
jointly managed their funds for purchasing secondary and some primary 
care. These multi-funds, and especially their last manifestation, the Total 
Purchasing Pilots, were networks of general practices. In many respects 
these networks anticipated the ways in which Primary Care Groups and 
Trusts later undertook clinical governance in primary care. 
For that purpose, Primary Care Groups and later Primary Care Trusts 
created and continue to manage networks, of which GP membership was 
practically mandatory. These networks nearly always had a GP 'lead' and 
were co-ordinated either through a working group of the Professional 
Executive Committee or by that Committee itself. At PCT level, such 
networks generally had non-medical members (e.g. nurses, pharmaceutical 
advisers) and could co-opt additional members at need, but generally they 
were numerically and organisationally dominated by GPs. Such networks 
served two main purposes. One was to promote the uptake of evidence-
based clinical practice within general practice. The other was to help 
implement specific models of care which national policy currently endorsed, 
in particular (but not only) the National Service Frameworks. Consequently, 
and as a corollary of their broader responsibilities for local implementation 
of national health policy, PCTs began to take interest in managing the co-
ordination of care for policy-salient care groups. Initially this activity focused 
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on care pathways, in particular referrals between primary and secondary 
care. In some cases the membership of these networks overlapped that of 
the wider networks (Collaboratives) also co-ordinating care for a specific 
disease groups across primary, secondary and tertiary care. Public health 
networks developed alongside although they tended to be networks of 
individuals rather than of organisations (45). 
Inclusion of public and patient representation in networks became a regular 
concern of policy guidance. Local government scrutiny of the NHS was 
introduced, a form of local networking usually called 'partnership', which 
involved public consultation, citizen participation, collaboration and 
partnership (46-49). 
The Darzi report subsequently proposed the development of 'polyclinics'. In 
many places (not least London), however, the proposals do not correspond 
to the classical European model of an hierarchical polyclinic. Rather, a 
federated model is often proposed, a 'polysystem' consisting of a network of 
general practices with a central referral hub for some shared services (out-
of-hours services, GPs with special interests, complex diagnostics, limited 
substitution for secondary care). In the UK (and elsewhere) 'third-sector' 
organisations were increasingly drawn into the provision of primary health 
care and social care (50), making more pressing the question of how to co-
ordinate these networks of providers. 
A big role for networks is still foreseen in the latest White Paper on the NHS 
(51). GP commissioning consortia will be networks of general practices, 
possibly supplemented with other primary care providers. The consortia will 
themselves be members of wider networks ('partnerships') with local 
government, partnerships responsible for scrutiny of their local health 
economy and for jointly commissioning certain services. Public health 
networks will in future be centred upon local government. Services treating 
uncommon health problems will be commissioned by further networks. The 
white paper also announces: 'We will extend choice in maternity through 
new maternity networks' (p.3). 
 1.2  The changing roles of NHS clinical and professional 
networks 
From October 2006 this pattern of professional and clinical network altered 
in line with a broader shift of NHS structures in a more quasi-market like 
direction (52-54). Provider diversification and competition policies were 
strengthened, including recruitment of both commercial and social 
enterprises to provide services for the NHS, increasing the number and 
variety of organisations liable to be involved in services for a given care 
group. A number of policies – Alternative Provider Medical Services, the 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         25 
Private Finance Initiative, Local Improvement Finance Trusts and 
Independent Treatment Centres (the descriptor 'independent' was later 
dropped) - were all aimed in this direction. Concomitantly the service 
provider arm of PCTs was separated off from PCTs' commissioning activities. 
Policy shifted towards client-based commissioning (i.e. linking provider 
payments to individual episodes of care) through the policies of 'Payment by 
results' (PBR), 'Patient Choice', Practice Based Commissioning (PBC) and 
World Class Commissioning (55). Mergers of PCTs and of SHAs were 
followed by policy changes as to the remit of professional and clinical 
networks towards a focus on or to advising the commissioners of health 
services and the development of a unified planning approach to London (56) 
and the Darzi Report (57). PCTs themselves were often merged and the 
SHAs were reconfigured. 
One consequence of these policy changes was the focus of PCT and SHA 
interest in networks shifted towards the use of networks to support 
commissioning work. Another was that PCT-wide networks were in many 
cases merged when their host PCTs merged. Professional and clinical 
networks generally remained PCT-centred but most PCTs were now several 
times their original size. Similarly the bodies replacing SHAs were of 
regional size, and so became the professional and clinical networks centred 
upon them. When the present research was commissioned in 2005 the 
paradigm NHS clinical and professional network, apart from the cancer 
networks and larger Collaboratives, was a PCT-centred set of around 35 
general practices serving a population of about 250,000 people, the policy 
changes described above meant that during the study period the scale and 
function of NHS clinical and professional networks changed. General 
practices shifted from being central to professional and clinical networks to 
being more marginal members of the networks. The networks were now too 
large for all general practices in a PCT to participate in even if they wanted 
to. On the other hand, hospital clinicians' roles in the networks changed 
from that of a valuable but still marginal participant to being at centre 
stage. 
Meantime there were additions to or shifts in the care groups upon which 
English health policy focused. Greater priority, and therefore managerial 
attention, was attached to vascular disease, above all diabetes and stroke. 
Because of continuing, highly publicised failures such as the Victoria Climbié 
and 'Child P' cases, children's services remained a policy focus. Failures or 
problems in children's services attracted increasingly drastic interventions 
from central government. The scope of many professional and clinical 
networks widened. The remit of, for instance, CHD networks was widened 
during 2006-8 with responsibility for vascular disease, above all diabetes 
and stroke. From 2010 these networks are about to be supplemented – or 
supplanted? - by GP commissioning networks as outlined above. 
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In the UK and more widely policy-makers have become interested in 
discovering what forms of network structure, what managerial practices and 
what productive activities are most likely to enable a network to realise the 
policy objectives which policy-makers and health managers have given it. As 
they sometimes put it: what factors promote the 'effectiveness' of 
professional and clinical networks? 
 1.3  Networks as governance structures 
One obstacle to answering these questions is the sheer variety of health 
networks and of the possible functions which they might serve. As networks 
become more numerous and diverse, the term 'network' becomes 
correspondingly ambiguous. The concept of networks entered the policy 
lexicon gradually and as with the life cycle of the cancer networks, the 
nomenclature has evolved from that of 'collaboratives' to networks in 
England and Wales to 'managed care networks' in Scotland (58,59). These 
ideas were then championed in the NHS Plan (60) and reinforced with the 
adoption of networks as UK Clinical Research Network's preferred delivery 
and planning structure for research activity, service improvement (61) and 
comprehensive system redesign (the NHS Confederation's suggestion of the 
introduction of 'Lean Management' practices into the NHS). So far as health 
services, as opposed to health promotion, are concerned, care networks 
were thus the first and paradigm form of health network, with 
commissioning-oriented networks as developments from them. In Scotland, 
what are known as 'managed clinical networks' have been defined (58) as 
'linked groups of health professionals and organizations from primary, 
secondary and tertiary care working in a co-ordinated manner, 
unconstrained by existing professional and (organizational) boundaries'. 
Consequently, in NHS usage the term 'professional and clinical networks' 
does not distinguish very clearly between different types of health networks, 
being a general label applied on different occasions to clinical governance 
regimes in primary care, inter-sectoral public health campaigns, extended 
care pathways, commissioning networks, coalitions of professional interests, 
'partnerships' with local government, and indeed almost any inter- 
organisational collaboration besides the groups of organisations 
promulgating evidence-based medicine. 
At a higher level of generality, a similar ambiguity also plagues research 
into networks (as we explain below). Of the three generally-recognised 
types of governance structure, both markets and hierarchies can be 
conceived as specific kinds of network (62). Networks are then seen as a 
fundamental generic concept of social analysis. Alternatively, one can 
conceive of networks as one of the three main types of governance 
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structure (markets, hierarchies and networks) found in developed industrial 
capitalist societies. 
Underlying managers' and policy-makers' interest in what factors promote 
the 'effectiveness' of professional and clinical networks is a presumption that 
these networks are inter alia governance structures. Managers might, for 
example, be able to re-model and influence professional and clinical 
networks in order to effect current policy ends. When the restructuring of 
health organisations is the policy-maker's intervention of choice, questions 
naturally arise of how networks might deliberately be restructured for these 
purposes. For instance, will the addition of new members – and if so, which 
new members – make a network more effective in these terms? By such 
interventions, might managers be able to influence – and make more 
effective - the collaborative productive activities through which a network 
achieves its own (and managers') policy goals? Such considerations underlie 
some of the research questions that we have studied. We have therefore 
selected the approach which conceives of networks as (among other things) 
one of three main types of governance structure. This approach is more 
likely to yield an analysis of networks relevant to the aims of the present 
research in particular applicability of findings to the NHS and to the SDO 
research agenda. Because it differentiates networks from other governance 
structures, this approach is also relevant to health policy debates about the 
differences between – and the relative merits of - markets, hierarchies and 
networks as health system structures. 
To explore how network structure relates to network performance, we 
compared seven English health networks. Fuller descriptions are given 
below but in brief these networks were: 
A) Child Mental Health Network. This network linked health and 
social care in a provincial city. It was a voluntary, informal network 
of long standing. In the last five years the local NHS and the city 
council took an increasing interest in managing it. 
B) Children's Hospital Project Network. Its remit was to co-
ordinate the implementation, and manage the consequences of, a 
large capital scheme which would almost completely re-profile 
hospital services for children in a large city. 
C) City Children's Network, a Children and Young Person's Trust 
constructed out of several much smaller networks in another large 
city. 
D) Small CHD Network. Serving a provincial city and its rural 
hinterland, this network originated as a CHD collaborative. 
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E) Regional CHD Network: Formed by merging several PCT-wide 
CHD networks, this network served a large area including suburban 
and rural areas, and several medium-sized cities. 
F) Urban CHD Network: This network originated from the merger 
of several CHD collaboratives in a large conurbation. 
G) Self-Care Network: Patients and ex-patients of mental health 
services in a provincial city set up this network to care for their 
physical health. 
This brings us to the questions of how to define networks for present 
research purposes; and what existing research tells about how networks 
work as governance structures, especially in health systems. 
 1.4  The development of network research 
A deep-rooted trend in both sociology – especially Durkheim's (63,64) - and 
political thought in the liberal tradition has been to assume that social 
structures and systems consist at root of stable sets of relationships 
between individual persons. Since the 1960s there have developed 
quantitative social network analysis (SNA) techniques for the description 
and mapping of everyday social interactions within groups. Many US 
organisational researchers used such techniques to investigate business 
alliances. A few have applied them to health systems (65-68). 
Implementation theory was a second intellectual provenance of network 
research. 'Top-down' implementation contrasted with implementation of 
policy 'from' below. An 'implementation structure' (69) is the concatenation 
of organisations involved in implementing complex (i.e. most) policies, with 
the aim of producing congruence between policy and practice (70). Rhodes 
subsequently developed the idea of a 'policy community', the relatively 
stable set of interest groups whom policy makers normally consult when 
deciding policy, either by choice or because the interest group is too 
powerful to ignore (71). A special case, which attracted research interest in 
the Netherlands especially, was alliances of local governments with common 
policy or economic interests (72). It was a short step from the idea of an 
implementation structure to that of 'networks' of non-commercial, 
'horizontal' social linkages. 
The resulting research literature distinguishes and describes the types of 
network shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Network types 
Policy implementation structures, including 
(a) Policy communities 
(b) Social movements 
Economic networks, including 
(a) Networks of non-commercial service or product providers (e.g. the 
free software movement) 
(b) Self-help networks of consumers, including internet-based social 
networks 
(c) Long-term market relationships which vertically integrate firms 
(d) Long-term market relationships which horizontally integrate firms, 
for instance as purchasing or selling cartels 
(e) Businesses alliance aimed at resource exchange, market access or 
circumventing regulations or other restrictions on trade 
Sectional interest alliances, including 
(a) Occupational networks (e.g. professional organisations, trades 
unions) 
(b) Trade associations 
A convergence of these currents in the early 1990s resulted in recognition of 
networks as a distinct type of governance structure (3) leading to a new 
stream of research, to which the present project aims to contribute, about 
governance through networks and governance within them. Research on 
collaborative networks has come of age with a special edition of Public 
Management Review in 2008 addressing the performance challenges of 
these types of network (73). 
By way of published research, managerial fashion, think-tanks and 
consultancies the idea of 'networks' gradually entered English political and 
NHS managerial discourse, especially after 1997. However this convergence 
also created the opportunity for definitional and terminological muddles 
about what counts as a network (74). Klijn's review of a decade of research 
on networks and governance reveals a tendency for researchers to use both 
'governance' and 'networks' as macro-level terms. Moore et al's (75) 
findings on networks in intermediate care however point to the importance 
of micro aspects of governance 'on the ground' (p.163). 
For present purposes we take 'networks' to mean deliberately constructed 
groups of (above all) organisations (not 'natural' networks such as families). 
We therefore define networks as Provan and Kenis (76) do, i.e. as: 
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groups of three or more legally autonomous organisations that work together to achieve 
not only their own goals but also a collective goal 
(p.231) 
Typically this collective goal is a distributed task, e.g. operating a care 
pathway, which is so complex as to require input from more than one 
organisation. This definition however leaves unstated the social co-
ordinating mechanisms which distinguish networks. Jones, Hesterly and 
Borgatti's widely-used definition of 'networks' (77), which does mention 
these mechanisms, is as: 
a select, persistent and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as non-profit 
agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open-ended 
contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to co-ordinate and safeguard 
exchanges. These contracts are socially – not legally – binding. 
(p.914) 
The autonomy and separate accountability arrangements of different 
partners are retained (78). For health system application, we should note 
that health networks typically include individual persons (e.g. patients and 
informal carers (79)) besides organisations. 
In the NHS, a scoping study (62) led to the commissioning of primary 
research into NHS networks including this study. Another scoping study (80) 
reviewed research on the relationships between organisational structure and 
policy outcomes relevant to the health sector. To do so it applied and 
developed Donabedian's framework which analyses health care 
organisational structures in terms of their health system environment, 
processes and outcomes (both clinical and policy) (81). Figure 1 outlines the 
framework, showing the overall sequence by which policy outcomes are 
produced by way of organisational or, in this case, network structures. 
In such analyses 'structure' means 'organisational structure'. 'Process' 
means not the organisational activities ('organisational processes') which 
occur within such a structure, but the core productive process – the 
'technology' – by which an organisation actually produces the healthcare or 
other goods and services which are its main outputs or 'artefacts'. 
'Outcomes' means 'policy outcomes'. 'Complex services' means 'services 
which a patient receives from two or more providers in combination'. The 
present study – indeed, the next chapter - develops that theoretical 
framework further for application to networks. 
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 2  Theoretical framework and taxonomy  
The theoretical framework for the study is conceptualised around eight 
themes and this chapter is structured accordingly. The themes are : 
1. Origins of networks. 
2. Mandate of a network 
3. Participation in networks 
4. Co-ordination of networks 
5. How networks are layered in respect of their process and 
resource flows 
6. The nature of their external links 
7. The incentives which operate 
8. Their performance, which includes processes and outcomes. 
 2.1  The origins of networks  
Voluntarily constructed networks start to form when a potential network 
membership believe that their existing activities or purposes will be 
promoted by collaborating. Some networks thus emerge from de facto 
collaboration in a common activity and may develop no further, the network 
remaining 'emergent'. Or, network development may go further, 
culminating in explicit negotiation and agreement of membership, activities, 
objectives and an organising structure for the network. 
Trust appears to be an important pre-condition for the formation of a new 
network and its presence helps in the associated negotiations which occur 
when a prospective network forms (82). A network whose members have 
this strong convergence of interests would therefore be expected to perform 
more effectively than one with no such alignment. Appendix 4 summarises 
the reasons why co-ordination might, on balance, work better when there is 
trust between network members. At a personal level, the generation of trust 
and building of good working relationships ('relationality') is cumulative, so 
these phenomena and their benefits will be more evident in older networks 
with a stable membership. There is an empirical correlation between 
participation and 'trust' (83); a participant's belief that the rest of the 
network will pursue goals which she shares. 
However besides these motivational conditions there are also organisational 
preconditions which enable prospective network members to trust one 
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another. In particular, there must be compatibility of business models and 
the property rights on which they rest, including compatible intellectual 
property rights which will allow joint operation of a technology (e.g. in the 
contrasting case, intellectual property rights prevent the sharing of technical 
knowledge (84)). In short network members' goals in joining the network 
must at least be compatible, if not complementary or congruent. It depends 
on the circumstances whether 'mutually compatible' means all the same or 
not (e.g. to increase market share for one's own organisation) (76). 
Conditions for network success include the existence of joint pay-offs and 
collective sanctions against members defecting or 'free riding' (85). The 
more these conditions of strong and compatible prior objectives held, the 
more one would expect to see commitment of resources and participation in 
network activities, lower internal transaction costs of debate and decision- 
making; and more effective network function. 
Health care networks also emerge as by-products of other, de facto 
relationships and organisational structures, including previous friendships 
and other informal contacts (86). They also emerge out of communities of 
practice (87-89) and routine exchanges such as those which arise from 
using a common care pathway. Networks also emerge in response to the 
need for network members (or potential members) to address some prior 
task or problem of their own. The latter constitute the initial 
problematisation of the network and in turn its goals and objectives. 
Because much research on network formation concerns market networks 
and alliances, the problematisation of such activity has often been conceived 
as directly financial (e.g. to combine market shares, form a cartel or gain 
market entry); to gain access to commercially valuable resources which 
network members severally lack but can assemble by collaborating (e.g. to 
combine different elements of technical know-how, or to combine technical 
and marketing resources, attain economies of scale or vertical integration) 
(90) and to manage demand uncertainty, asset specificity, frequent 
transactions, risk and competition, for instance through flexible use of 
agencies, outsourcing and subcontracting (77,91-97). 
Much as organisational objectives emerge by negotiation among individuals, 
network objectives emerge by negotiation among the individuals and 
organisations which are potential network members. This negotiation may 
result in a formal agreement, contract or legal personality; or be informal, 
even tacit. It would be naïve to assume that different prospective network 
members enter the negotiation with equal bargaining power (resources, 
legitimacy, bargaining skills). Some potential members play a more 
powerful role than others in the negotiations (98,99). The interests of some 
members may then be sacrificed to others' interests, producing uneven 
degrees of commitment to the network. 
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The products of negotiation, if a network results, are typically three: explicit 
collective goals (100); construction of a sequence of activities – the 
network's 'core process' - to realise these goals; and the creation of an 
organising structure for the network i.e. known, stable rules for interactions 
(101,100). Collective network goals emerge from the aforementioned 
negotiation and, unless one prospective member is in an absolutely 
dominating position, will for that reason be distinct from and transcend the 
goals of the individual network members (102). The nature of the shared 
purpose or common 'values' (103) varies, alternatively attributed to shared 
political interests; to the operation of a policy network or, as a special case, 
a policy community (71); or to shared economic interests (104), so that the 
network acts as an implementation structure or, on a more modest scale, a 
project team. In any event such aims, purposes or objectives may in 
principle be explicit, tacit or even concealed (90), shared or discrepant 
amongst the network members, an explicit founding principle of the network 
or emergent as the network develops. Individual members' desired 
outcomes may coincide with those of the network as a whole, but maybe 
not entirely if concessions and compromises have been made to get the 
network started. Over time a network may experience re-negotiation 
'mission creep' or 'goal displacement'. 
Since networks are goal-oriented, one way to classify health networks is 
according to what their goals, if achieved, would contribute to the wider 
health system; that is, to classify health networks by their practical 
function. Southon et al. supply such a taxonomy. It distinguishes the six 
basic types of health network as: 
1. Care network 
2. Professional network 
3. Project network. 
4. Programme network 
5. Experience network 
6. Interest network 
As a working assumption we adopt this taxonomy. 
 2.2  Mandate 
When health systems are largely within the public sector, policy mandate is 
frequently the source of origin of health networks (2,105-107). The 
mandate can operate in a number of different ways. Historically, they have 
included a legal requirement for a collective agreement to practice between 
profession and state (108) or, in the NHS, a requirement for clinical, 
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professional or intersectoral health networks. Mandate can produce 
networks where lack of trust might otherwise prevent them forming. 
Mandated networks can emerge in two ways. Given a policy mandate, 
health organisations may voluntarily form a network in order to implement 
it. Alternatively a mandate may be imposed upon an existing network (e.g. 
the formalisation of cancer networks described above). When an existing 
network is mandated, the question arises of whether its prior objectives, 
culture and activities will reinforce or countervail the new mandate; that is, 
how far the residues of the earlier voluntary phase persist and what effects 
they have on how the now-mandated network operates. Health policy 
mandates take forms that include legislation; regulation; targets and 
evidence-based guidance as well as managerial direction from higher 
authority. A network, or one of more of its member- organisations or 
individuals, is obliged to comply with these norms on pain of losing 
resources (real resources, money, authorisation) necessary for continuing 
their activity. Thus, mandate is in one sense a matter of degree. If a 
network does not heavily depend on the resources which might be 
withdrawn if a mandate is ignored, the network is for practical purposes 
only weakly mandated. In any event, the mandate defines or re-defines 
network objectives. 
Although obligatory, a policy mandate may nevertheless be accepted as 
legitimate, whether because it comes from an authoritative source (e.g. 
government) or because it coincides with or reinforces some prior 
motivation of the organisation or person who is mandated. It may also be 
accepted without coercion actually being exercised, or even publicly 
acknowledged. More subtly, the precepts of evidence based medicine (EBM) 
have what might be called an impersonal mandate (by analogy with 
Therborn's concept of power (109)). Compliance is necessitated not by the 
laws of governments but by the laws of nature, if the intended biological or 
clinical outcome is to be produced. 
When the mandate stipulates who must join it, a network is liable to acquire 
involuntary members with the implication that trust between some network 
members may be relatively low, and their willingness to contribute or share 
resources and information. Insofar as they are motivated extrinsically rather 
than intrinsically (as in voluntary network), incentives or soft coercion may 
be required to make them comply with network decisions (110). Even for 
voluntary network members, mandate adds new extrinsic motives for 
participation. Compulsory membership also removes the option to resolve 
disputes by exit: only voice and passive non-compliance remain. One would 
therefore predict the density of mandated networks to be lower than for 
voluntary networks. (That is, a higher proportion of members in voluntary 
networks would actually collaborate with each other.) Conversely a mandate 
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may exclude certain members from the network. Then, mandated networks 
would be less open to new members and have a narrower occupational mix 
of members than voluntary networks. Unless they were expressly mandated 
to accommodate it, mandated networks would also be less open to patient 
or carer participation. One would therefore expect that service user 
involvement in voluntary networks is more extensive but uneven than in 
mandated networks.Often, care networks based on referral routes and 
patterns emerge long before a mandated, formalised managerial centre is 
superimposed on them as health managers attempt to manage the pre-
existing network. Mandate adds a distinction (76) between internal and 
external governance. If the external mandator exercises strong control, a 
network is not necessarily incompatible with hierarchy-like relationships (cp. 
Canadian long-term care teams) (111). Indeed Ferlie and Addicott (35) 
argue that although networks without a central body are less complex, a 
more 'hierarchical' structure appears to help focus their activities on their 
strategic goals. 
 2.3  Participation 
Network members are already socially 'embedded' before they establish or 
later join a network, doing so to pursue their own prior objectives and 
motivations, even if this includes a response to a mandate. Prospective 
network members who face stronger prior incentives are more likely to 
commit resources and work for network activities, insofar as they believe 
that participating in the network will help them achieve the goals which the 
prior incentives are aimed at. However their pre-network roles also 
constrain what resources each member can bring to the network and what 
incentives its members are susceptible to. Emerging networks bring 
together people who: 
 participate purely as individuals. In general, individuals tend to 
network with others who are like them (homophily) (112-114). 
 belong and are accountable to a member organisation but do not 
formally represent it. Nevertheless, these members may give the 
network access to that organisation's resources (e.g. royalty-free 
use of patents). 
 represent member organisations in the sense of being formally 
accredited by them and able officially to commit their home 
organisation to the network's decisions (e.g. by implementing 
network decisions on brand-sharing within their own organisation). 
Health networks typically have a diverse membership, ranging across 
general practices, community health services, mental health services, 
hospitals, commissioners and regulatory bodies each with different forms of 
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ownership, in contrast to the relative homogeneity of commercial alliances. 
This diversity of organisations has obvious implications for the development 
of trust between them and of a common network culture. Nevertheless such 
organisations in each locality often have histories of collaboration before 
more explicit, formal clinical and professional networks form. 
Different organisational levels (115) are often represented in a single health 
network which may be a department or smaller sub-unit of a larger 
provider. To implement network decisions will then require compliance, not 
only by their individual representatives who participate in the network, but 
of the whole organisations or sub-units of larger organisations. From the 
perspective of a network, we call these large parts of the network members' 
original home organisations the network's 'hinterland', external to the 
network yet connected to it via 'boundary-spanning' network members. 
These 'boundary spanners' both represent their organisational interest in 
negotiations with the rest of the network and, in turn, represent the whole-
network interests and decisions back to their organisations (the network's 
hinterland) for implementation there. Thus the effectiveness of a network 
will depend upon how receptive these hinterlands are to innovations or 
policies generated by the network, that is upon whether these organisations 
have an internal culture which is receptive to new working practices. One 
would therefore predict that organisations with more extensive network 
links are more likely to engage in innovation-related activities (e.g. care 
pathway reviews, piloting new models of service delivery) because they 
have more sources of new ideas; but also that the impact of these links 
upon innovation would be moderated (or perhaps potentiated) by the 
organisation's internal culture. 
Adding new members might be expected to change the network's internal 
balance of power, co-ordination and governance regime (116). English 
health policy appears to assume that adding patient and public 
representatives makes the network more responsive to network users 
because the new members gain a voice in network decision-making and so 
influence what the core process produces. If network membership is 
mandatory, the network becomes an 'enclave' (62) in the sense of having a 
formally defined membership (and exclusions from membership). 
 2.4  Co-ordination 
The formulation of collective goals makes the network a means of rational 
co-ordination in the sense that network activity becomes consciously goal-
directed rather than having only implicit objectives. From the point of view 
of network research, it becomes logically possible to assess the instrumental 
rationality ('effectiveness') of network activities, and to identify its core 
processes as those intended to attain those goals. This rationality manifests 
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itself in terms of activities that are transparent, ordered, formalised and 
systematic. Network structures can subsequently be analysed in terms of 
network membership (network 'nodes'), the links between them, and the 
co-ordinated activities which these links are used to conduct. The analysis 
which in this report has been conducted via qualitative case study analysis 
and social network analysis (SNA) of the four most often discussed elements 
of networks: patterns of links, resources, norms and dynamics (117,118). 
Empirically the strength of the link ('social tie', 'bond') between actors has 
been measured in a number of ways, including: the time actors engage with 
each other; the intensity of emotions between actors; the level of business 
between actors; and whether the actors interact through exchange, coercion 
or conflict (119). 
The two fundamental modes of network co-ordination are emergent and 
managed co-ordination. All functioning networks have the former. It occurs 
spontaneously by self-selection of roles based on an existing division of 
labour among network members so that overall network activity emerges as 
a resultant, but not necessarily one that any network member or members 
deliberately planned or effected. As in a market, deliberate local co-
ordination occurs but only an unintended post-facto global co-ordination. It 
is a de facto system of participative co-ordination shared among network 
members with no overall manager or controlling organisation (76). For the 
reasons outlined above, voluntary networks would be more likely to have 
relational, trust-based internal co-ordination and role-negotiation than 
mandated networks would. Walker et al. (120) and Pope and Lewis (121) 
identify the importance of brokers within the networks as key components 
of network effectiveness, reinforcing previous findings (122) about 
collaboration. 
Besides common goals, the negotiations which found a network may also 
lead to the creation of a co-ordinating structure, often referred to by a 
variety of terminology including the network 'centre' or 'core' (123), 'co-
ordinating body' or 'co-ordinator'. Managed co-ordination is the work 
undertaken by the central co-ordinating body that mediates the links 
between (other) network members. At its most complex, in health care 
relational co-ordination involves a unified, multi-agency organisation 
charged with providing all care for a patient group (124). Although co-
ordination activity is in addition to the network's core activity, the network's 
transaction costs are nevertheless lower than in a market or a hierarchy 
because when network participants' trust in each other's reputations, 
transactions can occur without contracts or bureaucratic controls (125). 
From the viewpoint of all the network members not just the co-ordinators, 
deliberate co-ordination (management) of network activity is intended to 
make the network more effective than would be the case if the network 
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relied only on emergent, participative co-ordination (76). Deliberate co-
ordination has this effect to the extent that it makes the core process: 
 Complete: all activities and links necessary for the core 
process are available, linked in the necessary sequence, obtain 
sufficient inputs by exploiting the resource 'infrastructure' possessed 
by each member ('node') (126) and have sufficient capacity to 
produce the required volume of intended outcomes (e.g. patient 
throughput). 
 Effective, i.e. based on valid science. External ties allow such 
knowledge to enter the network (112,113,127,128). Closure (129) 
or very dense or homogeneous network structures (130) prevent it. 
 Consistent: When a network operates two or more 
incompatible core processes they counteract each other to produce 
(at best) a policy 'mess' (131) or (at worst) 'gridlock' (132). Hence 
the co-ordinating structure requires a decision-making process for 
resolving any such conflicts. 
 Relevant to the network's objectives. A core process would be 
irrelevant to the network if it only worked effectively in another 
setting than the one to which the network now applies it (18,133). 
It is an entirely contingent, empirical question whether a given network's 
co-ordinating body actually achieves this 'deliberate' co-ordinative 
management or instead creates what Sparrowe et al.(134) describe as 
'hindrance networks'. 
 2.4.1  The co-ordinating body 
The selection of the central co-ordinating body, or of the person who acts as 
co-ordinator, can be by representation; ex officio; election; self-
appointment by a lead organisation which founded the network around 
itself; credentialisation; or creation by an external mandator for the specific 
purpose of network co-ordination, making it what Provan and Kenis (76) call 
'a unique network administrative organization (NAO)'. They hypothesise that 
as networks develop their governance will tend to shift from relatively 
participative, democratic, egalitarian forms to more centralised, brokered, 
formal governance. Thus, the co-ordinating body has an important 
moderating role in most network activity. 
In turn a central co-ordinating body is more likely to promote network 
effectiveness, and therefore develop, when the following conditions apply: 
 There is high interdependence amongst the network members 
in the core process. (Otherwise they would have little need to co-
ordinate their activities.) 
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 The core process is so extensive and complex that it is not 
spontaneously obvious to each network member what needs to be 
done and when. (Hence explicit, systematic co-ordination of their 
work is needed.) 
 Network members' goals are not fully compatible, making a 
decision-making system for resolving conflicts necessary. 
 Strong relationality has not yet arisen through repeated 
personal contact or been reinforced by the experience of rewarding 
collaboration. One would expect this condition to hold in newer and 
larger networks. 
 Monitoring the core process is difficult because it is not 
obvious whether the intended outcomes are achieved (e.g. the 
outcomes are complex, hard to measure, multi-dimensional, long 
term and confounded by factors external to the network). 
 Accountability to bodies outside the network is required. 
The more these conditions apply, the more likely it is that a network co-
ordinating body will be formed and the more elaborate it is likely to be (76). 
Thus the co-ordination of a network has two requirements. The co-
ordinating body applies a second-order, co-ordinating process to the core 
process; and it must have a set of links which give it a 'footprint' on the 
network's core process. The second-order co-ordination process has three 
essential stages: 
 Real-time monitoring about problems, gaps or deficiencies 
(compared with the networks' objectives) in the core process. 
 Decision-making across functional, organisational and 
professional boundaries with the collaborators taking collective 
responsibility for the output (Liedtka 1998) to resolving problems 
and disputes, and remove 'mess' (different network members 
simultaneously pursuing incompatible activities or objectives). 
Decisions and recommendations are intangible, made concrete only 
in such artefacts as documents and in the network's actions. 
 Implementation of the decisions. These artefacts have then to 
be transmitted into the core process and applied there, which often 
depends on member organisations' or departments' resources 
beyond its boundary, in the network's 'hinterlands'. 
Empirically little is yet known about precisely how co-ordination effects 
network performance (76). 
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Networks lack many of the levers of control usually found in hierarchical 
organisations (98) and in markets. Nevertheless a network co-ordinating 
body can changes members' behaviour by applying one or more of the 
following inducements for network members to implement the collective 
decisions: 
 Prudent reciprocity, achieved through help in kind. In some 
non-market settings reciprocation may only occur after a long, ill-
defined time and the condition or obligation is only tacit, not stated 
(as in the Russian customs of blat or lapa (135)). Another 
description of this governance mechanism is as the managerial 
creation and manipulation of contacts (136). A concomitant is to 
maintain good informal, social relationships among individual 
network members ('relationality'). 
 Allocation of resources or use of financial incentives. 
 Appeals to the shared values (normative assumptions) 
making up the network's macroculture (as distinct from the culture 
or 'microculture' of its member organisations (137-139)) including, 
especially in heterogeneous networks, appeals to non-instrumental 
values (86,140). Within networks whose member organizations have 
different cultures but pursue shared goals or tasks one might expect 
over time to observe a 'cultural blending' (141) into a network 
macro-culture; or, if the member- organisations' own cultures are 
more resilient, a 'cultural mosaic' (142). In the absence of a strong 
macroculture more shallow and transient, but nonetheless shared, 
normative assumptions about particular problems can also be 
created by negotiation between network members. 
 Technical persuasion and authority based upon scientific 
knowledge. In general, this is the activity of knowledge 
management. In health systems the main form of knowledge 
management is evidence-basing, concretely embodied in such 
artefacts as guidelines and formalised clinical pathways (143-146). 
 Governmentality through the monitoring of network activities 
and members' contribution to each. Governmentality rests upon the 
combination of transparency of information and a strong network 
culture. When each members' contribution, or lack of it, to the 
network's core activity is transparent to other network members, 
the network member is exposed to peer pressure or to the (real or 
imaginary) threat of intervention by some external body (147). 
 In commercial alliances, contracts and formal articles of 
agreement (juridical instruments). 
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By these means network co-ordinators can monitor, and if necessary 
correct, progress toward achieving the network's objectives. This is 
achieved less by power rather than by the appeal to the authority of the 
network and its co-ordinating structure. We also know from the literature 
that multiple governance mechanisms are likely to be more effective than a 
single mechanism (148,149) because they make the requisite practice more 
salient to those expected to apply it (150,151). 
 2.5  Layering 
Network links can be seen as conduits for the flow of inter-personal 
resources (126). The resources transmitted include real resources, above all 
transmitting intermediate products (work in progress) from one stage of the 
network's core productive process to the next (which in healthcare means 
making patient referrals); information, above all 'real-time' news about how 
network members are carrying out the core activity; knowledge about how 
to make the core process technically effective (or more so), for example by 
evidence-basing it; social, emotional and psychological support and 
friendship, most often through face-to-face contact (Kersner 1999); and 
money (grants, gifts, contracts or budgets). One can thus decompose a 
network into a number of different 'layers' of links. Each layer is 
differentiated by the kind of resources that it transmits. Links transmitting 
patients (referrals) would constitute one 'layer' of the network, the links 
transmitting information another layer, and so on. 
Two main types of 'layer' of links in clinical and professional networks are 
those which: 
 produce the outcomes (activities, artefacts) which the 
network's objectives state and constitute what we have called the 
'core process' of the network. Which specific types of resource-
transmitting link make up the core process will depend on what the 
network's objectives are and will therefore vary from network to 
network. We consider this point further below. 
 co-ordinate and motivate the activity of the network members 
who participate in the core process. These layers transmit (for 
instance) financial incentives; mutual help-in-kind; normative beliefs 
(network macro–culture); and monitoring information about the 
core process. 
Since the second group of layers is ancillary to the first (152) one would 
predict that the network layers through which the core process of a network 
are delivered will be denser than the other layers. 
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 2.6  Openness: external links 
For the transmission of knowledge from outside the network to within it to 
be a managed activity, the network co-ordinating body needs to have a 
number of external links and to maximise the effect of these links a network 
needs to either create or use relational co-ordinating structures. 
These external links take many shapes such as professional links and 
accountability to external mandators. They are of practical significance for a 
health network as: 
 sources of knowledge and innovation. Most networks have 
'structural holes' where links between members are relatively 
sparse. The few links which do bridge these structural holes are 
disproportionately important as routes by which the relatively 
separate 'partitions' or regions of the network acquire knowledge, 
innovation and other new resources (112,113). The same reasoning 
applies to links between a given network and the wider social fabric 
in which it is embedded. That implies that network members with 
more external links are more likely to display higher levels of 
innovation. Having more, and more fluid, external links, open 
voluntary networks are therefore likely to be more innovative than 
closed ('enclave') mandated networks. 
 potentially rival sources of authority or power over network 
members. In health systems professional bodies, in the sense of 
uni-professional networks promoting the interest of just one 
occupational group, are the most obvious potentially rival authority 
(111,153,154). 
 a medium for exercising external accountability and control, 
indeed governance, over a mandated network. 
Again, in the interest of effectiveness network members with external links 
would have also to possess the internal links by which to transmit to other 
network members the knowledge and other resources obtained through 
links outside the network. They would be mediators or 'brokers' between the 
external and the internal links. 
 2.7  Incentives 
The distinctive character of networks is often attributed to the incentives 
within them. The incentives – or rather, motivations – for network members 
are typically the prospect of help in kind, acquiring knowledge, maintaining 
good social relationships and realising wider values that the network 
members share (155). Not least among the latter is the motive of realising 
the network's founding objectives (76,156). These incentives differ from 
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market incentives in being asymmetrical and hence in relying heavily on 
trust and reciprocity over a long period (157-159). In contrast, market 
incentives are essentially financial. Typically a money payment is made and 
symmetrically the buyer soon receives in return 'real' goods or services to 
the same value. Within hierarchies, control over incentives is ultimately 
vested in the chief executive. A network map would show a 'hub-and-spoke' 
pattern of unidirectional links transmitting both instructions and payments 
from her to her subordinates (160,161). 
The more a network relies on a particular kind of incentive, the closer the 
structural match between the layer of links which transmits that incentive 
and the other layers of links in the network. 'Structural match' means that 
the layers would be similar in density, involve the same network members 
and exclude the same network members (who in network terminology would 
be 'isolates'). 
Depending on the circumstances, these resource dependencies may be 
satisfied by the networks members' own inputs and contributions to the 
network, but otherwise the network becomes dependent on external 
resources to undertake its work. Above all, the network may depend for 
these resources upon its boundary-spanner members mobilising them in the 
network's hinterlands. 
 2.8  Performance 
A network's 'performance' (or 'rationality', 'effectiveness' and similar 
normative terms) can be defined as its propensity to realise the jointly-
agreed goals on which the network was founded and which the network 
members pursue collaboratively (76,159). These goals may include 
externally-mandated targets and similar requirements, but need not. 
Voluntary networks have only internally-generated goals. Working back 
from these goals, health networks typically attempt to realise them in the 
following way. 
To realise the network objectives it is necessary to change the behaviour of 
certain key actors: in health networks, typically clinicians and health care 
commissioners (for health care objectives), or consumers, firms and 
government (for public health objectives). Whose behaviour and which 
behaviour changes it is necessary to change may, depending on the case, 
already be specified in epidemiological, clinical or organisational evidence, 
or be stipulated by any mandate the network is under. 
To produce these behavioural changes among the key actors, the network 
members collaboratively produce certain artefacts and distribute them to 
the key actors. Collaboratively producing the behavioural changes by means 
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of artefacts is the network's 'core process'. Goodwin et al. (62) call it 'joint 
production'. 
Depending on the circumstances network artefacts may include practical, 
symbolic or social artefacts. Practical artefacts directly produce the 
network's intended outcomes. Symbolic artefacts which physically represent 
the network's culture or values, for instance as logos or publications (162). 
By 'symbolic' we mean 'intended to legitimate the network either to its own 
members or to external audiences'. Social artefacts are the social 
interactions which networks involve and which serve members' non-rational 
needs (for example friendships) and irrational needs (163,164). They are 
sometimes what members most value about a network. One would expect 
voluntary networks to be more likely to serve such purposes than mandated 
networks. Writing of networks of local government agencies the 'Dutch 
School' (72,165-167) therefore advocate re-orienting policy evaluation away 
from 'goal achievement' towards network members' judgements on the 
processes and quality of interaction in the network (155). 
Network performance is thus the consequence either of the network 
producing the necessary final artefacts; or, if the network cannot do that 
directly, of its distributing to the actors who can, such intermediate artefacts 
as will enable and stimulate those key actors to do so. Either way, the more 
fully linked network members are, especially the member organisations 
which contain the key actors, the more likely is the network to perform as 
its members intended. But at the same time, a core process is more likely to 
be effective the fewer successive stages, hence the fewer links, it has. For 
each successive link is an opportunity for transmission to fail or for goal 
displacement to occur. Hence smaller, simpler core processes (e.g. 
providing a few narrowly-defined services) are more likely to work 
effectively than more complex or extensive ones (168). Local networks are 
more likely to do so than regional or national ones. Networks with direct 
links between the members conducting successive stages of the core 
process are more likely to succeed than those in which those members are 
only linked indirectly, for example via a central co-ordinating body. 
Southon et al. (169) identify six different functions which health networks 
may serve. It follows that each distinct function involves and requires a 
correspondingly distinct core process. We therefore next outline what their 
respective core processes are and how they differ (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Health network core technical processes 
Network type Core processes  
Care network Care pathway and its component clinical interventions.  
Professional network  Occupational closure, jurisdictional control, collective 
bargaining, 'capture' of official positions, professional 
discipline, credentialisation of workers and working practices, 
lobbying, sanctions through direct action.  
Project network.  Negotiation to ensure project members make their 
contribution in the correct sequences. Formal OM and similar 
project management techniques.  
Programme network  Negotiation to ensure relevant organisations' and individuals' 
comply with the model of care; obtain and allocate resources 
accordingly.  
Experience network  'Technologies' of self-care; user-operated care providers and 
pathways; lobbying; social marketing; sanctions through 
direct action.  
Interest network  Discussion; exchange of opinions, information.  
In a network's core process, the links between network members function 
as 'transfer devices' (170). What they transfer (their content) depends upon 
what products or 'artefacts' the network has to produce in order to achieve 
its goals (function). In turn, the nature of the artefacts to be produced 
determines what inputs and intermediate products therefore have to be 
transferred between network members (86). Table 3 shows the 
corresponding types of inputs (resources) and transmission link on which 
the core processes in Table 2 respectively rely. 
Table 3. Contents transmitted in health network core processes  
Network type Essential inputs and links 
Care network Patients; clinicians; referrals; physical inputs to care 
Professional network  Knowledge; Policy-context information; external 
dissemination of demands to power-holders; links between 
members of the same occupation  
Project network.  Real resources, finance, sequencing of physical tasks  
Programme network  Knowledge, real resources, finance  
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Experience network  Real resources, friendships  
Interest network  Knowledge, opinion, debate.  
Empirically the present study concerns care, project, programme and 
experience networks. 
 2.8.1  Care networks 
In brief, a care network provides co-ordinated care across multiple separate 
providers for a defined care group. Its core process is the care pathway 
which those patients or clients follow. A care network operates a given, 
established care pathway or model of care (or several of them). 
 2.8.2  Programme networks 
A programme network exists to replace an existing with another model of 
care (e.g. WHO 'vertical' programmes, English National Service 
Frameworks). Here, 'model of care' means both a set of clinical or other 
interventions (e.g. social work) and the organisational arrangements by 
which they are implemented. Nowadays new models of care are often 
specified, at least in part, as a care pathway and matched set of service and 
clinical quality standards, such as the English National Service Frameworks 
(NSFs). In any event, a programme network therefore acts as an 
implementation structure exercising governance over the providers (and 
perhaps other bodies) whom it is intended will implement the new model of 
care, accountable to the policy sponsors of the new model. A programme 
network's core process is therefore a negotiation between the programme 
sponsors and the other actors (above all, health care providers) who will 
implement it, and obtaining their agreement to undertake the necessary 
activities within their own organisations and to make any necessary 
resource or information transfers. This activity is liable to require ancillary 
inputs such as knowledge-management, promulgating the new model of 
care and any ancillary knowledge (e.g. clinical techniques, risk assessment) 
which it requires; information about the current epidemiological context (i.e. 
needs for health care), clinical and other therapeutic practice, referral 
patterns and criteria, patterns of user demand, uptake and compliance with 
both the existing and the new model of care; and whatever inputs are 
required for the new model of care itself. 
In quasi-markets the foregoing is accomplished primarily through the re-
commissioning of health care (and maybe other) providers. In the case the 
core process is to draft, negotiate agreement, obtain signature for, and 
execute contracts between healthcare commissioners and providers. 
Essentially this is a discursive, negotiative process whose concrete artefacts 
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are contracts and the supporting documentation. The inputs to this process 
are knowledge of the new model of care, information about existing 
services, their real-side and financial constraints, patient flows and the 
existing divisions of labour; and estimates of how far all these can or should 
be changed in the direction of the new model. Another way of accomplishing 
the foregoing change might be to reconstruct existing, or to set up new, 
care networks. 
 2.8.3  Project networks 
A project network has the purpose of implementing a defined change in the 
resources available to the member organisations. Typically these are 'real-
side' resources e.g. re-building, software upgrade, replacement of mains 
services etc. A project of these kinds does not necessarily imply any change 
in the model of care being delivered; what is being changed is the 
infrastructure through which a possibly stable model of care is provided. 
That model of care may or may not be subject to revision at the same time. 
The core process of a project network is therefore the sequencing and 
scheduling of the infrastructural changes, ensuring that new services are 
brought into operation as the old ones cease at each stage of infrastructure 
development. Unlike project and programme networks, a project typically 
has a pre-defined endpoint, time scale and cost. 
 2.8.4  Experience networks 
Of Southon's network types, the experience network most resembles a care 
network. For when the members of an experience network provide complex 
services for each other, they will have set up a care pathway. But the 
experience network's services differ from those in a care network because 
the people and organisations who operate the latter (practitioners, 
professionals, clinicians) provide care for other people (patients) than those 
who operate the care network. The experience network's members use their 
care pathway for self care, even self-treatment, although an experience 
network may also include carers or professionals supporting patients' self-
help activities. An experience network may (but need not) also undertake 
the same activities (campaigns, direct action etc.) as policy networks. 
In summary, network goals determine the core processes required to realise 
them. The content and sequence of links making up the core process is 
technically determined and so are the inputs required. Together these 
factors constrain the range of network structures that will allow the core 
process to be undertaken effectively (or at all). Our research questions 
focus upon elaborating, exploring and testing certain aspects of these 
approaches.  
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 3  Research aims and questions  
 3.1  Research aims 
The policy changes described above have provided in the English NHS a 
natural experiment in which to study the 'dynamic' effects of environmental 
'turbulence' upon professional and clinical networks, and the effects of 
network reconfiguration. Given the policy context, research context and 
analytic framework outlined above, the overarching aim of the present 
project was to explore how health networks collaboratively produce the 
policy outcomes that they do. That is: 
1. How the environment, structure and processes of professional and 
clinical networks influence each other and the networks' 
performance (policy outcomes). 
2. What policy environment and managerial activities appear likely to 
assist NHS professional and clinical networks in producing these 
outputs or benefits. 
3. Whether, and if so in what ways, network theory would have to be 
adapted to explain the characteristics of professional and clinical 
networks in such health systems as the NHS. 
 3.2  Research questions 
Changes in network membership and function (see above) early in the study 
period meant that the role of general practices shifted from being central to 
being marginal in all but two of the study networks (where they were 
marginal to begin with). We therefore re-interpreted RQs 3 and 6 of our 
original research questions, replacing references to general practices with 
'network member organisations' (which might still include general 
practices). For the same reason we reformulated RQ6 to remove the 
obsolete assumption that NHS clinical and professional networks are 
necessarily centred on a PCT. We have also changed the sequence of the 
research questions to match the logic of the analytic framework above. 
Otherwise the research questions remain those stated in the original 
proposal, based upon certain of those in the research brief. Our research 
questions were: 
RQ1: How do networks emerge as rational co-ordination structures? 
What determines the formation of both mandated and non-mandated 
networks? 
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RQ2: In mandated networks, what prior social networks pre-exist and 
how do they affect the operation of the new, mandated network? 
Does re-organising network structure disrupt or enhance network 
processes, or not affect them at all? How does the inclusion of 
additional occupational groups and other network members (e.g. 
users) affect performance? 
RQ3: What determines the way in which member organisations use 
relational co-ordination structures (or fail to)? What determines the 
effectiveness of member organisations' use of these structures? 
RQ4: What types of co-ordination processes mediate the above effects? 
RQ5: How do the different layers of network, dealing with different media 
or contents, co-exist and influence each other? 
RQ6: How are member organisations within a network tied to 
organisations outside it, how are these relationships structured, and 
what effect do these relationships have on how effectively member 
organisations use relational co-ordinating structures? 
RQ7: What effects are produced by incentives to cooperate (or not to)? 
What match is there between incentives and network structures? In 
NHS networks for example, how will the shifts to practice based 
commissioning and payment by results affect network processes? 
RQ8: What determines the performance of mandated and non-mandated 
network structures, and are there systematic differences in the 
performance of the two kinds? 
Network performance, in the sense of impacts on services and service 
management is considered under RQ8 (rather than RQ3). We took RQ8(a) 
as a general question about what the determinants of network performance 
are (taking both mandated and non-mandated networks together), and 
RQ8(b) as contrasting mandated and voluntary networks in those terms. We 
interpreted the normative terms 'effective', 'perform' and 'succeed' in two 
ways. One was in terms of what artefacts the networks produced. The other 
was in terms of impacts on referral rates for conditions where referrals are 
known to be sensitive to the level of primary-secondary co-ordination. 
 3.3  Supplementary hypotheses 
In elaborating our research proposal and analytic framework we developed 
a number of more specific hypotheses which operationalise parts of the 
above questions in a more precise, testable way. Matching them to the 
above research questions, we now list these supplementary hypotheses. 
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 3.3.1  RQ1: Network Origins 
H1A: Voluntary networks have an occupationally more diverse 
membership than mandated networks. 
H1B: Networks emerge in pursuit of common policy goals. 
H1C: Non-mandated networks are created as by-product of other, de 
facto relationships and organisational structures as the (future) 
network members pursue shared interests using a shared 'technology'. 
H1D: Voluntary networks' processes are more likely that those in 
mandated networks to emerge to serve non-rational and irrational 
needs (163,164). 
H1E: Mandated networks are created by one or more of: 
1. legal requirement for practice, hence collective agreement 
between profession and state; 
2. 'closed shop' or cartel; or by managerial direction. 
 3.3.2  RQ2: Mandated networks 
H2A: Mandated networks include involuntary members. 
H2B: Mandated networks are 'enclaves' in the sense of having a 
formally defined and closed membership. Voluntary networks have 
fluid membership, mandated ones more stable membership. 
H2C: Mandated networks are structurally uniform (within their 
economic sector). 
H2D: Prior voluntary networks persist within subsequently-mandated 
networks. 
H2E: Mandated networks are more comprehensively and 
systematically managed across the whole network than are voluntary 
networks. 
 3.3.3  RQ3: Participation in and use of networks 
H3A: Network node (individuals, organisations) connectedness will 
correlate with innovation-related activity. 
H3B: Organisations whose internal culture is more favourable to 
collaboration will have more extensive (and denser) network links. 
H3C: Service user involvement in voluntary networks will be more 
extensive but uneven that in mandated networks. 
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 3.3.4  RQ4: Co-ordination 
H4A: In mandated networks, the co-ordinating body will: 
1. have the highest brokerage score in the network 
and; 
2. be the topmost member of any hierarchical relationships 
present. 
H4B: Mandated networks, compared with voluntary networks, will: 
1. be more 'hierarchical' 
2. be lower in density 
3. have flows of resources mainly from the co-ordinating body 
to the other network members. 
4. have relatively consistent separation. (All members relate 
directly to the co-ordinating body, and to each other mainly 
via the co-ordinating body.) 
H4C: Voluntary networks will have more relational, trust-based 
internal co-ordination and roles than mandated networks do. 
H4D: Voluntary networks have negotiated allocation of roles. 
H4E: Voluntary networks deal with conflicts by exit, mandated ones by 
negotiation and voice. 
H4F: Mandated networks show uniform and formal organisational 
processes and flows than voluntary networks do. 
 3.3.5  RQ5: Layering 
SH11: Network layers through which the core process of a network are 
delivered will be denser than the other layers. 
 3.3.6  RQ6: External links 
H6A: (Alternative hypotheses) Individuals with greater local, regional 
and national links outside the study network will have 
1. more extensive links within the network (because they obtain 
resources from outside the network to share within the network). 
Alternative hypothesis: 
2. fewer links within the network because non-network links 
substitute for the network. 
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H6B: More strongly professionalised occupations are more likely than 
other professions to have contacts outside the network. 
H6C: Each profession is more likely to have contacts outside the 
network with fellow-professionals than members of other professions. 
H6D: Networks with more external links report higher level of 
innovation-related activity. 
H6E: Providers with more external links will have better outcomes (in 
terms of admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination). 
 3.3.7  RQ7: Incentives 
The above hypotheses H4C on co-ordination (RQ4) and H5A on network 
layers (RQ5) also operationalise this research question. 
 3.3.8  RQ8: Performance 
H8A: Network nodes (individuals, organisations) with more extensive 
network links will have lower rates of growth of admissions for 
conditions where admissions are preventable by strong primary-
secondary care collaboration. 
H8B: Simpler networks with fewer interfaces are more likely to succeed 
(in the above terms) than complex ones. 
H8C: Outcomes should be best (in the above terms) when each 
member organisation relies on a few strong relations for most of care 
delivery whilst a few weak ties are maintained for information search. 
H8D: Teaching hospitals will report better outcomes in terms of 
admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination. 
H8E: Organisations with an internal culture which more strongly 
favours collaboration will report better outcomes in terms of 
admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination. 
H8F: Organisations with high levels of innovation-related activity will 
report better outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by primary-
secondary co-ordination. 
H8G: Organisations which are more central to the network will report 
better outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by primary-
secondary co-ordination. 
H8H: Mandated networks show swift, relatively uniform implementation 
of mandated policy and activities in the short term, but these outcomes 
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will be more limited (narrower in range) than in non-mandated 
networks. 
H8I: Voluntary networks' processes are more likely than mandated 
networks to produce symbolic artefacts and function as social networks 
(besides pursuing their stated practical goals) 
H8J: Voluntary networks show more flexibility and openness to 
innovation (both organisational and technical), especially to 
innovations invented or promoted by grass-roots enthusiasts or 
introduced by boundary-spanners across structural holes (113). 
Whilst we operationalised our research questions in terms of these 
hypotheses, it is in the nature of hypotheses that they are liable to be 
refuted. We therefore did not limit our interpretation of the research 
questions to those terms but remained open to the idea that (other) 
emerging findings might as the study progressed lead us to understand the 
research questions in other terms besides those stated above. This brings 
us to the research methods.  
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 4  Methods  
 4.1  Design 
The analytical framework was assembled from published research findings 
or, where these had gaps for present purposes, by a priori reasoning. Our 
main sources of published research were peer-reviewed studies on 
networks, especially health networks, published after 2003, the date of data 
collection for the SDO-funded review of that literature (62). These studies 
were found by searching the ASSIA and ABI-Inform data bases by keyword, 
by hand-searching journals such as Administrative Science Quarterly and 
the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory which publish 
relatively large numbers of high-quality studies on networks, and by 
searching by names of authors (cited above) known to have published 
relevant research. From these sources we snowballed to others. The 
architecture of the explanatory framework follows the research questions 
stipulated in the original calls for research proposal. 
Given these research questions, the corresponding hypotheses and the 
explanatory model which both elaborated, the strongest available study 
design was a systematic, mixed-methods comparison of networks. The 
comparisons combined data from longitudinal case studies with, for most 
research questions, 'quasi-quantifications' of network structure by means of 
social network analyses (SNA), as Corviello (2006) recommends. Using a 
set of seven main study networks, the research design was to make 
comparisons: 
 1. between whole networks. 
 2. within each network, between: 
(a) different 'layers' of links, contrasting links for direct patient care, 
for patient care organisation and for administration, links mediated 
by help in kind and those mediated by money. 
(b) members (nodes), taken as instantiating organisations and 
occupational groups 
Contrasts between study networks (or layers or nodes within them) were 
used to explore how differences in network origin, function, structure, 
performance and development might be causally related. Similarities 
between the study networks were the basis for the induction of common 
patterns of causal relationships across all the study networks. Common 
analytic frameworks were applied to all the study sites (171), making the 
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comparisons systematic. Findings from the comparisons were used to revise 
the analytical framework as unexpected patterns or findings emerged (172). 
Research question by research question, Table 4 overviews the resulting 
research design. 
Table 4. Contents transmitted in health network core processes  
RQ Research Design 
1a. How do networks emerge 
as rational co-ordination 
structures?  
1b. What determines the 
formation of both mandated 
and non-mandated networks?  
2a. In mandated networks, 
what prior social networks pre-
exist and how do they affect 
the operation of the new, 
mandated network?  
2b. Does re-organising network 
structure disrupt or enhance 
network processes, or not 
affect them at all?  
Induct patterns across longitudinal case 
studies of network emergence, formation, 
re-organisation and transition from voluntary 
to mandated status.  
2c. How does the inclusion of 
(i) additional occupational 
groups and 
(ii) other network members (e.g. 
users) affect performance?  
 1. Compare longitudinal case studies of: 
(a) networks serving different care groups, 
hence involving different occupations. 
(b) patterns of user-involvement. 
 2. Compare activities and artefacts of user-
controlled and professionally-controlled 
networks.  
3a. What determines the way 
in which member organisations 
use relational co-ordination 
structures ?  
3b. What determines the 
effectiveness of member 
organisations' use of these 
structures?  
 1. Induct patterns from longitudinal case 
studies of how network members structure 
and use co-ordination links and activities 
 2. Cross-sectional test of association between 
characteristics of member organisations' 
network position (described using SNA) and 
(a) innovation-related activities 
(b) culture in member organisations 
(c) changes in referral patterns (see RQ8)  
4. What types of co-ordination 
activities mediate the above 
effects?  
 1. Induct patterns of co-ordination across 
longitudinal case studies. 
 2. Social network analysis to test for presence 
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/ absence of 'hierarchical' relationships 
within networks, degree of centralisation of 
networks.  
5. How do the different layers 
of network, dealing with 
different media or contents, co-
exist and influence each other?  
 1. Compare social network analyses of 
different layers within each network. 
 2. Induct patterns from qualitative accounts 
of interactions between layers each 
network. 
 3. From (1) and (2) induct patterns across 
networks. 
6a. How are member 
organisations within a PCT-
centred network tied to 
organisations outside it, how 
are these relationships 
structured?  
1. SNA-based comparison of network 
members' links inside the network with 
their links with bodies outside their 
network. 
2. Cross-sectional analysis by occupation of 
network members' external links.  
6b. What effect do these 
relationships have on how 
effectively member 
organisations use relational co-
ordinating structures?  
Cross-sectional test of the associations 
between members' links outside the network 
and innovation-related activity.  
7a. What effects are produced 
by incentives to cooperate (or 
not to)?  
7b. What match is there 
between incentives and 
network structures?  
1. Compare SNA of financial and of non-
financial layers of links in each network. 
2. Induct patterns across longitudinal case 
studies of network members' self-reported 
motives for network participation.  
7c. In NHS networks, how will 
the shifts to practice based 
commissioning and payment by 
results affect network 
processes?  
Induct patterns of networks' and their members' 
responses to the development of PBC and PBR.  
8a. What determines the 
performance of mandated and 
non-mandated network 
structures? 
8b Are there systematic 
differences in the performance 
of mandated and non-
mandated structures?  
1. Cross-sectional comparison across neworks 
of core activities and artefacts produced 
2. Cross-sectional test of association between 
network connectivity of each member 
organisation (described using SNA) and 
changes in referrals sensitive to primary-
secondary care collaboration.  
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 4.2  Sampling 
 4.2.1  Sampling strategy 
The logic of our sampling strategy was to select networks which contrasted 
in terms of their membership, core process and co-ordination mechanisms. 
At the outset of the research we assumed that variations in these 
characteristics would reflect, above all, the care groups of interest to the 
networks. At individual informant level, the sampling strategy was to select 
individuals who played contrasted roles in the key process of each network 
and in its co-ordination, and who brought different professional backgrounds 
(goals and knowledge) to network co-ordination and core process. Our 
research questions, research design and sampling logic therefore required 
selecting networks which differed by: 
 1. Voluntary versus mandated status (RQs 1,2,8). 
 2. Membership (RQs 2b,2c,3,6). 
 3. Coexisting with versus not coexisting with client-based 
commissioning (RQ7c). 
 4. Function, in terms of: 
(a) Acute, medicalised care versus more socially-oriented care 
(RQs 1,2,3). 
(b) the Southon et al. typology (see chapter 2) (RQ1a) 
We therefore made a theoretically driven sample of networks seeking 
maximum variety in terms of the above criteria listed. If the contrast could 
empirically be found post facto, a comparison of 'successful' and 
'unsuccessful' networks would also contribute to answering RQs 3b and 8a. 
To satisfy sampling criterion (4a) above we selected cardiac heart disease 
(CHD) networks as representing relatively acute and heavily medicalised 
care. The evidence base for the commonest varieties of CHD is relatively 
well developed and treatment (as opposed to prevention) is largely 
medicalised. To represent more socially-oriented care we initially selected 
networks of services for children with long-term health problems as defined 
by Stein et al. (173) because they require high levels of networking 
between carers, particularly health, social care and education. Families with 
disabled children deal with many different professionals (174), a situation 
which the 'key worker' policy is intended to remedy. In the course of 
identifying children's networks it became evident that children with 
disabilities severe enough to require long-term service provision by network 
are a difficult care group to define. At the level of a PCT of the size found in 
early 2006 (population c.250,000) a clinically unambiguously defined care 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         59 
group of that kind (e.g. children with moderate to serious neurological 
impairment) would be too small for patterns of networked relationships (as 
opposed to a set of disparate one-off care packages) to emerge. We 
therefore redefined our second study group of networks as those providing 
services for children with complex, chronic health problems. Our sample 
thus contained three CHD networks and three children's services networks. 
Beyond this point the exigencies of NHS reform constrained our sampling 
strategy. Our research proposal envisaged comparing mandated and non-
mandated CHD networks, and similarly for children's service networks. For 
children's services networks this was still feasible in 2006 and we 
accomplished it. However the flow of NHS policy mandates described above 
removed the variation between mandated and non-mandated status for 
CHD networks (and increasingly for most other types of NHS network). The 
voluntary CHD network which we had planned to study was absorbed into a 
larger, mandated CHD network. These conditions prevented a mandated-
versus-voluntary comparison between CHD networks. Variety between 
mandated and voluntary networks in our sample was thus limited to 
children's services networks, of which we selected one voluntary and two 
mandated sites, the latter pair contrasting a programme (and former care) 
with a project network. 
Whilst searching for study sites we discovered a user-experience network 
(Self-Care Network) in the course of formation. Sampling this site offered 
opportunity to compare this network with the others in terms of age (Self-
Care Network was at an earlier stage of formation than we could observe 
elsewhere); membership (individual patients and their voluntary 
organisations versus networks mainly of statutory organisations); and 
function (Self-Care Network was a user-experience network). 
Our eventual sample of seven networks was therefore: 
 one care network for NHS children's services networks, initially a 
a voluntary care network and at the end the study a programme 
network. 
 one programme network for children's services networks, 
mandated throughout the study period (though previously a care 
network) 
 one project network for children's services, mandated. 
 three NHS CHD networks, all mandated programme networks by 
the end of the study period but all having originated as voluntary 
care networks, either as or nested within CHD collaboratives. 
 one voluntary network for physical health promotion 
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Two sites for piloting data collection instruments were selected by 
convenience. Our eventual sample of study sites allowed comparison by: 
function; care group; mandate; membership; size; and, for CHD networks, 
effectiveness. 
Within each network we made a qualitatively representative purposive 
sample of informants to include at least one from each main agency in the 
network (NHS trust, social services department, charity etc.); and at least 
one from each of the professions represented in each network. We 
particularly sought the 'boundary spanners' in each agency to interview 
where possible. In every case we included the network co-ordinator(s) and, 
where relevant, the clinical leads for the participating NHS trusts 
(cardiologists in the CHD networks; most often nurses and psychologists in 
the children's services networks). The interviewees included were managers 
(35 including network, commissioner and provider-service managers), 
patients (21) and consultants (13). The remainder covered a range of 
occupations including nurses (including midwives and health visitors), 
psychologists, social workers and GPs. 
It soon became clear (see chapter 7) that it would be difficult to define 
network membership. We adopted the definition: 
Confirmed report: members are those who are described as such by two or more other 
network members. 
because this definition offered reliability, was replicable, verifiable and 
practically straightforward to apply. To get data collection started, one has 
to make an initial assumption by identifying at least three putative network 
members and then snowball from them until saturation (no new members 
are identified by two or more already-confirmed members). Since it is 
reasonable to assume that the network co-ordinators are members we 
started the snowballing from them, and this method enables one to check if 
the original three are subsequently confirmed as members by at least two 
others. To gather data for social network analysis we sent a questionnaire 
(see below) to all the listed network members. Being a census, the survey 
involved no sampling strategy. 
 4.2.2  Study site selection and access 
Following an initial review of government, NHS and voluntary bodies' (e.g. 
British Heart Foundation, SCOPE, Carers UK) websites, and the combined 
NHS organisations with which the researchers and their institutes had 
existing research relationships, we identified seven study sites to satisfy the 
above sampling strategy. 
Despite positive meetings with the network's lead cardiologist and steering 
group one of the CHD networks decided in January 2007 that they would 
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not participate in the study. The reasons stated to us were resourcing and 
structural changes; uncertainty about the future of the network and 
overload on the part of the four consultant cardiologist members. In two 
more sites, despite a favourable reception of the project, the re-structuring 
of PCTs and then networks prevented access for much of the period required 
for this study. Since we could not access the first study site for fieldwork 
anyway and were told that in the other two restructuring and its after-
effects would continue at least until the project was 15 months old, we 
replaced these three sites. 
Nevertheless the effort and time expended there were not entirely wasted. 
Our attempts to access all three provided data about the effects of NHS re-
structuring processes upon networks. Initial negotiations and set-up 
meetings provided introductory historical data about the networks. In one 
case (CHD pilot site) this documentation was so extensive as to provide 
data which we have included (separately identified) in our findings as 
supplementary evidence. 
Replacing the above three sites we arrived at the following set of study 
sites, each of which we have pseudonymised. The appended case vignettes 
describe them more fully, but their characteristics for sampling purposes 
were: 
A) Child Mental Health Network: A care network voluntarily founded by 
clinicians and managers to co-ordinate services for children under 5 
with mental health care needs and their families; transition from care 
to commissioning support network in the spring of 2008. 
B) Children's Hospital Project Network: Project network charged with 
re-profiling children's hospital services in a large conurbation, including 
services for children long-term complex conditions. 
C) City Children's Network: Originally a care network based on Sure 
Start projects but early in the study period this site became a 
Children's and Young Persons (CYP) Trust, a mandated strategic 
partnership (programme) network for children's and young persons' 
services. 
D) Small CHD Network: Initially a PCT-based CHD care network which 
during late 2007 and early 2008 merged and was transformed under 
mandate into a commissioning support (programme) network. 
E) Regional CHD Network: Originated from two sub-regional care 
networks based on earlier CHD collaboratives. Mergers and reforms of 
these networks, local level networks and the corresponding PCTs took 
from early 2007 to mid 2008, creating a mandated programme 
network (commissioning support). 
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F) Urban CHD Network: Originated as a care network based on CHD 
collaboratives but early in the study period this site became a 
mandated CHD commissioning support (programme) network. 
G) Self-Care Network: User-experience voluntary network for health 
promotion for people with long-term mental health problems., 
established just at the start of the study. 
The CHD network which refused access for fieldwork, but about which other 
data are available, is designated 'CHD pilot site'. The NHS study networks 
served predominantly urban populations ranging in size from 250,000 
(Small CHD Network) to 4 million (City Children's Network). Self-Care 
Network was active in several adjoining suburbs whose combined population 
was approximately 60,000. The sites were geographically distributed across 
south west, south east, midland and north west England. 
Table 5 gives figures for individual memberships at the study sites, counted 
from the latest mailing-list which the study sites supplied to us. Except for 
Small CHD Network whose figures are for 2007, the figures describe 
individual membership in the second half of 2008. The three CHD networks 
had consistently the highest proportion of clinicians, particularly doctor 
(mostly consultant cardiologist) members. The project network for children's 
services (Children's Hospital Project Network) also followed this pattern. At 
the opposite pole, with a substantial minority of local government members 
were the two networks for children's services, one programme (City 
Children's Network) and one care network (Child Mental Health Network). In 
the right-hand column the 'Others' category were predominantly from the 
third sector. Except for Self-Care Network there were few user-members or 
none. 
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Table 5. Study networks: individual members  
Network  Members 
(N) (Total) 
Of whom, NHS 
  Managers 
N  
Doctors 
N 
Others 
N  
Local 
Authority 
N  
Users 
N  
Others 
N  
Child Mental 
Health 
Network 
133 6 8 50 51 0 18 
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
58 17 24 14 3 0 0 
City 
Children's 
Network 
61 26 2 2 30 0 1 
Small CHD 
Network 
18 7 9 2 0 0 0 
Regional 
CHD Network 
47 25 21 1 0 0 0 
Urban CHD 
Network 
118 43 43 20 0 2 10 
Self-Care 
Network 
13 0 1 1 0 10 1 
The doctors included hospital consultants (the largest contingent) but also 
public health doctors and GPs. 'NHS Others' were mainly nurses but also 
some other clinicians such as psychologists and ambulance staff. Non-NHS 
'Others' includes those whose occupation was unknown to us, but the 18 in 
Child Mental Health Network were mainly from third sector organisations. 
Because of the change in NHS networks' role and function, and the marginal 
role of general practices even in the one NHS network that remained a care 
network through nearly all the study period, general practices were only 
exceptionally named as network member organisations. 
 4.3  Data collection 
In each site the same sequence and methods of data collection were 
followed: 
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(a) Initial semi-structured interview with network co-ordinator. 
(b) Semi-structured interviews with other informants; attendance 
at network meetings; 'grey' document collection (e.g. external 
consultants' reports). 
(c) The network co-ordinator provided a list of network members 
and identified up to five of them who were best informed to 
corroborate or correct the list. We then invited these additional 
informants to verify or correct the list. All and only the names 
verified by at least two informants formed the confirmed network 
membership list. Because of the instability of individual (as opposed 
to organisational) network membership we kept records of who had 
left the networks and who had joined. By means of correcting 
membership list 'inflation' (see below) the researchers soon had for 
several networks a more complete, up-to-date list of network 
members than the network co-ordinators did. Assembling a 
membership list took between less than one month (in one site) and 
over a year (in a network which was repeatedly re-organised). 
Regional CHD Network produced its list only whilst we were writing 
this report. 
(d) Survey by questionnaire of those listed. 
(e) Data entry, cleaning and analysis. 
Stage (b) was repeated towards the end of the project, but without 
repeating all the interviews in full. Rather, we updated our knowledge of the 
network first of all with the network co-ordinator then made further 
interviews with any interviewees whose role had been added, or been 
played an important role in developing the network, since the start of 
fieldwork. In Regional CHD Network the de facto network co-ordinator had 
been replaced twice over since the start of fieldwork. Once a long-term co-
ordinator had been appointed (during the last 9 months of the study) this 
network began to recover quite quickly and so we repeated document 
collection and some interviews there. 
The aforementioned changes in the role and membership of NHS clinical and 
professional networks necessitated the research design modifications 
described above, and the latter changed in turn our data collection 
requirements in two ways. Case study target interviewee lists were adapted 
accordingly. Because the role of general practice in the networks had 
dwindled it became irrelevant to the study network outcomes to collect 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) or general practice survey data: or 
to examine clients' general practice medical records. 
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 4.3.1  Case study data 
Case study data were collected by mixed methods, predominantly key 
informant interviews, supplemented with content-analyses of documents 
collected from official websites, documents which informants had indicated 
were seminal, and field-notes made in an 'observer-as-participant' role 
(175) at meetings. We supplemented these sources with ad hoc enquiries 
by telephone or e-mail. 'Third party' accounts (published research and re-
using data from other SDO projects) were included but first-hand accounts 
gave privileged knowledge of network members' motives, reasons and 
assumptions in participation in the networks. 
Interviews with individual network members used a semi-structured 
schedule whose categories were derived from the theoretical schema 
outlined above. It included open questions. We piloted the interview 
schedules in a PCT which did not subsequently become a study site (see 
above), testing it on two PCT managers (generalist and public health) and a 
general practice manager. As a result we made some minor revisions. The 
resulting interview schedule is in appendix 5. Case study data collection was 
iterative (176) not only in a chronological sense, but also because a 
common core interview schedule was re-adjusted before each interview. The 
researcher selected which themes the prospective interviewee would be best 
placed to answer, tending as we became better informed about each site to 
supplement the selected general questions with more specific sub-questions 
or probes so as to elaborate or check emerging themes and findings. 
The study networks and their member organisations varied considerably in 
size from site to site, and so therefore did the numbers of individual 
members which ranged from 13 (Self-Care Network) to 133 (Child Mental 
Health Network). Numbers of member organisations and departments 
ranged from 3 (Self-Care Network) to 46 (Child Mental Health Network). In 
all we interviewed 130 individuals between them covering 48 (out of 96) 
member organisations. Interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed, the 
data cleaned and anonymised. Informants were offered the opportunity to 
see and if necessary correct their transcript but few did. Follow-up 
interviews were conducted by telephone. 
Re-organisations of the study networks prevented site access during certain 
periods (see below), preventing us tracking patient experience of 
longitudinal continuity of care prospectively for three years. The best 
available substitute was to record this experience retrospectively, which we 
did by selecting patients with at least three years' experience (or vicarious 
experience, in the case of parents) of services which the networks co-
ordinated. Members of the seventh network, who were people with long-
term mental health problems, preferred to discuss their healthcare 
experiences collectively so there we collected data on patient experience by 
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way of three focus groups. We also ran focus groups in two other networks 
(Child Mental Health Network and Urban CHD Network). For each focus 
group a cut down version of the interview schedule was used as topic guide. 
All client data were collected face-to-face. 
In one site where we had received conflicting accounts of network activity, 
and in the user-experience network, we sent the co-ordinator an outline 
case study for factual verification or correction. In the former site, this 
elicited the supply of further documentary data. In all sites, we minimised 
the potential distortions which can arise in analysing qualitative case study 
data by following the requirements for qualitative research of credibility 
(check with respondents), transferability, dependability (data stability, 
reliability) and confirmability (audit trail) (177). 
By these means we collected mainly qualitative data on network origins, 
membership, structure, processes and the artefacts the networks produced. 
We collected data about about 'official', 'on paper' ties between agencies, 
whether or not any networking actually took place, and how the member 
organisations acted through, or reacted to, the network. The case histories 
included narratives of the events involved in attempts to co-ordinate a 
network: how problems or tasks for the co-ordinators to deal with were 
conveyed to the co-ordinators, what happened as a result, and with what 
consequences for the core process. Service outcomes were recorded as 
qualitative 'snapshots', describing how the network co-ordinating body 
operated or changed the network's core process and, insofar as data were 
available, services for patients. 
Using the theoretical framework we constructed a data grid (Appendix 2) 
into which the case study data were collated. The data grid indicated the 
minimum data set to collect for each site and provided a way to check that 
at least the minimum necessary data were collected. It was a means of 
combining qualitative and survey data, and of exposing any apparent 
contradictions which necessitated triangulation or further data collection. 
The attempt to populate the grid also revealed where is was necessary to 
supplement the data grid with new categories to accommodate unforeseen 
empirical findings. From the populated data grids case studies were 
constructed. 
 4.3.2  Survey for social network analysis 
Data for the social network analyses and to supplement the case studies 
were collected by questionnaire. Drawing upon instruments previously field-
tested in US and UK studies (68,146,178,179) we assembled a structured 
questionnaire (appendix 6), administered on-line but with postal back-up. 
We pilot-tested this questionnaire and the subsequent data entry and 
analysis, with a small (N=11) network of professionals of mixed 
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occupational background and employers (NHS, academic, third-sector) 
working with patients with brain injury in one PCT. This pilot test established 
that the grid could produce data of the kind required and was practical to 
complete. However the categories 'high/medium/low connectivity' proved 
difficult to interpret reliably so we replaced them with yes/no questions 
about whether links existed and devised the concept of 'depth' of connection 
(explained below) to replace 'high/medium/low' connectivity. 
The pilot data were then used to test three specialised network mapping 
software programmes, Visone, Pajek and Ucinet (180). We selected Ucinet 
because it allows multiple analytic techniques, and gives clear output and 
presentational options. 
Initially questionnaires were distributed by on-line data collection using a 
web-based survey system (LimeSurvey), chosen because it is tested, secure 
and as an open-source system its internal workings are transparent. We 
sent postal questionnaires for network members for whom we had no e-mail 
address or who took up the option of returning a hard copy by post. 
Although a response rate of 100% is not strictly required for valid social 
network analysis (181) our first experience in a study PCT suggested it 
would be difficult to achieve our desired response rates of ≥75%. 'Bounced' 
e-mail messages soon revealed that many of the putative members' 
electronic addresses were non-existent, yielding either automated 'not 
found' or 'out-of-office' replies, or messages saying that the alleged member 
had left that job. Other addressees denied they were network members. 
(Our questionnaire asked them nevertheless to state why they thought 
that.) To borrow a phrase from waiting list management, membership lists 
were inflated. Only in the voluntary network did we encounter the opposite. 
That network from time to time produced new members who we had 
previously been unaware of. Table 6 shows membership list inflation for the 
six NHS networks. 
Table 6. Inflation of network membership lists  
Site (1) Initial 
list (N) 
(2) Bounced 
or obsolete 
(N) 
(3) Denials 
(N)  
Deflated list 
(N = (1)-
(2)-(3)) 
Child Mental Health 
Network 
133 15 3 115 
Children's Hospital 
Project Network 
58 15 2 41 
City Children's Network 135 10 13 112 
Small CHD Network 18 1 2 15 
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Regional CHD Network 47 NA NA NA 
Urban CHD Network 115 12 13 90 
We followed up non-responders by sending a postal questionnaire and up to 
two e-mail, postal or telephone reminders. When the intended respondent 
was either the sole representative of a member organisation or an individual 
not affiliated to any member organisation, we also offered a telephone 
interview or face-to-face interview to complete the questionnaire. 
Ignoring Regional CHD Network which was in the throes of re-structuring 
and lacking a co-ordinator for long periods, at the level of individual network 
members the response rate was 31% of the individual members (38% of 
the deflated lists) but these responses represented 50% of the departments 
and organisations which were network members (Table 7). Across sites, 
response rates were uneven. 
Table 7. Survey response rates  
Network  Individuals; 
Responses / 
Membership N (%) 
Co-ordinating 
Body: Responses 
/ Membership N 
(%) 
Organisations: 
Responses / 
Membership N (%) 
Child Mental Health 
Network 
42/133 (32%) 10/17 (59%)  26/33 (79%)  
Children's Hospital 
Project Network 
37/58 (64%) 5/23 (22%)  23/23 (100%) 
City Children's 
Network 
8/135 (6%)  1/13 (8%) 6/32 (19%) 
Small CHD Network 5/18 (27%)  5/18 (27%) 6/7 (86%)  
Regional CHD 
Network 
NA/57  NA/13 NA/21  
Urban CHD Network 39/118 (33%) 8/34 (24%)  13/17 (76%) 
Self-Care Network 12/13 (92%)  12/13 (92%)  3/3 (100%)  
Overall 143/462 (31%)  40/105 (38%) 48/96 (50%)  
When non-responders excused themselves without denying network 
membership, it was always to say they were too busy to respond. A further 
reason for the tiny response rate in City Children's Network is known. 
Although the network co-ordinators had written to network members 
explaining and endorsing the survey and asking them to complete it, one 
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local authority assistant director made the following 'reply to all' response to 
her electronic questionnaire: 
Before anyone responds to this request we need to know some facts. Who commissioned 
the research. Has it been through an ethics process. What will be done with the results. 
Can I advise recipients that we await authentication before responding. 
Later she acknowledged: 
Your reply was comprehensive and clearly you have the support of key chief officers in 
[city] I am sure given that information people will be happy to participate in the survey. 
but by then the damage was done. Subsequently interviewees mentioned 
that they had deleted the questionnaire because of the AD's earlier e-mail. 
Regional CHD Network was the one where the long managerial hiatus 
disrupted data collection. 
For five of the study networks we therefore had sufficient data for a social 
network analysis at inter-organisation level. We transferred the 
questionnaire data for each question about links between network members 
into a N*N (square) matrix. Because response rates were below 100% we 
symmetrised cells where data were missing for one participant in a 
theoretically possible network link. That is, if person X reported contact with 
person Y, we assumed that this meant Y was in contact with X. For the 
small remainder of theoretically possible links where neither party had 
responded, we set a default value of zero (i.e. no link) on the assumption 
that non-response to a survey officially endorsed by the network co-
ordinators was in itself weak prima facie evidence of weak or no network 
involvement. An opposite problem was where we had more than one 
response from a given organisation. To consolidate these individual-level 
data into an organisational-level response we combined all links reported to 
make the superset of linkages reported by all respondents for that 
organisation. This method tended to make the sites with the greatest 
number of individual participants appear to have correspondingly large 
numbers of external links, reflecting the presumption that these sites were 
especially active in the network. Also, if we were to make any subsequent 
normative judgements, for example any critical comments about network 
completeness and function, it would only be fair to judge the network or 
organisation at its strongest i.e. assuming greatest density of links. 
By these methods we produced one square matrix for each of five 'layers' 
(money; help-in-kind; direct patient care: patient care organisation; general 
administration) within each of five networks. 
From the ten survey fields about participation in innovations, we assembled 
a score (one point for each activity ticked). To test whether organisations 
whose internal culture is more favourable to collaboration will also have 
more extensive network links (H3B), we constructed a culture score for each 
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informant, a mean score summarising their agreement or disagreement with 
such statements as 'I feel comfortable checking with other members of my 
profession about …' and 'Doctors in my organisation do not fully value my 
skills and talents.' We assumed that these culture scores for each individual 
be regarded as evidence of the quality of that individual respondent's 
linkage with her or his organisational hinterland. To measure the balance 
between a member organisation's links outside and links inside its networks, 
we calculated its 'External-Internal' (E-I) index score. H6 concerned the 
occupational character of the bodies outside the network which network 
members reported they had links with. For each informant, we listed the 
non-network bodies she participated in at local, regional and national level. 
We coded these bodies according to whether they were bodies of the 
informant's own profession, multi-professional bodies or of unknown 
occupational composition. Analogously to the E-I index, we constructed a P-
M index to show whether an individual's links were predominantly with 
bodies within her own profession (P) or with multi-professional (M) bodies: 
P-M Index = P-M / P+M 
where P is the number of uni-professional bodies of the informant's own 
profession that she has links to, and M the number of multi-professional 
which she reports participating in. 
We had hypothesised (H10) that outcomes would be best when each 
member organisation relies on a few strong relations for most of its care 
delivery alongside a larger number of weak ties for information search. To 
operationalise this hypothesis we created what Luke and Wholey (182) call a 
'service configuration score', expressed as a dummy variable called 
'stong+weak'. We defined a 'strong relation' in terms of depth, as one 
involving at least four of the five layers of link defined above. All other 
relationships counted as 'weak'. We defined 'a few' as meaning 'a quarter 
(or fewer) of the number of the organisation's links to other network nodes'. 
We coded network nodes according to whether they satisfied this 
'strong+weak' pattern. 
 4.3.3  Routine administrative data on outcomes 
A critical question was whether or how organisations' (especially hospitals') 
connectivity characteristics (as network nodes) were associated with 
particular network outcomes, or rather service, outcomes. We assumed that 
a relevant outcome indicator for CHD networks and for acute care for 
children is hospital admissions known to be sensitive to ambulatory care, 
because strong networking across primary- secondary care boundaries 
would assist the partial substitution of primary for secondary care, hence a 
reduction in these admissions. As a definition of admissions sensitive to 
ambulatory care provision, we used the AHRQ Prevention Quality Indicators 
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(183) which have also proved applicable to research in health systems more 
similar to the NHS (e.g. Canada (184), Spain (185)) than the US health 
system. These indicators consist of ICD-9CM codes for conditions where 
admission rates have been shown to be sensitive to the provision of primary 
care (as a partial substitute for secondary care). From these disease groups 
we selected those relevant to the CHD networks and to acute care for 
children (184-188). At the time of this study no equivalent indicators 
existed for the mental health care for young children, nor for patients' self-
care. We were thus able to perform this analysis on two CHD networks and 
one children's network only. For each hospital node in the two CHD 
networks for which we had survey data, we obtained HES data for the 
relevant ambulatory care sensitive admissions. This required using the 
nearest equivalent ICD10 codes instead of ICD9-CM codes for extracting the 
data. For some codes this was straightforward but for the others the NHS 
Coding Service advised us what the correct re-coding from ICD9CM into 
ICD10 was. 
Although no equivalents to the AHRQ measures were available for children's 
service networks, indicators for a similar purpose had been devised for the 
'Closer to Home' project evaluation (189), although these indicators also 
concerned acute care not mental health referrals. They were however 
already defined using ICD10 categories which avoided the problems of 
recoding. We therefore also obtained HES data about changes for the 
'Closer to Home' indicators for the children's network to which they were 
relevant. 
One way in which HES data are anonymised is by blanking out all non-
empty data fields with five or fewer patients. We treated all these cells as 
having a value of 1. Although the resulting patient numbers are therefore 
likely to be slightly underestimated, this is a better approximation than 
treating blanked-out values as zero (which also causes division-by-zero 
calculation problems) or just omitting them. Any bias is also likely to be 
consistent across all ICDs and sites. 
 4.4  Analyses 
One research question was answered by analysing qualitative data only, but 
the others required combining qualitative and a quantitative analyses. Either 
way the analyses involved cross-sectional comparisons of network data at 
three levels. Predominantly qualitative methods were used, supplemented 
with social network analysis, at network level i.e. to compare whole 
networks. At layer level and node levels, layers and nodes within networks 
were compared predominantly by means of social network analysis, 
supplemented with some qualitative analyses. 
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 4.4.1  Qualitative analyses 
The qualitative analyses consisted of systematic comparisons at whole-
network, layer and node levels. They were systematic in that data were 
collated, grouped under headings and presented in the same way for each 
network. For each comparison, we constructed a table whose columns were 
the study networks and whose rows varied for each research question (or 
part of a research question). So far as possible these rows and the data in 
them were simply selected and copied from the data grid of each study 
network (see appendix 2). When necessary we then added further rows 
specific to the research question, entering supplementary qualitative data 
directly from the transcripts, documents and other sources reported above. 
Research questions enquired whether, or hypothesised that, networks, 
layers or nodes would qualitatively differ were answered by making 
systematic comparisons across sites. These comparisons were between 
study networks or groups of them which contrasted in terms of 
1. Network formation (RQ1b) 
2. Mandated or voluntary status (RQ1b, RQ2a, RQ8a, RQ8b). 
3. Having undergone reorganisations (RQ2b) during the study period 
or not. (This was a post facto grouping of study sites, which had not 
originally been sampled on that basis.) 
4. Composition of membership (RQ2, RQ3, RQ4). 
5. Size (RQ3a). 
6. Artefact production (RQ8a). 
The findings were were combined with those of social network analyses in 
the ways reported below. For research questions about which we had made 
no predictions about how different kinds of network would behave, we 
compared the data across all the study sites (without any sub-grouping 
within the six) and by induction noted what common or divergent patterns 
there were. The patterns were then 'read off' as (qualitative) answers to our 
research questions about: 
 1. network histories in regard to development (RQ1a), transition to 
mandated status and its consequences (RQ2a), and responses to 
PBC and PBR (RQ7c) 
 2. Patterns of user-involvement (RQ2c). 
 3. How network members use relational co-ordination structures 
(RQ3a) 
 4. Types of co-ordination activity (RQ4) 
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 5. How network layers interact (RQ5) 
 6. Individual network members' motivations, including incentives, to 
cooperate (RQ7a) 
For research questions 3a, 4, 5 and 7a these findings were also combined 
with findings from the social network analyses as reported below. 
Additionally we scrutinised the qualitative data for any relevant patterns not 
anticipated by the above research questions and analytic. These findings 
were incorporated into the findings and contributed to revising the analytic 
framework in light of our emerging empirical findings. 
 4.4.2  Social network analyses 
To describe each network formally we visualised the matrices of 
questionnaire data as network maps, using UCINET's NetDraw network 
mapping software to visualise the network for each layer. To visualise whole 
networks we added the matrices for each layer to produce a summary (all-
level) matrix for the network. Whilst the component per-layer matrices had 
binary values only, adding the binary scores of the corresponding cells in 
each matrix meant that the corresponding cell in the summary matrix was 
the sum of those scores, i.e. a number between 0 and 5. Each summary cell 
thus contained an interval measure of strength of the link it referred to, with 
'strength' meaning the multidimensionality of the links. We also visualised 
the summary matrix for each of the five relevant study networks. The 
resulting summary maps are in appendix 1. The maps immediately showed 
whether any isolated members or groups were present. However, reflecting 
the properties of the networks themselves, most of the maps were so dense 
that summary tables of network properties were usually more informative. 
Figure 2 is an example of such a map. 
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Figure 2. Example of network map 
Membership lists for each network, and the demographic data in the 
questionnaire responses, showed the composition of network membership 
and which member organisation co-ordinated the network. 
Using these materials we then conducted the following analyses. The 
glossary explains the technical terms unavoidably used (but we have tried 
to keep these terms to a minimum). 
The first set of analyses was conducted at node (network-member) level. 
Our research proposal predicted that 'an organisation with higher levels of 
integration into different layers of a network will make greater use of 
integrated care management (i.e. cross-network referral of patients). Thus, 
organisations that are more integrated into common network arrangements 
should perform better.' For these purposes we operationalised the concept 
of 'integration' by calculating, network by network, from the summary 
matrices each node's (i.e. member organisation's) measures of: 
 1. Degree (number of links) of each organisation (node), both in 
absolute terms and normalised for network size. 
 2. Centrality within the network (measures were: normalised degree, 
Freeman degree centrality, reach centrality, betweenness centrality, 
flow betweenness) (190). 
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 3. Brokerage, that is the extent to which each network node acts as 
an intermediary between others. We used Fernandez and Gould's 
(191) definitions and measures. To do this we partitioned the networks 
(i.e. classified their member organisations) into: NHS providers (NHS 
Trusts since Foundation Trusts did not exist when the study began; 
NHS commissioners (PCT or SHA); Local Authority commissioners; 
local authority service providers; and third sector organisations. 
 4. Power, using Bonacich's definitions and measures (see (192) and 
setting the attenuation factor at the conventional rate of -0.5. 
 5. Openness, measured by the relative numbers of links external and 
links internal to the network using the E-I index (193). 
For short we label the above our 'connectivity measures'. Where relevant we 
used normalised measures in order to abstract from differences of size 
between the networks. 
The next step was to analyse the questionnaire data and measures so as to 
answer the relevant research questions. Table 8 gives an overview. 
Table 8. Hypotheses and social network analyses  
Research question and hypothesis Data tested for:  
Voluntary networks have occupationally 
more diverse membership than 
mandatory networks (RQ1, H1A). 
Correlation between network status 
(voluntary/mandated) and: number of 
professions; proportion of membership 
represented by each profession.  
More intensively networked providers 
have superior service outcomes (RQ3, 
H8A) 
Correlation between growth of referrals 
sensitive to primary-secondary care co-
ordination and providers' connectivity.  
Organisations with more extensive 
network links are more innovative 
(RQ3,H3A). 
Correlation between innovation-related 
activity scores and connectivity  
Organisations whose internal culture is 
more favourable to collaboration will have 
denser network links (RQ3, H3B) 
Correlation between internal culture 
scores and connectivity  
Designated network co-ordinating body 
will have the highest brokerage scores 
and be the top-most body in any 
hierarchical relationships (RQ4, H4A).  
Association between co-ordinating-body 
status and: brokerage score; Burt 
measure of hierarchy; power.  
Mandated networks are more hierarchical 
than non-mandated networks (RQ4, 
H4B).  
Correlation between mandated status and 
measures of hierarchy.  
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Network layer delivering the core process 
of will be denser than other layers (RQ5, 
SH11).  
Significant differences of density between 
layers in each network. Compare which 
were pendant, isolate and most-
connected organisations in each layer.  
Individuals with more links outside a 
network also have more links within it 
(RQ6, H6A).  
Correlation between internal and external 
connectivity.  
More strongly professionalised 
occupations have more links outside a 
network than other occupations do 
(RQ6,H6B).  
Association between occupation and EI 
('External-Internal') index.  
Each profession will have more external 
links with its own than with other 
professions (RQ6,H6C) 
Comparison of ratio of own-professional 
to multi-professional links to non-network 
bodies for each profession.  
Organisations with more links outside the 
network are more innovative (RQ6,H6D). 
Correlation between innovation-related 
activity scores and E-I index.  
There will be a match between incentives 
and (other) network structures layers 
(RQ6b)  
Significant differences of density between 
money-layer and other layers of links in 
each network. Compare which 
organisations are are central in each 
layer.  
Simpler networks with fewer interfaces 
would perform better than more complex 
ones (RQ8, H8B).  
Correlation between growth of referrals 
sensitive to primary-secondary care co-
ordination and network size, density.  
Outcomes are best when providers rely 
on a few strong relations for most care 
delivery plus numerous weak ties for 
information search (RQ8,H8C).  
Correlation between growth of referrals 
sensitive to primary-secondary care co-
ordination and 'strong+weak' index.  
To test whether more intensively networked providers (here, hospital and 
primary care trusts) would have superior service outcomes (H8A), we tested 
for correlations between the aforementioned measures of connectedness for 
each provider node and the following outcomes:  
1. in CHD networks, the providers' admissions rate for all ICDs included 
in the AHRQ Prevention Quality Indicators for CHD  
2.  in Children's Hospital Project Network, the providers' admissions rate 
for all ICDs included in the the AHRQ Prevention Quality Indicators for 
children's services and in the Closer to Home indicators for children's 
services.  
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To abstract from the differences in catchment populations between the 
different hospitals in any one network, we used as the outcome measure 
growth, not absolute volume, of the relevant admissions. 
In the analyses which compared connectivity variables within a network we 
used Ucinet's bootstrap methods to calculate the correlations and 
regressions because within a single network the data on each node's 
connectivity are not independent observations. For independent samples we 
tested correlations using Spearman's rho when there were 30 or fewer data 
points, otherwise Pearson's r. For certain analyses (e.g. by respondents' 
occupation, for patterns in referral data) we also pooled data across the 
networks. Pooling provided sufficient data points for basic multiple 
regression (OLS) to be applied. As required, t-tests and ANOVA were also 
used. For all tests we declared the threshold significance level as 0.05 and 
non-trivial correlation as r≥0.25. In the event, the Small CHD Network had 
only three member organisations (one PCT, two hospitals) directly involved 
with referrals in the relevant categories. Instead of making statistical tests 
among these three we therefore simply compared referral patterns among 
them. 
Testing the hypothesis (H1A) that voluntary networks have occupationally 
more diverse membership than mandatory networks only required data 
from the network membership lists and so we were able to use data from all 
seven networks. 
Comparison of network layers was our second group of analyses. Our main 
interest in comparing network layers was to examine how far money was an 
incentive for collaboration between network members. If it was, one would 
expect to observe a very specific network structure. Network structure 
consists of links between pairs of members. If there were market-like 
financial incentives within the networks, the links transmitting money would 
match the links transmitting 'real' services. For each link transmitting a 'real 
side' content (referrals, administrative data etc.) from one network member 
to another, a matching link would in exchange transmit money back in the 
opposite direction. The presence of these reciprocated financial and non-
financial links is a necessary condition for financial incentivisation to be 
observed. Our methods of data cleaning and aggregation meant that our 
data did not show the direction in which each link ran, but we were still able 
to test for the presence of matched financial and non-financial links between 
each pair of member organisations in each network. We began by finding, 
for each network, which links for client care collaboration were matched by 
links transmitting money. We then repeated this comparison for the other 
three non-financial layers. But more than this was required to show that 
financial incentives were operative in the matched links that did exist. We 
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therefore also collected qualitative evidence about members' motives for 
collaborating through the network. 
Comparisons of whole networks was the third set of analyses. To compare 
whole networks, we tabulated all the above findings (for nodes and for 
levels) for each network. Using the table we then made the systematic 
comparisons described above to ascertain whether any cross-network 
patterns appeared, in particular the following. 
On the basis of qualitative evidence, other studies (36,35,194) have 
described mandated networks as more 'hierarchical' than non-mandated 
networks, as did H8. We therefore compared mandated networks (we had 
SNA data for networks Children's Hospital Project Network, Small CHD 
Network, Urban CHD Network) and the non-mandated study networks (Child 
Mental Health Network, Self-Care Network) in terms of how far the networks 
approximated to a hierarchy. To do this we compared the networks in terms 
of: 
 1. Hierarchical reduction, using the Krackhardt GTD measure of 
hierarchy (161). All four items in this measure (connectedness, 
hierarchy, efficiency, least upper bound (LUB)) must score 1.0 for the 
network to be a 'pure' hierarchy. Smaller scores measure deviation 
from a pure hierarchy. An LUB score of 1.0 would show that a single 
organisation could (theoretically) co-ordinate the whole network in a 
hierarchical way. If that occurred the network maps would then show 
whether that single organisation was indeed the network co-
ordinating body. 
 2. Density (predicted lower in mandated networks). 
 3. Separation: Whether the mandated networks showed more consistent 
separation (all members relate directly to the core, and to each other 
mainly via the core) (see H4A). That is: 
(a) Whether the centrality of the co-ordinating organisation was 
higher in mandated than non-mandated networks. 
(b) Whether the co-ordinating member organisations in the mandated 
networks had higher betweenness than in the non-mandated 
networks. 
 4.4.3  Combining findings from the mixed methods 
Our theoretical model provided an overall framework through which to 
combine the narrower, more specific analyses noted above into a unified 
explanation of how (and to what extent) the study networks did indeed act 
as a conduit for innovations and other resources into the activity of 
managing complex care. 
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To combine the findings which the foregoing mixed methods had produced, 
we extended the tables used for the systematic qualitative comparisons on 
networks to incorporate the findings of the relevant social network analyses. 
We then compared the combined results for consistency. Any apparent 
inconsistencies of findings were resolved by re-checking the SNA methods, 
by using qualitative data to illuminate discrepant SNA findings between 
sites, and by seeking more precise, subtle formulations of the findings which 
would combine them consistently. In this way we produced answers to the 
research questions and decisions as the validity of the hypotheses tested. 
 4.5  Ethics and research governance 
Leicestershire, Northamptonshire & Rutland REC2 approved the pilot study 
(reference 06/Q2502/27). Ethical approval for rest of the project was 
obtained from the University of Plymouth Ethics Committee and Cambridge 
MREC (reference 06/MRE05/62). The latter permitted the project team to 
vary questionnaires and other data collection instruments provided the REC 
received final copies, but not to collect data about social and friendship 
links. No decision was made about collecting data about e-mail traffic, 
although we were given to understand that a separate application 
comprehending the collect of informed consents from all individuals involved 
would be required. Research governance approvals and honorary contracts 
for the researchers in each site were obtained on an individual ad hoc basis 
(fieldwork began before the research passport scheme). Anonymity of 
informants and sites was a condition of ethical approval. We have therefore 
pseudonymised the study sites and removed site names and other 
identifiers from the references for the 'grey', published and website material 
cited or quoted in the findings.  
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 5  Network formation 
Our findings are presented under the same headings and in same sequence 
as the research questions and analytic framework. We re-state the research 
questions (in italics) and relevant supplementary hypotheses at the start of 
each chapter. 
Regarding network formation, our research questions were: 
RQ1a: How do networks emerge as rational co-ordination structures? 
RQ1b: What determines the formation of both mandated and non-
mandated networks? 
We observed two patterns of network formation. One was of network 
emergence 'from below' out of everyday working practices. The other was 
the deliberate modification or creation of a network to implement a policy 
mandate. Here we narrate in chronological order how the study networks 
formed. To speak of network as 'rational co-ordination mechanisms' (RQ1) 
implies that the networks pursue goals, so we also report how they formed 
their goals. From the narratives we then draw out common patterns and 
differences. 
 5.1  Emergence from below 
 5.1.1  Long-established networks 
One of the two oldest networks was in Child Mental Health Network. Health, 
local government (social care, educational psychology) and third sector 
organisations had since the 1980s established patterns of cross-referral, 
information sharing and collaboration. The initial goals of the network were 
only implicit: to act as a broker for the exchange of contacts and knowledge 
for those involved in the care of young children with mental health 
problems; to enable them to make better use of existing services; and to fill 
any gaps in the range and volume of available services. 
Negotiation to formalise the network began at a conference held on 15th 
December 2005, attended by over 50 people from a wide range of those 
involved in mental health care for children in the city, although in the short 
term 'not a lot happened' (Child Mental Health Network, health visitor 1). A 
planning day was organised and a network manager, who energised the 
process, was appointed. A steering group formed and made itself 
accountable to a Children and Young Persons Partnership that already 
existed between the PCT and the City Council. 
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Equally old was the Children's Hospital Project Network, in a large city. This 
network originated from an attempt in the 1980s by the hospitals and 
(then) Regional and Area Health Authorities in the city to devise a plan for 
rationalising children's services, particularly hospital services, which were 
dispersed over a number of sites, and closing duplicate old and relatively 
small buildings that were ill-suited to their current purpose. They wanted to 
concentrate future capital and service developments on just a few well-
developed sites, re-configuring primary, community and social care 
accordingly. The network thus originated as a consultative project planning 
group for a newly-built children's hospital. 
Its membership therefore had to include the main power-holders in making 
these changes, meaning the administrators (later, general managers), 
planners and consultant paediatricians. Consequently this network had a 
more markedly medical membership than the other two children's services 
networks, particularly its sub-groups and working parties: 
There are no managers in the Clinical Network, the only exception to that is CAHMS by 
the look of it and I'm not sure whether they attend the meetings … But the neonates, 
paeds and maternity, those are clinical [sub-]networks and you have to be a clinician to 
get on to them. There's a slight exception around neonates where they're probably going 
to have a patient and carer representative there, but only by invitation because 
essentially they are clinical things that are being discussed. 
(Network co-ordinator, Children's Hospital Project Network) 
The clinician membership tended to be skewed towards secondary and 
tertiary care. 
At a broad, general level the network's goal was fairly clear and consensual. 
However the more concrete questions of precisely which children's services 
the network's should develop and which ones it should close were highly 
controversial, creating the prospect of there being 'winner' and 'loser' 
organisations and populations. These proposals were hotly and publicly 
debated in the city and several times re-negotiated between the NHS 
organisations involved. Specific network goals took over 15 years to reach 
because of these conflicts of interests: 
We talk about it as being a twenty five year trajectory to get us to today. Paediatricians 
in [city] have been talking for over twenty years about the need to consolidate services in 
order to maintain quality and safety …. there have been a number of consultations, 
clinically led, supported by the various organisations, most of which have been 
unsuccessful. ...The one that was ultimately successful was in 1997, … which resulted 
in the decision to close two children's hospitals … and establish a brand new state of 
the art children's hospital on the [hospital] site … and the new children's hospital will 
open its doors in June 2009. 
(Co-ordinator, Children's Hospital Project Network). 
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This network's goals were thus the consequence of a long-term capital 
planning and service re-profiling activities. 
Although Children's Hospital Project Network had a more medical 
membership, all three children's services networks had a mixture of 
member organisations as founder-members. These organisations were 
diverse, including: care providers (NHS, local authority and third sector) for 
both health and social care; commissioners (indeed a joint local authority 
and NHS commissioner in Child Mental Health and City Children's networks), 
and especially in the children's services networks (see below), other 
statutory bodies (education, police, probation). Two of the children's 
networks were centred no less on local government than on the NHS. Even 
the third, the project network for children's services (Children's Hospital 
Project Network) included representation from all but one of the local 
authorities in the city. PCTs were represented in their capacity as 
community health services providers as well as in their commissioning role. 
Third sector organisations tended to be voluntary and charitable service 
providers rather than fund-raisers or organisations representing (lobbying 
for the interests) of specific groups of patients, children, parents or carers. 
 5.1.2  From collaboratives to CHD networks 
We studied three CHD networks and made some preliminary investigations 
in a fourth. They originated in the late 1990s as local or subregional 
'Collaboratives', essentially care networks aimed at managing referral flows 
and improving standards of practice, with a focus on professional activities 
and interests. For a PCT to participate in a collaborative was its decision, but 
once that decision was made the Department of Health supplied specific 
recommendations and resources. 
Small CHD Network was established in 1998, built on existing close working 
relationships between primary and hospital based clinicians (both for 
secondary and tertiary care) in an area with a high incidence of heart 
disease: 
in fact there was, sort of, effectively a [city] something called the [city] grouping when I 
came to [city] seven years ago, which was effectively a [city] CHD network before such 
things existed, which did a reasonable amount of work around those areas anyway, 
and there was quite a strong tradition … [of] good working relationships between 
primary and secondary care. 
(Cardiologist, Small CHD Network) 
Cardiologists working in and around Small CHD Network were mostly 
trained in the same nearby medical school and still did occasional sessions 
there (e.g. angioplasty) so there was also already an established informal 
network of cardiologists with occasional discussion meetings. There were 
already long-established close working relationships between primary, 
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secondary and tertiary care clinicians. The initial membership consisted of 
commissioners, senior hospital cardiologists, GPs, other primary care 
clinicians (OTs, physiotherapists, heart failure nurses and community 
matrons) and managers, and social services. During its care network phase, 
the network's membership was defined by the organisations who 
contributed to the equally clearly defined care pathways between primary, 
secondary and tertiary care. The network became a CHD collaborative 
centred on the then Health Authority. With publication of the National 
Service Framework (NSF) for coronary heart disease (195) the network was 
charged with implementing it. Between 1998 and 2005 the four local PCTs 
merged into one, but despite these repeated reorganisations both the 
network maintained continuity of leadership. 
Even at this stage Small CHD Network still had no explicit goals. Its deputy 
co-ordinator could still answer: 
Stated aim? I've never seen the aims actually stated on paper I have to say. 
(Deputy co-ordinator, Small CHD Network) 
the nearest one came to finding stated network objectives were what our 
informants said they thought the network's objectives implicitly were: 
something around the lines of improving cardiovascular care for people in [place], 
producing a network of care and making sure everyone has access to a high standard of 
quality care regardless of where within the patch they live and that sort of thing. 
(Cardiologist, Small CHD Network). 
Other informants from the network also mentioned these as benefits of the 
network. 
In the other two CHD networks, the actors, activities and foci were similar, 
but the collaboratives emerged sooner at and on a wider (sub-regional) 
scale than did the PCT-level networks (often based on clinical governance 
networks) dealing with CHD. 
In the part of Regional CHD Network on which we focused, an interested GP 
set up a group to improve the co-ordination of primary care services, and 
the primary-secondary care interface, for CHD services. After 2000 this 
network continued as those sub-networks of GPs and others, within PCT 
clinical governance networks, but now increasingly focused on implementing 
the cardiac NSF. It was GP-dominated but some (not all) hospital 
cardiologists also participated. The foci of interest were initially the local 
problems of managing the volumes of (and criteria for) referrals from 
primary to hospital care, and on the provision of post-discharge care for 
CHD patients receiving long-term follow-up care from primary and 
community services. The constituents of what was to become the Regional 
CHD Network were this network and several similar PCT-based networks 
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across one SHA. Regional CHD Network formed through the merger of these 
networks. The membership of the resulting network was mainly of hospital 
doctors and SHA managers. 
Urban CHD Network cardiac network grew from a cardiac collaborative 
established in 2002. It too originated organically from pre-existing 
professional relationships: 
I started off with a collaborative, it wasn't the Network then, it was the CHD 
collaborative, and my job really evolved since I've been in post, so the job I'm doing now 
isn't the job that I would have initially have applied for. 
(Urban CHD Network: Cardiac Commissioning Development Manager) 
A number of areas had developed Cardiac Modernisation Boards and the 
merger of such a Board with the CHD Collaborative led to the establishment 
of Urban CHD Network. Then transition to a network with a wider remit 
appeared an obvious step: 
In a way I think it was a natural progression from the CHD collaborative - I was a 
Programme Manager, and as had been outlined in the NSF of the CHD, it had said that 
Networks should be developed, and there was nothing much happening at the time, so I 
suggested that we try and develop a Network, and we did. So we started proceedings in 
2003, which was just about interviewing people on their thoughts of clinical networks, 
what they should be and whatever, and me reading up a bit about it and then 
establishing it properly, fully functioning I would say. 
(Director, Urban CHD Network) 
This network's founder-membership too were predominantly hospital 
doctors and managers from PCTs. When PCTs become predominantly 
commissioners, Urban CHD Network became a venue for consultation about 
proposals to bring in new providers sited in nearby PCTs. Here too explicit 
objectives were late in coming, with the cardiac NSF being a watershed for 
the formulation of network objectives. 
Activity to establish CHD pilot site network began in 2001, aiming to create 
a common strategy for cardiac heart disease services across two counties 
served by four main acute hospitals. Its members set it up to solve a 
common problem facing these hospitals; difficulty meeting waiting time 
targets for CHD patients and dealing with the consequent budget over-
spends, problems exacerbated by Norwalk and MRSA outbreaks. Local PCTs 
responded by commissioning extra cardiac inpatient capacity in London and 
another city outside the network's territory. Payment by Results meant that 
the PCTs also shifted the payment for these episodes to the extra-territorial 
hospitals. Increasingly, advising a Strategic Health Authority commissioning 
group became the network's main activity, from the relatively early date of 
2003-4. With this activity came explicit terms of reference for the network. 
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The CHD networks had essentially similar organisational and occupational 
memberships, being networks of NHS organisations with little local 
government or third sector representation and no commercial member 
organisations. Cardiologists were a dominant force but other clinical 
professions (nurses and ambulance paramedics mainly) were also involved. 
The common evolution was: 
 1. Emergence from informal professional contacts and referral patterns 
of long standing. 
 2. Formation of clinical audit networks after 1991. 
 3. Evolution into Collaboratives. 
 4. PCTs became the local co-ordinating body for existing clinical and 
professional networks 
 5. The cardiac NSF was first of a series of specific mandates. 
 5.1.3  Recent networks 
The third children's network in our study was much newer than the other 
two, originating in its present form just before the start of the study period. 
Local government played an greater part in its formation even than in Child 
Mental Health Network. Some long standing network relationships were in 
place particularly for Looked After Children, CAMHS, child protection and in 
small, localised Sure Start initiatives which later became Children's 
Resource centres. In these domains, nascent professional and user 
(parental) relationships and proto-networks developed. Before the study 
period professional networks did exist in City Children's Network but were 
not systematically organised and tended to be uni-professional. Publication 
of Every Child Matters (196) led to the Sure Start initiatives and the 
initiation of some new Children's Resource Centres. From these antecedents 
City Children's Network was formed in response to the policy of creating 
Children's Trusts. 
Because City Children's Network had been set up on the initiative of one 
member organisation (the City Council), its intended objectives for the 
network were documented from early in the negotiations to form a network, 
indeed as a first step towards recruiting other network members: 
In those early days of the network being set up I can remember that the work that went 
on there was very high level, very strategic, I can remember that there was a lot of focus 
on the tertiary centre and not so much on secondary care or primary care. And I think 
that's changed quite a lot now and there was varying input between managers and 
clinicians etc. 
(PCT General Manager, City Children's Network) 
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The network could trace its origins more clearly to a managerial decision 
which involved, inter alia, the setting of tasks and objectives for a to-be-
created network: 
because of the Government plans, I knew that the local authorities were moving towards 
Children's Trust arrangements and I guess that some of the networks that I've been in 
for a bit longer then got subsumed into or co-opted into the Children's Trust network. [...] 
I'm a member of the children's centre steering group which was the main group that 
managed and implemented the development of children's centres in the city, you know, 
the development from the Sure Start, initial Sure Start Children's centre, so that's been 
co-opted into the overall structure. 
(Voluntary Sector Member, City Children's Network) 
and: 
There has been a large group meeting for many years to sort of be a talking shop for 
children's services in the city, there used to be about 40 people around the table and 
back in 2001 onwards. I was involved because I was chief executive at the time so I 
know about it. However in the more recent time having a very clear, a clearer structure 
of the CYP partnership board, yes I've been a member since the inception. 
(PCT Member, City Children's Network) 
This network thus emerged both out of day-to-day clinical work (as Child 
Mental Health Network had) and (like Children's Hospital Project Network) 
out of city-wide planning fora. City Children's Network focused its activities 
not on physical infrastructure but on service co-ordination and on child 
protection, at that time highly salient in the media and politics. 
Newest among the study networks was the user-experience Self-Care 
Network, which formed in 2006, just as our fieldwork was beginning. This 
network also developed emergently - with an element of chance involved - 
from a pre-existing pattern of self-care or health promotion activities 
undertaken by three mental health voluntary organisations in two adjoining 
deprived areas in a provincial city. Self-Care Network was a network of a 
number of individual members who are also mainly users of its activities, 
three voluntary organisations and (later) the Public Health Development 
Unit and the umbrella body for the whole third sector in the city. The three 
member organisations already collaborated on other matters. Another was a 
member of the PCT's community group network. Links between the three 
voluntary organisations were long-established but reinforced by friendship 
links among people who had been patients or clients of the same mental 
health services in the city. 
Most members participated purely as individuals. They were present or 
recent mental health service users from (as one of them put it) 'user-land', 
though a minority were also members of other voluntary or self-help 
organisations. They had had bad experiences of long-term anti-depressant 
use. Many of them did not qualify for annual GP reviews and rarely saw a 
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GP. Membership of the Self-Care Network was blurred between those 
running it and those attending its events. These events in themselves 
created a network of mental health service users who get to know one 
another, an outcome of consequence given the social isolation experienced 
by these service users. Occasionally other people - CPNs, a PCT 
commissioning manager and during this project some of the researchers 
(but only one at a time) - also attended network meetings but were never 
the majority.  
Negotiations leading to network formation began in a conversation between 
two members of local self-help groups who had the idea of linking and 
consolidating their two local groups. A local GP interested in mental health 
found out that NIMHE was willing to finance a 'Let's Get Physical' pilot 
project and with a worker in the PCT's public health development unit began 
encouraging these groups and individuals to collaborate in bidding, which 
had not happened before. 
For Self-Care Network members their common goal was to meet their 
personal needs for physical self-care, but also to provide social contact and 
activity outside the home (which is evidence for hypothesis H1D). 
Independence from 'service-land' was important to them, a reaction against 
frustrating or unsatisfactory experience of statutory services. Their first bid 
for funding prompted them to write down the network's objectives for the 
first time. Besides health objectives their goals included 'Develop confidence 
and capacity of third sector providers to engage in health promoting 
activities' and 'Increase the link between health and other sectors' (Report 
on NIMHE funded pilot 2006-7) and 'to encourage those users stuck in 
“service-land” to make use of other opportunities' (pilot scheme evaluation 
report). 
 5.1.4  Patterns of origin 
In the CHD networks and the oldest of the children's networks everyday 
clinical work generated repeated contacts between organisations and 
individual professionals as they referred patients, sought advice, engaged in 
education or training or other activities of common interest. Over time, 
repeated contacts of these kinds consolidated into relatively stable networks 
of links. These networks thus emerged as a means of co-ordinating 
recurrent, complex care activities which routinely involved many individuals 
or organisations (a finding which supports hypothesis H1C). In the networks 
which emerged from clinical care or self-care, network objectives were 
formulated as a consequence rather than a cause of network formation. 
Initially the networks had tacit, uncodified objectives only. In five networks 
the formulation of explicit objectives was slow, often taking years and when 
formulated expressing what the network was now doing rather than setting 
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out a manifesto for future realisation. The other two networks had explicit 
goals from the outset but these goals were at first broad. Agreement on 
specific goals came later. 
Patient involvement in setting up the networks was, with one important 
exception, minimal. So far as we could discover, there were no users or 
user organisations among the founding membership of the three CHD and 
the three children's services networks. In contrast, the reasons for patients' 
centrality in the Self-Care Network were that: 
1. Users founded the network 
2. Users dominated its managing body 
3. Because this was a self-help network, users also undertook the 
network's main activity ('core process'). 
When eventually network members formulated explicit goals for their 
networks, that enabled the network to organise itself more systematically 
and attract new members and resources. The networks began to expand, 
but extensively; that is, by doing more of the things that they always had 
done rather than by shifting to completely different activities. In the NHS 
networks one aspect of this consolidation and expansion was that 
professional links – and by extension inter-professional links – were used to 
develop the activity focused on specialised work topics. 
 5.2  Mandate from above 
 5.2.1  How mandated networks formed 
Two of our networks, Child Mental Health Network and Self Care Network, 
remained voluntary networks throughout the study period, so the following 
findings do not apply to them, although at the very end of the study period 
Child Mental Health Network also became mandated. The other five study 
networks made a gradual evolution from voluntary to mandated network. 
Our research proposal hypothesised (H1E) that 'Mandated networks are 
created by one or more of: 
1. legal requirement for practice, hence collective agreement between 
profession and state; 
2. “closed shop” or cartel; or by managerial direction'. 
It might be argued that a collective agreement between the medical 
profession and the state implicitly underlies the adoption of EBM and hence 
policies which mandate either application of the methods which EBM 
involves or specific evidence-based recommendations for clinical practice or 
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the organisation of care. What we unequivocally observed in our study sites 
was the formation of mandated networks by managerial direction. Thus our 
findings tend to support only a narrow interpretation of the above 
hypothesis. We did however find three different patterns of formation of 
mandated networks by managerial direction. We have called them 
'evolutionary capture', 'merger and re-moulding' and 'ministerial 
intervention'. 
Evolutionary Capture For the emergent networks a consequence of a PCT or 
SHA adopting the role of network co-ordinator was a transition from 
voluntary to mandated network. For a public body to adopt the co-
ordinator's role was generally accepted as a natural, constructive 
development for network development. As policy mandates relevant to 
these now PCT-centred networks began to appear, PCTs turned to the 
relevant network to implement them. Thus its local SHA adopted Urban CHD 
Network as successor to a Local Implementation Team for the NSF for 
cardiac heart disease. 
This development was in the interests of both the networks and the NHS 
body which became the co-ordinator. On the one hand, existing networks 
created by service providers for solving earlier problems were looking for an 
on-going role. On the other, new policy mandates were for PCTs new tasks 
and problems looking for means of implementation. The obvious solution for 
all parties was to adapt the existing networks accordingly. In the CHD 
networks especially, the co-ordinating PCT or SHA would initiate the 
commissioning cycle but then request advice or other inputs from the 
networks, for instance asking the network to deal with a new policy 
mandate (for example, to implement national standards for stroke care) or 
a proposal, often from a consultant, for a new or extended service. 
Merger and re-moulding. For some policies in some locations, no ready-
made network existed to serve as an implementation structure. Then such a 
network was constructed, either ex nihilo or by merging existing networks. 
Our study included no examples of the former, but did include the latter. 
City Children's Network was purposefully designed to meet the mandate of 
children's legislation with its duty for statutory agencies to cooperate. City 
Children's Network therefore included the relevant statutory agencies: 
PCTs; the City Council; the Child Protection Board; the SHA; Police and 
Probation services and the Learning and Skills Council, besides members 
drawn from the public and voluntary sectors. 
As for CHD networks, Small CHD Network was eventually merged into a 
wider sub-regional network (another former Collaborative). Regional CHD 
Network was formed through the merger of two sub-regional CHD 
collaboratives. The merger and consequent restructuring of these sub-
regional networks, and of the PCTs they served, was orchestrated by the 
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SHA. This merger went through at least two stages, taking over 18 months 
from preliminary discussions to completion. Network mergers were only 
possible because the networks had already undergone 'evolutionary 
capture'. 
Children's Hospital Project Network evolved into a mandated network 
through ministerial intervention. As described above, NHS capital planners 
set up ad hoc committees and working parties in the early 1980s to plan 
and implement a city-wide re-profiling of children's hospital services. A long 
period of politicised debate and indecision followed. The point at which this 
deadlock began to break was fairly precisely identified as a consultation 
among paediatricians and (the then) Health Authorities in 1997. The 
Secretary of State broke the deadlock by mandating the broad objectives of 
the project – a selection of the locally-generated proposals - and a time-
scale for achieving them. The Secretary of State also specified the 
governance system – a centred network – by which the network member 
organisations would manage these changes. Nevertheless negotiations to 
form the network appeared to drift for some years more until it became 
necessary to write the business case for the new children's hospital building, 
stimulating the creation of a Network Supervisory Board in 2003. 
 5.2.2  Mandate and network goals 
Mandate had consequences for network goals, membership, core process, 
co-ordination and upon how the health system environment affected the 
networks themselves. 
Revision of goals. Over the study period we observed three main impacts of 
mandate upon network goals. National mandates and their implementation 
become the goals of the mandated networks, reversing the relationship 
between nationally-formulated and (such as they were) locally-formulated 
goals. The networks dealt with this change by describing their role as the 
adaptation of national mandates to local circumstances: 
For cardiac, really, the aim or objectives might be NSF, but the detail tends to be we 
come up with a plan every 6 months, then we take that to Board, and they sign it off. I 
suppose the detail of how we do things and how we decide what we're going to take 
forward is done in working groups and we decide what we're going to do, I don't know, 
peer reviews - that's how it work. It's all formally signed off by the Board. Although we 
pull it all together, there's no one individual that sets the objectives like you would 
normally have in a normal structure. 
(Network Director, Urban CHD Network) 
Similarly, within the overall framework of its policy mandates, the leaders of 
City Children's Network perceived a degree of discretion for them to design 
their future structure and modus operandi. Because of the complexity and 
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scale of this network, they decided to commission management consultants 
to design a model of working and to facilitate objective setting: 
Well the outside [management] consultants' research project was all about getting all the 
agencies, it's been a piece of work that's been going on for 18 months to 2 years focusing 
on outcomes and it was developing – yeah they helped develop the logic model and 
helped us develop a focus on outcomes. So we then had a reason for being in terms of 
commissioning because we're interested in commissioning for those outcomes. 
(PCT member, City Children's Network) 
In two networks the shift in objectives however also raised fears among the 
existing network members that their established collaboration was to be 
sacrificed to some new purpose. 
Sedimentation of goals. As time passed PCTs and SHAs became mandated 
to implement an increasing range of policy targets, service frameworks, ad 
hoc initiatives, NICE guidance and other central policy mandates relevant to 
their services (e.g. access time targets, patient involvement policy). For 
example, Later implementation of the Darzi report became an important 
mandate for Urban CHD Network. Similarly, in Children's Hospital Project 
Network National Service Frameworks and further guidance relevant to 
children's services were added as they appeared to the network's mandate. 
The sedimentation of new mandates amounted certainly to 'mission spread' 
and arguably to 'mission drift'. Children's Hospital Project Network more 
than the others was willing to take on new tasks which, though related to its 
core purpose, were at times somewhat tangentially so, such as the EU 
working time directive. Over time the sedimented additional activities 
became predominant. 
Impersonal goals. The EBM-based elements of network objectives survived 
the transition from voluntary to mandated networks. For these evidence-
based objectives have their basis in biological and epidemiological processes 
which are of course the same for all networks, and beyond policy-makers' 
control. This stabilising influence on network goals was however more 
apparent in the CHD networks, whose evidence base was much larger than 
that for children's services, especially mental health services for children. 
 5.2.3  Mandate and network membership 
Another consequence of becoming a mandated network was a new 
membership profile, with more managerial, especially commissioner, 
involvement. These effects were reinforced by the networks' increased size 
(see below). 
A quantitative analysis of network membership confirmed that having a 
higher proportion of managers was significantly associated with mandated 
status. However this finding depended on the inclusion of two large 
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networks. Removing these sites from the analysis also removed the 
significant association between mandated status and proportion of 
managers in the networks. It therefore appeared that network size also 
influenced the occupational profile of network membership. But as already 
noted, the increase of network size was itself due to mergers, and the 
mergers due to the networks becoming 'captured' by mandated bodies. 
Children's networks were also increasingly mandated to include a range of 
statutory organisations. City Children's Network especially came to include 
representation from organisations who were not on, or were marginal to, 
health care pathways (e.g. police, fire brigade). In contrast the Children's 
Hospital Project Network had always had a determinate membership. Its 
clearly-defined task implied that a defined list of organisations should be 
required to participate, and not others. The participation of local 
government bodies (in a period before unitary local government) in the 
Children's Hospital Project Network was more patchy. The most active local 
authority member was not the one for the city centre itself, but for a group 
of suburbs (of very diverse socio-economic status and ethnic mixes). Even 
where there was no mandatory requirement to include them, some 
organisations had almost ex-officio representation. For example, large 
teaching hospitals cannot reasonably be excluded from acute care networks. 
In Children's Hospital Project Network senior doctors always played a role, 
but this role increased as the network's mandate widened after 2000; the 
soubriquet 'clinical and professional network' became increasingly justified. 
Conversely, once it became mandated (just after the study period), Child 
Mental Health Network excluded those former members which its new co-
ordinator deemed irrelevant to its new role. 
We hypothesised (H2B) that mandated networks are 'enclaves' in the sense 
of having a formally defined and closed membership. Voluntary networks 
have fluid membership, mandated ones more stable membership. The 
above evidence tends to support this hypothesis. Also we hypothesised 
(H14) that voluntary networks would have occupationally more diverse 
membership than mandatory networks. Using the membership lists for our 
seven networks we first counted the number of occupations represented in 
this list, and then the number (from which we could calculate the 
proportions) of individual members in each occupational group. The number 
of occupations was not significantly associated with network status as 
mandated or voluntary. Managers apart, neither was the proportion of 
AHPs, nurses, doctors, social workers, other professionals or users in a 
network's membership significantly associated with the network's status as 
mandated or voluntary. This pattern appears to reflect the fact that the 
networks grow by merger, so that their occupational mix continued to 
reflect their founding membership. So our data did not suggest that 
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voluntary networks have occupationally more diverse membership than 
mandatory networks do (i.e. did not support H14). 
 5.2.4  Changed core activities 
A consequence of the accretion of mandates was a change in the balance of 
the networks' core activities. As described above, Children's Hospital Project 
Network retained its original function as what Southon et al. would classify 
as a project network, but also acquired the role of a programme network, 
redesigning children's services in line with emerging new policy mandates. 
Elsewhere, a similar effect occurred in consequence of merging former 
referral networks (which happened in networks City Children's Network, 
Small CHD Network, Regional CHD Network and CHD pilot network). That 
made the individual network-members increasingly remote from the day-to-
day management of referrals which is the core activity of a referral network. 
To be sure, cardiologists remained members of the CHD networks, but the 
merged networks were increasingly focused on managing referral routes 
and criteria on a large scale, hence for the most part indirectly. So the 
clinician network members now directly managed only a small proportion of 
the referrals within the network's remit. Network decisions about, say, 
referrals were now to be implemented not mainly through network 
member's own behaviour (as would be the case in, say, a local network of 
GPs and other clinicians) but mainly through clinicians who were not 
themselves network members but working in the 'hinterland' of the 
networks' member organisations. Representatives of member organisations 
and professions now acted predominantly as boundary-spanners, influencing 
decisions which (mostly) were taken elsewhere in the hinterland of the 
network's member organisations. 
Furthermore, the content of the mandates themselves shifted the focus of 
network activity from the maintenance and operation of existing care 
pathways towards reconstruction of these care pathways on the lines 
mandated. The fact that the network co-ordinating bodies were 
commissioners also tended to produce a focus on the overall design of care 
pathways rather than upon a more detailed focus on referrals and resource 
use at the level of small care groups. In the sites studied an effect of 
mandate was thus to shift referral networks towards becoming programme 
networks. 
 5.2.5  Network co-ordination 
As PCTs and SHAs became increasingly held accountable for policy 
implementation within their local 'health economies', they were held 
accountable in particular for the operation and effectiveness of the networks 
in their territory. Thus the mandated networks except for City Children's 
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Network came to be 'hosted' by an NHS commissioning body, and in City 
Children's Network by the local government half of a joint commissioner. 
Mergers created sub-regional networks into which Small CHD Network and 
the forebears of Regional CHD network were merged. Urban CHD Network 
and Pilot Site CHD Network were already sub-regional in scale, as were 
Children's Hospital Project Network and City Children's Network. Mergers 
made the work of co-ordinating the resulting larger network more 
demanding. 'Hosting' meant that the host PCT or SHA provided managerial 
infrastructure for the network. These resources were usually more generous 
than had previously been available to the networks. They typically included 
a number of managers and office support services. The host organisation 
became the seat of the network's decision-making bodies and sub-groups. 
In effect it conducted a good deal of the day-to-day co-ordination of each 
network, from routines such as data collection and organising meetings 
through to the setting of agendas for discussions about network strategy 
and reporting network activity to higher NHS bodies. 
 5.2.6  Parallel governance 
In mandated networks, the mandator was the most important actor in terms 
of setting the network's objectives, and by implication its core process, the 
requisite membership and the accountability chain for the network (see 
findings for RQ2). This actor is however not a network member but, rather 
is 'off-stage' outside the network; a dominant but so to speak absent or 
virtual 'member'. The same mandates applied to the networks as to their 
member organisations but the latter were held accountable through 
separate governance structures (performance management, contracts, 
Payment By Results, Care Commission etc.) outside the networks. These 
relationships were not mediated by the network's co-ordinating body in its 
capacity as network co-ordinator. Rather, the network served as a parallel, 
supplementary implementation structure for the policy mandates. 
 5.3  Summary 
We observed two modes of network creation. Voluntary networks emerged 
'from below' as groupings of individuals and organisations performing 
common tasks. These tasks ranged from tasks producing rather abstract 
outputs (managerial decisions, project plans, information, guidance, service 
specifications) in documentary form to tangible outputs such as setting up 
new referral routes and introducing new methods of treatment or self-care. 
Mandated networks were created 'from above' by NHS 'host' organisations 
(typically a PCT) taking control of pre-existing emergent networks and then, 
in some cases, re-structuring them.  
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 6  Mandated networks  
On this topic our research questions were: 
RQ2a: In mandated networks, what prior social networks pre-exist and 
how do they affect the operation of the new, mandated network? 
RQ2b: Does re-organising network structure disrupt or enhance 
network processes, or not affect them at all? 
RQ2c: How does the inclusion of additional occupational groups and 
other network members (e.g. users) affect performance? 
We did not use social network analysis to answer these question but tested 
a series of qualitative hypotheses: 
H2A: Mandated networks include involuntary members. 
H2B: Mandated networks are 'enclaves' in the sense of having a 
formally defined and closed membership. Voluntary networks have fluid 
membership, mandated ones more stable membership. 
H2D: Prior voluntary networks persist within subsequently-mandated 
networks. 
H2E: Mandated networks are more comprehensively, systematically 
managed across the whole network than are voluntary networks. 
H2C: Mandated networks are (structurally) uniform (within the 
economic sector). 
 6.1  Network mandates and their sources 
Five of the networks were unequivocally mandated networks and were very 
much driven by national priorities and targets. For both the CHD and the 
children's services networks, the respective National Service Frameworks 
were a seminal source of mandates (Department of Health 1998; 
Department of Health 2002). The most often mentioned mandate was 
substantive clinical guidance (from NICE especially) and service-model 
mandates. NSFs were influential in all networks (except Self-Care Network) 
but always in ways mediated by local expertise. 
The evidence base for CHD practice was already well-developed by 1997. 
Whilst central government, regulatory and NHS bodies endorsed and 
disseminated these mandates, these 'impersonal' mandates originated 
elsewhere. They had been developed and promulgated largely by national 
and international sources: respectively, the professional bodies, such 
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agencies as the British Heart Foundation and NICE; and in the academic, 
medical and scientific research publications. Indeed NSFs provided the 
founding mandate first for local care networks (and clinical governance 
networks) then CHD networks. As noted, the CHD networks quite readily 
adopted national mandates on evidence-based practice, indeed saw this as 
part of their rationale for existence. Network Urban CHD Network would not 
have been established but for the NSF. Besides the relevant National 
Service Framework the most influential mandates were, for Urban CHD 
Network and Regional CHD Network, the national access targets for 
revascularisation and hyperacute thrombolysis; and achieve the national 
stroke strategy, achieve the cardiac NSF and its quality standards. Later the 
Darzi report became an important mandate for Urban CHD Network: 
as far as services as they are now will look very different in ten years time with the 
advent of more services moving into the community and polyclinics and hospitals having 
different functions … then having your existing local district general hospitals either 
rubbed out of the equation altogether or having existing services built up to cover bigger 
geographic areas. So I think the risk of not just having a network and having individual 
PCTs whilst also having on top of that the strategic health authority in [region] … I think 
the miscommunication between all of those layers, that there is a risk [of that]. 
(Urban CHD Network, PCT Commissioner) 
This was less of a problem for Regional CHD Network, which was organised 
SHA-wide. 
Children's services remained politically salient at national level and in both 
that domain and the partly overlapping domain of mental health, a steady 
flow of more guidance concerned more with the organisation of services and 
inter-sectoral collaboration than with clinical technique or other client-level 
interventions had appeared from central government. The children's 
networks informants and documents also showed that they oriented much 
of the networks' planning and activities around Every Child Matters. For 
Child Mental Health Network the NSF on mental health (197) was also 
relevant, although little of the guidance it contained was specific to children. 
Other mandates for them were policy guidance about mental health services 
(e.g. a National Service Framework on Mental Health (Department of 
Health, 1999)) and the care of children (the Common Assessment 
Framework, Every Child Matters). Public Service Agreement 12 was 
important for CAMHS especially. The catalyst for the formation of the City 
Children's Network as a comprehensive Children's Trust Arrangement in the 
form of a Children and Young Person's Strategic Partnership (CYSP) came 
from a number of policy mandates. Particularly, Every Child Matters and the 
underpinning Children Act 2004 and the Childcare Act 2006 with its ten year 
strategy for children. 
The second major mandate was public and patient participation in the six 
NHS networks, but the effects were limited. In the NHS networks, lay 
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participation, although almost always described to us as desirable and 
necessary, was equally often added on to the network once its main 
membership and function were established. The two usual mechanisms (not 
mutually exclusive) were to add a lay advisory sub-group or to recruit lay 
members to existing network bodies, either permanently or to participate in 
once-off events such as local conferences (e.g. Child Mental Health 
Network). In some cases these were individuals already active as, and in 
that sense accredited as, 'lay representatives' in other nearby NHS bodies. 
The Children's Hospital Project Network had a 'very vocal' public partnership 
board (PPB) which was a sub-board of the Network Supervisory Board and 
chaired by a representative of a voluntary organisation. Proposals for the 
re-profiling of children's services had been intermittently reported in the 
local press for many years and had at times become controversial. As its 
plans matured, the Children's Hospital Project Network embarked during 
2006 on an extensive public consultation, which its co-ordinators described 
as 'the biggest thing the NHS has ever seen'. Over a period of 16 weeks it 
had involved over 800 public meetings and elicited 55,000 responses 
representing the views of some 250,000 people. An external consultancy 
processed the responses and its report presented a total of 13 options for 
service configuration, including the five originally proposed by the network. 
Turning to the CHD networks, Urban CHD Network had a very strong Heart 
Support Group and one of their key organisers was a member of the 
network in her role as a cardiac rehabilitation specialist nurse and acted as a 
patient conduit for issues raised at the group. Urban CHD Network also ran 
patient reference groups including users from all trusts in the network. This 
group favourably impressed one of our informants: 
they've worked well with patient groups so that's one thing that you know that the 
network meetings, there's always some interesting feedback from patient groups. The 
tricky thing is, again it's this kind of getting representation across all the PCTs, so you 
know we get feedback from someone from, who's had experience in a trust which is not 
in our area for instance. But those links are good, you know, I think it's really good to 
have that kind of feedback. 
(PCT public health doctor, Urban CHD Network) 
Patient representatives were generally given a slot on the network meeting 
agendas. At the time of writing Urban CHD Network was beginning to 
consider extending its professional educational activities to patient 
education, intending to start with educating patients about life-style after a 
heart attack. 
Due to its managerial and structural hiatus, there was less evidence of 
patient participation in Regional Cardiac Network. Its activities concentrated 
on cardiologists and managers producing guidelines, developing services 
and implementing other policies relevant to CHD. 
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Small CHD Network was nested in a wider cardiac network, which did much 
of the patient consultation and involvement work for the local nested care 
networks in common: 
what they [patients] want is good treatment, they want rapid access and good treatment 
at the time, they don't care who's involved. I know we've done workshops and road 
shows within A and E departments where we've had patients go in, we did one in [city] 
at the end of October [2006] and patients and public were invited to come down and 
were able to swap stories and because they'd been through the system their insights 
were used, and I know the cardiac networks are keen to have these patients 
involvement through PPI, so they come in and talk to them, and the people at the 
network do interviews with patients directly to get their views. 
(Ambulance representative, Small CHD Network) 
This network also planned to set up patient consultation groups by condition 
(infarct, heart failure etc.) but this had not yet materialised at the time of 
writing. These were to be co-ordinated via a fifth sub-group of the network. 
However: 
sometimes the problem is the patients who volunteer to do this aren't always the 
patients who, often it's the same people, often it's the white, middle class males who 
volunteer to do it. 
(Heart Failure Specialist Nurse, Small CHD Network) 
In the Small CHD Network, however, such patient participation as occurred 
did so at sub-group rather than whole-network level. In Small CHD 
Network: 
clinicians might feel that sometimes patients think what's good for them isn't 
necessarily… it sounds like a terribly pompous kind of doctor statement to make but 
sometimes, you know, there are aspects about clinical care that are not immediately 
obvious to patients but are actually quite important in terms of achieving meaningful 
clinical outcomes. 
(Cardiologist, Small CHD Network) 
CHD pilot site network set up a patient participation group with 14 members 
with a part-time co-ordinator. The most energetic and influential patient 
representative was active in a number of other NHS bodies intended for 
patient involvement, indeed recruited from one of them. The NHS-employed 
network members were interested in the lay representatives' comments but 
there was a mismatch of focus. The lay members were (not surprisingly) 
most inclined to comment on the concrete details of service provision – car 
parking at one hospital site, hospital food - but it was harder to sustain 
dialogue about the more general aspects of CHD services, the main concern 
of this programme network. In that respect Child Mental Health Network 
had better success but it was a care network still interested in just such 
details. Its activities included open days for the public, clients and any 
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interested local residents at its new children's centre. So far as we could 
tell, Regional CHD Network had little public involvement. 
Patient and public involvement, in terms of participation in both decision-
making and undertaking the network's core activity in the non-mandated 
user-controlled Self-Care Network far exceeded all the (eventually) 
mandated NHS networks. The difference was both in the proportion of 
network activity that user-members contributed and the nature of their 
contribution, which included active participation in exercise and social 
events. 
Thirdly, the networks faced ad hoc policy initiatives e.g. for cost 
containment in 2005-6, targets for waiting times and, for Children's Hospital 
Project Network, the EU Working Time Directive which had important 
practical implications for children's services. In 2007 the Department of 
Health asked the Urban CHD and Regional CHD Networks to include stroke 
medicine within their remit. 
Although not so frequently mentioned, the reform of NHS commissioning 
bodies was the mandate with greatest practical impacts on the networks. 
The concomitant polices of PCT withdrawal from a provider into a 
commissioning role, provider diversification, patient choice, payment by 
results and practice based commissioning had equally far-reaching 
implications. In general these mandates left little discretion about what the 
networks should do; the networks' freedoms lay in deciding how to 
implement the mandates. 
Less obvious, but important for the functioning and internal governance of 
the network was what might, adapting Therborn (109), be called the 
'impersonal mandate' underlying national guidance and guidelines, insofar 
as their evidence base was sound. This mandate arose from the 
underpinning clinical, aetiological or epidemiological evidence itself. Its 
strength therefore depended on the strength of the evidence base and of 
the science underlying the guidelines. This mandate was stronger, in the 
senses of being more detailed, having wider coverage and being more 
convincingly substantiated, for CHD than for children's services, especially 
mental health services for children. This type of 'scientifically' legitimated 
mandate was the basis of the authority which a network's 'boundary-
spanners' could exercise over clinicians in the member organisations' 
hinterlands. 
Mandate was a matter of degree. Self-Care Network was mandated to such 
a slight degree as to make it practically non-mandated, remaining 
essentially voluntary. Over time other study networks became subject to an 
accumulation of mandates, which came to dominate their objectives. 
Reporting an earlier study of cancer networks, Addicott et al. (37) stated: 
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At the moment, the managed function of these cancer networks represents a novel and 
distinctive structure that is not present to the same degree in networks in other clinical 
areas. 
(p.96) 
Since the data for Addicott's study were collected, however, English cancer 
networks appear to have lost much of their uniqueness in these respects. 
None of the six networks subject to national mandates rejected them. A 
possible explanation is that all these individuals simply agreed with the 
mandates. One would expect that attitude to prevail more among managers 
than other occupations, but it would also be difficult for non-managers to 
reject the evidence-based components of national mandates about how 
clinical practice ought to be undertaken. None of our informants rejected the 
idea of evidence basing and most positively endorsed it. 
Furthermore, except in Self-Care Network, the network co-ordinators (the 
most influential role in the network) were all NHS managers. The same 
policy mandates as applied to the networks also applied to their member 
organisations or departments, giving current policy mandates a double 
salience for them. We nevertheless found that interviewees' knowledge of 
current DH policy and guidance was at times uneven or incomplete. 
The nearest any network came to questioning its mandate, and then a 
prospective rather than an actual current mandate, was that some members 
of Urban CHD Network expressed a fear that the network might be used to 
legitimate cost and service cuts that really arose from implementing the 
Darzi report. An informant in Small CHD Network, in its days as a care 
network, thought the Department of Health: 
seems to be pushing two messages out at the same time, saying, we should thrombolite 
them [acute coronary syndrome patients] as early as we can and we should get them in 
for primary angioplasty as early as we can. 
(Ambulance representative, Small CHD Network) 
Much as the announcement of PCT merger or reconfiguration was liable to 
produce planning blight in a network, so could the expectation of national 
mandates on clinical subjects: 
you almost feel like the network has been the intermediary between you know what's 
happening at national level and what's happening at local level and … rather than 
going, “Oh well look you know we've just got to wait for the NICE guidelines, we can't do 
anything until then”, it would have been I think more constructive way of looking at it to 
go, “Well look, what it is we can do within this uncertainty? … Let's have some agreed 
interim positions for instance”. 
(PCT public health doctor, Urban CHD Network) 
The same informant said that ill-defined guidance was also disabling – it left 
unclear what bases the network or PCTs were likely to be assessed on. As 
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an example he cited the unexplained term 'validation' in a recent (2008) 
target and the measures of NSF target compliance. 
In general the mandates were accepted and every effort made to implement 
them as a duty: 
Government policy is a must do and we'd all be foolish to think that isn't the case, so you 
know, you have to try and – the network has to try and bring those two things together 
as best they can. So i.e. if we're following Government policy, yes we need to clinically 
have people on board, but we need to be going in a certain direction which is seemed to 
be the right way. 
(Urban CHD Network, PCT Commissioner) 
Indeed there was evidence of targets actually being more than accepted; 
they [staff in member organisations] don't see a target as an aspiration, they see a target 
as a worse case scenario, in the case of something like [the] 18 weeks [hospital waiting 
time target], so yes, we don't want anybody to wait more than 18 weeks because that's 
the national target but actually that's the worst we want our patients to wait, and if, its 
very common now that if the national target says outpatients is 13 weeks now and yet 
they're working at 3 weeks and seeing that as a problem because its not less than 2 
weeks. 
(deputy co-ordinator, Small CHD Network) 
 6.2  Prior networks, mandates and PCT re-organisation 
Previously (chapter 5) we mentioned how an 'evolutionary capture' of 
voluntary networks occurred once a PCT or SHA became network 'host' and 
co-ordinating body. In greater detail, the usual sequence of events was this: 
1. All mandated networks were initially formed either emergently or 
deliberately. 
2. A PCT or SHA became the network co-ordinating body. 
3. Re-organisation of PCTs was announced in late 2005. There followed 
a period of anticipatory 'planning blight' in which PCTs were reluctant 
to make decisions about networks pending re-organisation of the PCTs 
themselves. 
4. The PCTs themselves were merged and then re-organised. A second 
hiatus followed whilst managerial posts involved in the networks were 
re-configured, re-filled or in same cases could not be filled because of 
the difficulty of attracting applicants to temporary posts. 
5. After the PCTs were re-organised, the new management would then 
review the role and structure of the networks. During this period the 
new mandate was formulated, adopted by the network and 
implemented. 
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6. Children's Hospital Project Network alone experienced an additional 
step. The Secretary of State's decision about the future clinical service 
configuration constituted a mandate not only for the network itself but 
also for its member organisations. It also mandated that existing ad 
hoc working parties and committees be formed into a project network 
formally charged with implementing this re-profiling project. 
7. The other mandated networks emerged as an implementation 
structure for new policy or managerial mandates (targets, EBM, other 
guidance). In the care networks the most important effect was to 
change the networks' function. In practice this meant a shift in 
membership towards commissioning interests, a larger role for 
hospitals and a smaller one for primary care, a wider remit and 
geographical coverage.  
8. In all but one (Child Mental Health Network) of the care networks, 
this re-foundation was accomplished by merging several smaller care 
networks, each the size of a pre-merger PCT, into a larger network of a 
size now corresponding to a merged PCT. Child Mental Health Network 
was exceptional because it continued to operate within a single 
unmerged PCT. Its membership decreased slightly but the balance still 
shifted towards stronger commissioner representation. 
This transitional period lasted only a couple of months in some of the 
networks (Children's Hospital Project Network, Child Mental Health Network) 
but in others considerably longer, approaching 18 months in one (Regional 
CHD Network). During this time the networks' function and membership 
changed. Other network activity diminished or ceased. A subsequent 
sedimentation of additional mandates gradually altered the networks' 
objectives and activity. 
 6.3  Mandates and re-organising network structure 
New policies for NHS commissioning were the mandates which had the most 
radical effect on the study networks, changing the function of five of our 
study networks. This occurred earliest in Urban CHD Network, during 2006-
7 in networks, Small CHD Network, City Children's Network, and somewhat 
later, in the second half of 2008, in Child Mental Health Network. In City 
Childrens Network: 
It's changed though in the last few months. … to become commissioning focussed rather 
than having everybody round the table at the Children and Young people's board. … 
And what we've moved to now is a children's trust board which has just got the partners 
around the table who have a duty to cooperate, which are commissioners … What we 
decided to do was get to the point where we needed to be clear about what groups 
needed to be in place to deliver the agenda, the commissioning agenda, and what 
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arrangements we needed to have in place to network other people in, particularly 
providers. 
(City Children's Network, NHS Chief Operating Officer) 
Towards the end of the study period, however, even informants in Urban 
CHD Network were saying that they were still learning how to operate in a 
commissioning-based health system. 
Concomitantly networks were merged. The direct cause of this was merger 
of the PCTs which were the geographical and organisational units on which 
the networks had originally been formed and had provided the managerial 
'hosting' for the networks. However the merger of PCTs had, besides the 
more widely publicised rationale of 'reducing bureaucracy' , a rationale 
reflecting their more substantial commissioning function; that of 
strengthening PCTs' negotiating position with providers by increasing the 
ratio of providers to commissioners. That would increase provider 
contestability. By the same reasoning, networks covering many providers 
would be better adapted to 'support' PCTs' commissioning activity. In this 
context, the most important providers in terms of costs (and political 
visibility) are secondary not primary care providers. 
If it was not the case already, one member organisation became host to the 
network's managers and infrastructure, and hence the main conduit for new 
policy mandates into the network. The co-ordinator(s) also became the 
network member(s) held accountable to higher layers of NHS management 
for ensuring that the network as a whole was implementing its mandates. 
The effects upon network structures of imposing a new or revising an 
existing mandate depended upon whether the new mandate changed the 
function of the network. Consequently, although NHS reorganisations 
impacted upon the structure of the Children's Hospital Project Network 
project network, the changes in other mandates did not. The organisational 
structures of both its provider and its PCT member organisations changed, 
resulting in some changes in the ways in which hospital sites and other 
providers were grouped and some changes in the top-level managerial 
personnel. These changes disrupted network activity but, apart from re-
grouping some of the member organisations and changing which individuals 
represented them, had no further lasting effect on the network structures. 
Both PCT re-organisation and network re-mandate led to a review of the 
activities, membership and function of the existing network. During these 
periods network members tended to assume – often correctly, later events 
showed – that the reformed member organisations would review what they 
wanted the network to achieve and what resources they would or could 
commit to it. Once the member organisations had re-structured themselves, 
they sometimes (e.g. Small CHD Network ) saw the event as an opportunity 
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to review and re-structure the network itself. What differed between sites 
was what level the network was then reviewed at, i.e. whether the PCT, 
SHA or DH took on the role of reviewing the network and making proposals 
for revising its functions or mode of organisation. 
Although the commissioning agencies went through a series of 
reorganisations there was continuity in terms of the strategic leadership and 
facilitation in Small CHD Network. Nevertheless even in this network: 
as far as motivation goes, I think it's a tough task at the moment, because of the 
constant changes that are going on, within networks, PCTs, ambulance trusts, it's really 
disruptive. You know, there are massive changes going on at the moment, and it is 
difficult. 
(Ambulance representative, Small CHD Network) 
In Regional CHD Network the hiatus was compounded by the difficulty of 
recruiting two successive replacement network managers and a period in 
which senior managers were reported (they did not tell us themselves) to 
have expressed doubts about the usefulness of networks per se. During that 
time managerial responsibility for sustaining the network passed from PCT 
to SHA and then, about 18 months later, back to one PCT (responsible for 
the whole network). The incoming new network manager then faced nine 
months hard work to rebuild member organisations' confidence in the 
presence, reliability and value of the network. 
In the case of the project network in Children's Hospital Project Network 
charged with negotiating a very complex re-profiling of hospital services, 
from August 2005, we had had a joint committee of PCT teams to represent the then 
seventeen-PCT population and [then] from the 1st of October 2006 we had to have a new 
committee, we had to completely start from scratch. As it happened there were some 
with continuity of membership but that was by happenstance. 
(Co-ordinator, Children's Hospital Project Network) 
Re-starting its consultation afresh, this time with thirteen PCTs, the network 
was nevertheless able to decide its re-profiling strategy in December 2006 
but three local authority Overview and Scrutiny Committees still objected. 
An independent review decided 'vision upheld' in August 2007. Thus, 
although NHS reorganisation had a disruptive effect, this network was able 
to recover relatively swiftly from it. Indeed, of the study networks it 
recovered fastest. Elsewhere the usual consequence was a stasis of network 
activity during this period, which seldom lasted fewer than six months. 
The polar case was Regional CHD Network after it was formed by merging 
two sub-regional CHD collaboratives was hosted at the SHA headquarters. 
The network co-ordinator post remained unfilled for a period, as did four 
(i.e. half) of the posts for service improvement managers to support this 
and a number of other networks. At mid 2008 still no decision had been 
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made about where the network would be hosted and so the network had to 
advertise service improvement manager posts in the knowledge that they 
might be re-located and that they could only offer a short-term contract of 
employment. These conditions severely restricted network activity. 
Even when restructuring was over, policy vacillations in higher-level NHS 
bodies could still make a network's activity difficult. Thus in Urban CHD 
Network: 
[NHS regional body] is sending, different information [about clinical service models] 
depending on how at a higher level things are changing all the time, people are just 
getting fed up with it and just saying well you said something different last week, or you 
said something different the month before. 
(Urban CHD Network, PCT Commissioner) 
Usually re-organising network structure, including network mergers, 
disrupted their internal processes. Restructuring of networks' member 
organisations disrupted the member organisations' ability to contribute to 
network activity, for instance through changes in the personnel who 
attended network activities, including changes of the personnel who played 
central roles in running the networks (e.g. the network chair, support 
managers). 
Not all networks were disrupted. In City Children's Network no large scale 
re-organisations occurred after the sea-change of extending network remit 
and membership from just social services at local authority level to the 
broader remit of children's services. Despite the positive effect which this 
winning a grant had on members' morale, the addition of a mandate from 
NIMHE had no effect at all on the structure of Self-Care Network because 
the network's overall dependence on this grant was low, and because 
preparation of the grant application was ancillary to the network's main 
activities. 
Where networks were exposed to restructuring of their member 
organisations (especially of the co-ordinating body) and of the local health 
economies, the effects were disruptive in the short term. The disruption was 
exacerbated by the simultaneous restructuring and mergers of PCTs and, 
above all, the changes in network function. Restructuring of local health 
economies and of the organisations within them destabilised the CHD 
networks especially, and the Child Mental Health Network which was most 
focussed on care pathways. Member organisations appeared and 
disappeared, individuals became disillusioned and dropped out. The 
experience of Regional CHD Network suggests that stability in post of 
network manager was very important because network co-ordination 
depends on tacit knowledge, trust and informal links. Unlike their 
counterparts in bureaucracies, network managers are not readily 
substitutable person for person. With each re-structuring of the member 
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organisations, let alone the whole local health economy, network links, trust 
and culture between network members have had to be re-established. 
Often it is assumed that longevity of a network will allow stable links 
between members to form, which will facilitate the transmission of 
resources, information etc. through the network and so promote the 
network's effectiveness. The evidence of the effects of NHS re-organisations 
suggest an important qualification. This effect only occurs, if the function of 
the network also remains stable; longevity is therefore necessary but not 
sufficient for relationality to consolidate. Conversely, as Self-Care Network 
demonstrated, strong relationality can build up even in relatively short-lived 
(new) networks based on a common experience and identity of the 
individual members. 
 6.4  Additional membership and network performance 
 6.4.1  Network mergers 
The NHS-based networks' main source of additional membership was 
merger following the mergers of their host PCTs. The main effects of the act 
of merging upon network structure are described above. Besides them, the 
policy mandates which caused the mergers had the following effects on 
network performance. 
When networks serve different functions their outcomes, performance and 
effectiveness are not commensurable, making it logically impossible to say 
that they changed from being less effective to being more effective (or the 
opposite) in the same terms. It is nevertheless possible from our data to 
infer that: 
 1. The loss or reduced role of primary care members, makes it reasonable to 
infer that the programme networks became less effective in the task of 
actually managing (operating) care pathways, especially within primary 
care. 
 2. Enlargement also meant that networks acquired a more complex co-
ordinating structure and became more complex to manage. 
 3. In the context of English health policy during the study period, the 
changing profile of network membership and the increased power of the 
networks' co-ordinating bodies shifted networks objectives and artefacts 
towards a commissioning support ('programme') and away for an 
immediate 'care' function. 
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 6.4.2  Additional providers 
The addition of new providers occurred in two of the children's networks 
(City Children's Network and Child Mental Health Network). It was not, even 
in the relatively fragmented and disparate third sector, that the networks 
suddenly discovered providers of which they had been unaware. Rather, 
existing members (e.g. councillors, in City Children's Network) proposed to 
involve existing organisations (e.g. Youth Offending Teams) in the network. 
City Children's Network gained stronger and wider City Council 
representation (e.g. including the police and more councillors). By adding 
new care groups to the networks' remit and hence the range of services 
covered, a wider range of professions became involved. In one of the 
children's services networks this had a complicating effect, although a 
necessary one in that some previously marginalised agendas now came to 
the fore: 
one of the issues was whether it was a subcommittee of the city council or whether it's a 
partnership and at times it behaves as if it's a subcommittee of the council i.e. it's 
chaired by the council lead and supported by the director for children and social care. 
Now over the past 12 months we've changed that so that it is actually a partnership 
body but unfortunately it does still hold … statutory responsibilities that only the city 
council have, mainly safeguarding and children's trusts. 
(Assistant Chief Constable, City Children's Network) 
In City Children's Network the contribution which these additional members 
made to the effectiveness the programme network was in terms of their 
inputs to the draft service level agreements and making the network aware 
of the integrated nature of CYP care and development. In both City 
Children's Network and Child Mental Health Network, managers and non-
medical professions were more to the fore in the membership and decision-
making. 
Child Mental Health Network obtained a two-year grant from central 
government to set up a new children's centre which soon became one of the 
main points of referral in the network. For a care network, the addition of 
new provision, particularly on this relatively large scale, necessarily 
increased the effectiveness of the network in providing access to services. 
Whether it increased network effectiveness in therapeutic terms has to 
remain an open question given the paucity of evidence of what the effective 
models of care for children with long-term mental health problems are. 
For two of the CHD networks an effect of concentrating on the inter-
organisation division of labour and the broad flows of patients between 
providers was to expose the strategic importance of certain less salient 
service providers. Urban CHD Network and Regional CHD Network prudently 
added to their co-ordinating body representation of an organisation on 
which it was most resource-dependent, the ambulance service: 
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I get the impression that I'm there to sort of put my hand up and say “actually you've 
done that wrong and that would affect us” and they'll say “oh we have discussed it” but 
actually [they] haven't. From my point of view it would be a case of “you want to do this 
but …we can't do that because then we're going to deplete this area of ambulance 
service cover”, so there are confines that you work within. 
(Urban CHD Network, Ambulance Operations Manager) 
CHD pilot site invested a substantial proportion of its income and activity in 
strengthening laboratory support for CHD services. 
When there was a change from a care to a commissioning network as in the 
CHD networks, medical members (cardiologists, but also a minority of public 
health doctors) were, we observed, already important figures in decision-
making but now hospital consultant cardiologists became more central and 
salient to the networks, especially cardiologists who were also medical 
directors. In becoming commissioning networks, the CHD networks created 
another route by which doctors could influence, indeed enter, NHS 
managerial activity. 
Despite central policy support for increasing the commercial provision of 
NHS services, the growing numbers of them contracted to the NHS and the 
fact that commercial health care providers are relatively heavily 
concentrated in the territories served by two of our CHD networks (Urban 
CHD Network, Regional CHD Network), none of the study networks recruited 
any commercial healthcare providers as organisation-members of the 
networks although the development of care pathways in Urban CHD 
Network was evidently of interest to pharmaceutical companies: 
A lot of pharmaceutical companies have contacted me to find out if we're coming up with 
guidelines, network guidelines that might mention their products in there. And obviously 
I'm very cautious about our involvement in that but I see no reason why we can't open 
dialogue as long as we speak equally the same, you know, treat all of the companies in 
the same way. … We obviously are committed to following NICE guidelines so we 
wouldn't be particularly recommending a product from one or other company anyway. 
(Urban CHD Network, Assistant Network Director) 
In this respect mandating the networks made no difference to their 
performance. One might infer that this is because, as independent 
providers, such organisations are under no obligation to participate. Neither, 
however, are third sector providers, yet these did participate in the 
children's networks in City Children's Network and Child Mental Health 
Network, indeed making up a around a third of the member organisations in 
the latter. 
The merged networks increased in terms of numbers of members due to the 
greater numbers of organisations and wider geographical coverage. One 
effect was to produce a potentially unmanageably large network (reported 
in Urban CHD Network). At the same time, a shift towards a commissioning 
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support function meant that the commissioner representatives became the 
links into the networks' (new) core process (of commissioning) rather than 
the provider, especially primary care, members. For this reason, although it 
also incidentally solved the problem of unwieldiness, the network co-
ordinating bodies tended to get smaller not larger as a result of the network 
mergers. In Urban CHD Network for example, and in City Children's 
Network, Board members tended to equate the board members with the 
network, selectively adding other members ad hoc for specific tasks. Hence 
another effect of growth was to make the definition of network membership 
less clear at the periphery: 
it was just passed over to me as something that I should be part of, you know like I was 
given the e-mail. 
(Director of Public Health, Urban CHD Network) 
Our Director's good for that she'll say “I heard this ….” or “I was reading ….” whatever, 
some new trial, shall we look into it, you know. There's one at the minute, there's a 
percutaneous valve replacement on the clinical side of things, a new way of doing valves 
in surgery, so we're kind of like going to look into that – that's a new service, how's it 
going to be commissioned, what's going to happen? 
(City Children's Network, Commissioning Development Manager) 
Some but not all governance mechanisms changed. With the shift in focus 
described above, there was much less scope for practical reciprocal help-in-
kind of the sort found in localised care networks. Instead, the enlarged 
networks relied more on issuing guidance, prominently including evidence-
based guidance and guidelines for clinical practice (a quasi-hierarchical 
mechanism (198). Increasingly normalised managerial activities became 
necessary for co-ordinating the network (which is slight support for 
hypothesis H2E). 
 6.5  Summary 
Prior social and professional networks influence affected the operation of a 
new mandated network by providing the initial membership and ties 
together with implicit objectives. However, the networks' response to 
mandate served to transform an emergent structure serving its founder-
members' interests into an implementation structure. As time elapsed an 
accretion of mandates resulted in new, stronger external accountability 
chains, in the formalisation and normalisation of working practices, and the 
development of a co-ordinating body with secretariat ('network 
administrative organisation'); in short, in a managerialisation of the 
networks. Networks acquired multiple functions sedimented within each. 
Prior voluntary networks persisted within subsequently-mandated networks 
(as H2D hypothesised) but as contributing only part – and a decreasing 
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proportion – of the networks' accumulating objectives, activities and 
artefacts. 
Our hypothesis (H2B) that mandated networks are 'enclaves' in the sense of 
having a formally defined and closed membership was also supported. 
Membership of mandated networks was by invitation from the co-ordinating 
body, on the basis of relevance to the network's mandates. Conversely, 
Child Mental Health Network excluded those not deemed relevant once it 
became mandated. In respect of our hypothesis (H2A) that mandated 
networks would include involuntary members, we found little supporting 
evidence. Uninterested or inconveniently critical people dropped out – 
sometime acrimoniously – or were never recruited. Representatives of 
member organisations instead appeared uniformly to be voluntary recruits. 
Contrary to our prediction, opposition was by exit (although with some 
'voice' beforehand).  
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 7  Participation  
Here we sought to ascertain: 
RQ3a: What determines the way in which member organisations use 
relational co-ordination structures? 
RQ3b: What determines the effectiveness of member organisations' use 
of these structures? 
We constructed the following hypotheses for the SNA : 
H3A: Network nodes (individuals, organisations) with more extensive 
network links have greater propensity to engage in innovative activity 
(because they have more sources of external ideas and feedback). 
H3B: Organisations whose internal culture is more favourable to 
collaboration will have more extensive network links (because that 
culture also favours inter-organisational collaboration). 
We interpreted the phrase 'use relational co-ordination structures' as 
meaning 'participate in the networks'; and 'effectiveness of … use' as 
meaning 'use the networks to promote innovation and influence referrals'. 
Our findings on the links between performance ( as defined above ) and 
participation in the networks are reported in chapter 12 so here we focus on 
innovation-related activity and upon service users' (patients', carers') 
participation in the networks. 
 7.1  Patterns of participation 
In general at the inter-organisational (node) level, network member 
organisations were highly connected to each other. In every network, ego 
densities (that is, the proportion of theoretically available links which each 
member organisation actually reported having) were high. Measures ranged 
from 52% to 100%. Thus every member reported direct links, on at least 
one level of interaction (patient referrals, help-in-kind etc.), to at least half 
the other network members. Even for the least connected network (Urban 
CHD Network), the mean ego density score was 0.76. Another measure of 
this high degree of connectedness was that nodes' reach centrality scores 
were all high (ranging from 0.66 to 1.00, the maximum possible). 
Mostly network members had direct links with each other, not via 
intermediaries. Because of the high proportion of directly-linked nodes, 
nodes' normalised brokerage scores were conversely low (range 0 to 0.24 
across all the networks) because a brokerage role relies on the 'broker' 
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acting as intermediary between other network members who would not 
otherwise be linked. 
Many people whom network co-ordinators had identified as network 
members nevertheless did not see themselves as such, even though they 
were reported, or even reported themselves, as active network members. 
Although our survey questionnaire explained that responses even from 
people who did not consider themselves network members would be useful 
to us, a number of respondents sent messages saying that they would not 
respond because they considered that they were not network members 
(Table 6). As has also been reported of Australian networks (2) it was 
noticeable how variable, and generally slight, general practice participation 
in network structures was, considering the number of general practices and 
the importance of primary care for both CHD and children's' services. The 
great majority of general practices were only passively involved (as 
recipients of guidance etc.) At the opposite pole were GPs who had been 
founders and leading figures in local networks (Child Mental Health Network, 
Regional CHD Network). Other classes of organisation were likewise eligible 
to participate in some networks but only a few of them actually did. Thus, in 
Child Mental Health Network only a few nurseries or school nurses were in 
contact with the network although in theory all of them were eligible to be. 
In these categories were large numbers of organisations all with a legitimate 
claim to participate, if they wished, in the networks; but the networks' 
activity was rather marginal to their own and no intermediary mechanism 
existed whereby one representative of one such organisation could attend 
(say, by rota) to represent the whole category. 
In Self-Care Network participation in network events was the criterion of 
membership. Members' levels of participation varied, above all when 
individuals had recurrences of their mental health problems but also for 
simple practical reasons such as whether bus services operated punctually 
(or at all) or whether friends could give them a lift to network events. There 
was clearly a kernel of volunteers, service users and professionals 
organising Self-Care Network events but membership of the Self-Care 
Network was blurred between those running it and those attending its 
events. 
Organisations' participation in Child Mental Health Network appeared to 
depend partly upon how interested their representative happened to be and 
upon case-load exigencies for the practitioners, but also upon how central 
the network's activities were to that member's own work and interests. 
Thus, social services and health visitor representatives attended regularly, 
as did CAMHS members and, latterly, PCT commissioning managers, but 
GPs rarely. Attendance, however, did not always mean convergence of 
interests: 
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at the end of the day we are organisations with sometimes conflicting objectives. You 
know, our [police] objective is in relation to crime reduction [...] but we accept that other 
people have got different objectives and views on things. For example do we work with a 
health trust in order to provide or to ensure the provision of sexual health support to 
young prostitutes sometimes or do we take the view that actually it's more important to 
work with the community and try to remove the obvious presence of prostitutes? [...] 
we've got different objectives and we try and help each other to achieve our respective 
ones. 
(Assistant Chief Constable, City Children's Network) 
In Regional CHD and Small CHD Networks participation also seemed to 
depend on its likely impact upon the member's work. Against the odds given 
their heavy clinical and managerial responsibilities, two leading cardiologists 
participated actively because they believed the network would influence 
both the referral flows and the profile (location, specialisations, and 
capacity) of their own hospital cardiology services. A pattern of participation 
among Urban CHD Network member organisations was that they would, so 
to speak, drop into the network when they wanted something from it (e.g. 
advice on a proposed service development) and then somewhat drop out 
again. Cardiologists had greater input and influence in the CHD network 
activities than their relatively small numbers would suggest, making a 
predictably large contribution to producing the technical guidance which was 
the main co-ordination artefact for these networks. The clinical leads for 
these networks were all hospital cardiologists. In terms of occupational 
groups, the most numerous active members in many of the networks (Child 
Mental Health Network, Urban CHD Network, Children's Hospital Project 
Network, Small CHD Network) had a nursing background, often either as 
nurse specialists or nurse managers. The organisations (PCTs, in every case 
except Regional CHD Network and Self-Care Network) which hosted the co-
ordinating bodies made the largest practical contribution to co-ordinating 
the networks. 
 7.2  Innovation through participation 
We hypothesised (H3A) that member organisations which participated more 
fully in networks, in the sense of having connections to a greater number of 
other network member organisations, would therefore undertake more 
innovation-related activity. From the ten survey fields about participation in 
innovatory activities, we assembled a score (one point for each activity 
ticked). These scores reflected participation in the activities characteristic of 
the development and implementation of evidence-based based medicine. 
These were: feedback about changed care processes before they were fully 
implemented; talking to health professionals outside one's own organisation 
about care processes; reviewing research for new ideas; participating in 
committees outside one's own organisation that are working on care 
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processes; seeking data that compares different organisations' performance 
of my organisation'; pilot projects; Plan-Do-Check-Act or similar quality 
improvement audits; site visits to other organisations. For short we call 
them 'innovation-related activities'. This is a narrower concept than the 
more widely-used concept of 'innovation' (199). 
Network by network, we tested member organisations' innovation related 
activity scores for association with the organisation's connectivity 
characteristics of network nodes (ego density; degree; reach; betweenness; 
flow betweenness) and for association with the nodes' E-I indices (Table 9). 
(Correlation scores range from 1.0 (perfect correlation) to 0.0 (no 
correlation) to -1.0 (perfect correlation between increased innovation and 
decreased connectivity)). 
Table 9. Correlations between Innovation-related activities and links 
within the networks 
 Correlation (Spearman's rho) between innovation scores 
and:  
  
Degree 
Degree 
centrality 
Reach 
centrality 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Flow 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Small CHD Network 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.13 
Self-Care Network -0.38 -0.08 -0.38 -0.44 -0.56 
Children's Hospital 
Project Network 
-0.37 -0.05 -0.422* -0.34 -0.17 
Urban CHD Network 0.674* 0.69* 0.67* 0.67* 0.69* 
Child Mental Health 
Network 
0.17 0.26 0.17 0.14 0.29 
* = Significant at alpha=0.05. 
The findings for Self-Care Network have to be interpreted very cautiously. 
Innovation related activities were relatively few in Self-Care Network 
because of the absence of, indeed very limited scope for, formal evidence-
basing. For example there was no possible equivalent to clinical audit in that 
network. They had no equivalent of a professional or scientific literature to 
draw upon. However Self-Care Network members could visit other 
organisations to discover good practices. They could also discuss among 
themselves and pilot new ways of promoting the physical health of adults 
with long-term mental health problems. A priori one would therefore expect 
the scores for innovation-related activity, as defined above, to be lower in 
Self-Care Network. In the case of Self-Care Network, the scores mostly 
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express the responses of private individuals rather than the representatives 
of organisations. 
For internal links, innovation activities were consistently significantly 
associated with connectedness in only one network (Urban CHD Network), 
albeit the largest. This pattern is as reported in studies (96,200) of 
networks outside the health sector. In our other study networks, though, no 
significant association was found (except for reach centrality in one 
network, and that was a negative correlation). This pattern suggests that 
the association between innovation activities and network connectedness 
applies only under specific conditions, found in Urban CHD Network and not 
the other study networks. As explanatory conditions we eliminated: 
 Care group served (lack of correlation was found in one CHD and one 
children's services network) 
 State of development of evidence-based practice. Granted evidence 
based practice is poorly developed for children's mental health services 
(Stenhouse et al, submitted) and for physical self-care for adults with 
mental health problems, but the same does not apply to acute care for 
children (Children's Hospital Project Network). 
 Network function (lack of correlation was found in programme 
networks and the project network) 
 Network density. Although Urban CHD Network was less dense than 
the others, all the study networks were relatively dense (see above) 
 Non-hierarchical structure. As explained in the following chapter, all 
the networks scored low in terms of the formal (Krackhardt GTD or 
Burt) measures of hierarchy. 
 Mandate; the lack of correlation was found in both voluntary and 
mandated networks. 
 Network size. The correlation between connectivity and innovation 
was found in one of the two largest networks (in terms of population 
and territory covered), but not in Children's Hospital Project Network 
which served a similar population and had a greater number of 
member organisations. 
 Occupations: there was no consistent pattern of occupational 
difference between Urban CHD Network and the others. 
 Preponderance of NHS member organisations. 
A possible explanation arises from the combination of two factors. The 
network co-ordinating body had relatively low centrality in Children's 
Hospital Project Network; and the CHD networks' mandates included or 
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implied various innovation-related activities. So, more in this network than 
the others, member organisations relied on each other and not just the co-
ordinating body as a source of evidence about clinical practice. This 
inference however requires further research to substantiate. Where the 
above associations do exist, it remains an unanswered question whether a 
higher degree of intra-network connectedness helps promote innovation-
making activity; or vice-versa with innovative activity stimulating linkage 
with other network member organisations. 
By repeating the above analyses but substituting E-I indices for measures of 
connectedness within the network we were able to test the analogous 
hypothesis about external connectivity. Table 10 shows the results. 
Table 10. Innovation-related activities and links outside the network 
 Correlation (Spearman's rho) between innovation 
scores and E-I index 
Small CHD Network 0.40 
Self-Care Network -0.56 
Children's Hospital Project 
Network 
-0.466* 
Urban CHD Network -0.606* 
Child Mental Health 
Network 
0.35 
* = Significant at alpha=0.05. 
Two networks had a strong and significant correlation between external 
linkage and innovation activities. The others did not. The association was 
found in one CHD network, indeed the same network that showed the 
association between innovation and internal connectedness; and one 
children's network. Contrary to what studies in other networks report (see 
above), however, that correlation was negative. 
Given our qualitative data, we speculate that the negative correlation 
between innovation-related activity and external links appeared for the 
following reasons. Policy guidance at the time stipulated various service 
standards (e.g. those in the NSFs) and EBM-related activities. Innovation-
related activity of the (mandated) networks consisted in implementing these 
policies rather than inventing new processes of care. Through their co-
ordinating bodies (SHA or PCT) the networks in which the negative 
correlation appeared were mandated to implement these policies and 
guidelines through the network. Thus, the more closely connected a 
member organisation was to the rest of the network and the fewer links 
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outside the network it had, the more it partook of innovation-related 
activities of the types demanded by policy and national clinical guidelines at 
the time. 
In summary, connectedness within one of the largest networks was 
significantly positively associated, and in two of the largest networks 
external connectedness was negatively associated, with innovation-related 
activity. But in the other three smaller networks, there was simply no 
association between connectedness and innovation-related activity. 
 7.3  Culture, collaboration and participation 
In order to look at the relationship between collaboration and the culture in 
the network, we hypothesised (H3B) that member organisations with a 
more favourable culture would also have denser network links. This analysis 
treated the questionnaire data as the responses of individuals rather than of 
the organisations which those individuals represented in the network. 
Organisational 'culture' was defined in terms of individuals' confidence in 
their colleagues respect and willingness to discuss difficult questions 
constructively; and in terms of willingness to work alongside their present 
colleagues. Organisation culture was expressly defined as an attribute of the 
respondent's home organisation, not as an attribute of the network as a 
whole. 
Nodes' (organisations') culture scores were higher for the two children's 
than for the two CHD networks. The user-experience network's culture score 
was nearer that of the CHD than the children's networks. Using similar 
methods as for H3A we tested node culture scores for correlation with the 
connectivity for each node. Table 11 shows that no statistically significant 
correlations were found although some of the coefficients have high (but 
negative) values. 
Table 11. Correlations (Spearmans rho) between culture and connectivity 
 E-I 
index 
Degree Degree 
centrality 
Reach 
centrality 
Between-
ness 
centrality 
Flow 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Small CHD 
Network 
0.95 -0.82 -0.63 -0.82 -0.63 -0.63 
Self-Care 
Network 
-
0.56 
-0.73 -0.05 -0.73 -0.73 -0.15 
Children's 
Hospital 
-
0.02 
-0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.15 -0.15 
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Project 
Network 
Urban CHD 
Network 
-
0.20 
-0.44 -0.30 0.17 -0.13 -0.04 
Child 
Mental 
Health 
Network 
0.22 -0.28 -0.14 -0.62 -0.02 -0.06 
None significant at alpha=0.05 
Table 11 shows a general absence, in the networks studied, of significant 
correlations between culture within the member organisations and the 
extent of their connectivity to other organisations within the network. A 
similar absence of significant correlation between between culture and 
connectivity to organisations outside the network was found in all the study 
networks. 
Provided that they are not a measurement artefact (the instruments have 
previously been applied in the USA but not, so far as we know, in the UK), 
these findings consistently tell against the hypothesis (H3B) that member 
organisations whose internal culture is more favourable to collaboration will 
also have denser network links. Neither, therefore, is there evidence that 
closer participation in the network improves the internal culture of the 
member organisations. 
Our qualitative data analysis did however suggest that culture within the 
network influenced members' willingness to participate. Climate within the 
network depended upon how members perceived the other network 
members treated them; that is upon the quality of network 'relationality'. 
Indeed the quality of network relationality influenced whether members 
participated constructively or the opposite: 
we had a very bad meeting where we [primary care members] all turned up from our 
[sub-]network to see what was going on and we were really badly treated. I stood up 
and they [regional cardiology centre representatives] all said, “Right we're going to 
launch it [a new service plan], right we're going to do this”. And I said, “But have you 
discussed it with the PCTs and the primary care and what was the primary care 
involvement?” And they just basically told me to shut up and they didn't care. So I went 
and scuppered the whole thing (laughs). I went home and shouted at a few primary care 
people and stopped it happening. 
(GP lead for a member PCT, Regional CHD Network) 
This GP had been a leading, indeed founder, member of one of the local 
CHD networks which merged to form Regional CHD Network. She and 
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several others left the network, as did the former network co-ordinator in 
the Child Mental Health Network when it became mandated. These events 
tell against hypothesis H2A. Although revealing, these conflicts were 
exceptional. City Children's Network had an opposite atmosphere of explicit 
inclusiveness based on an interpretation of Children's Services so broad that 
such a service as Youth Offending still regarded itself as part of the network 
even though the manager did not have a place on the Board: 
Oh I've been … head of service for about three years … I was a member of the 
operational management group that reported to the board but because of how busy we 
are ... I'm involved in a range of partnerships. So therefore it wasn't always essential 
that I attended and I was sort of more focussed on our own youth offending service 
management board which has the chief exec of the PCT, senior police, senior probation 
officers and is represented on the Trust Board. 
(City Children's Network, Head of Youth Offending) 
As described in the following chapter, this network was one in which the 
different views and interests of member organisations were recognised and 
mutually accommodated. 
 7.4  Service user participation 
Service user involvement in voluntary networks is, we hypothesised (H3C) 
more extensive but uneven than in mandated networks. Mandates produced 
public and patient participation in the six NHS networks, but the effects 
were limited. In the NHS networks, lay participation, although almost 
always described to us as desirable and necessary, was equally often added 
on to the network once its main membership and function were established. 
The two usual mechanisms were to add a lay advisory sub-group (e.g. CHD 
pilot site); or to recruit lay members to existing network bodies, either 
permanently or to participate in once-off events such as local conferences 
(e.g. Child Mental Health Network). In some cases these were individuals 
already active as, and in that sense accredited as, 'lay representatives' in 
other nearby NHS bodies (CHD pilot site). 
Child Mental Health Network had few systematic methods for patient or 
public involvement. Some open meetings had been held, but with poor 
attendance, especially in the more deprived parts of the city. There were no 
systematic user surveys. Clients and patients were however encouraged to 
attend, indeed co-present sessions with staff, at open days for the new 
children's centre. 
The main means for public involvement in CHD pilot site were talks, 
organised through the patient involvement group, to 'educate' patient 
representatives (e.g. about infection control). CHD pilot site also set up a 
patient participation group with 14 members with a part-time co-ordinator. 
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The most energetic and influential patient representative was active in a 
number of other NHS bodies intended for patient involvement, indeed 
recruited from one of them. NHS-employed network members were 
interested in the lay representatives' comments but there was a mismatch 
of focus. The lay members were (not surprisingly) most inclined to comment 
on details of service provision – car parking at one hospital site, hospital 
food - but it was harder to sustain dialogue about the more general aspects 
of CHD services, the main concern of this programme network. In that 
respect Child Mental Health Network had better success but it was a care 
network still interested in just such details. Its activities included open days 
for the public, clients and any interested local residents at its new children's 
centre. So far as we could tell, Regional CHD Network had little public 
involvement. 
The Heart Support Group in Urban CHD Network was very active. One of its 
key organisers was a cardiac rehabilitation specialist nurse who acted as a 
patient conduit for issues raised at the group. Urban CHD Network also ran 
patient reference groups including users from all trusts in the network: 
one thing that you know [is] that the network meetings there's always some interesting 
feedback from patient groups. The tricky thing is, again it's this kind of getting 
representation across all the PCTs, so you know we get feedback from someone from, 
who's had experience in a trust which is not in our area for instance. But those links are 
good, you know, I think it's really good to have that kind of feedback. 
(PCT public health doctor, Urban CHD Network) 
Patient representatives were generally given a slot on the network meeting 
agendas. 
Children's Hospital Project Network had a 'very vocal' public partnership 
board (PPB) which was a sub-board of the Network Supervisory Board and 
chaired by representative of a voluntary organisation. Proposals for re-
profiling children's services had been intermittently reported in the local 
press for many years and had at times become controversial. As its plans 
matured, the Children's Hospital Project Network embarked during 2006 on 
an extensive public consultation, which its co-ordinators described as 'the 
biggest thing the NHS has ever seen'. Over a period of 16 weeks it had 
involved over 800 public meetings and elicited 55,000 responses in total, 
representing some 250,000 people. An external consultancy processed the 
responses and its report presented a total of 13 options for service 
configuration, including the five originally proposed by the network. 
Small CHD Network was (as described above) nested in a wider cardiac 
network, which did much of the patient consultation and involvement work 
for it. Such patient participation as occurred did so at sub-group rather than 
whole-network level. 
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Patient and public involvement, in terms of participation in both decision-
making (and of course proportion of active individual network members) 
and undertaking the network's core activity, in the non-mandated user-
controlled Self-Care Network far exceeded that in all the mandated NHS 
networks. Appendix 8 itemises the new self-care activity which the patient 
members of user experience network developed, showing how this 
contrasted with the other networks. The difference was both in the 
proportion of network activity that user-members contributed and the 
nature of their contribution, which included actively participating in, indeed 
organising, exercise and social events besides more passively undergoing 
'education'. In the other voluntary network (Child Mental Health Network), 
some individual users played an active and influential role, but the most 
influential of these was a former nurse who had previously been active in 
the network in her professional capacity. They participated in committees as 
individuals by invitation; we found no structures for patient involvement. 
User participation in the mandated networks appeared to occur in much the 
same ways as in NHS organisations such as PCTs, and with similar (i.e. 
limited) effects. The contrast between the experience network (Self-Care 
Network) and the mandated networks supports the hypothesis (H3C) that 
service user involvement in voluntary networks is more extensive in 
mandated networks; but the contrast between Child Mental Health Network 
and the mandated networks suggests the opposite. The hypothesis that user 
participation would be more uneven in voluntary than mandated networks 
thus gains some support from this study, raising the question of what 
factors therefore promote patient involvement. 
 7.5  Summary 
We conclude that what determined the extent and ways that members used 
(participated in) the study networks were: 
 Convergence between member organisation's own prior objectives 
and incentives, and the network activity i.e. network participation is a 
way to secure prior objectives of the member organisation (which 
might include the avoidance of sanctions). 
 Salience (strategic importance) of the network's activities or policies 
to the member organisation. 
 Experience of the inter-personal quality and practical value of 
network activities for the individual participants. 
 The presence or absence of mediating bodies to represent numerous, 
fragmented organisations for whom the network activities have 
relevance and value, but not preponderantly among their interests. 
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 Its point of contact with the network. A member organisation whose 
point of contact was the network co-ordinator(s) were at an obvious 
advantage in influencing the network agenda, keeping informed of its 
activities, and routing information and resources to the other 
members. 
How far a member organisation effectively influenced ('used') the network 
appeared in our study sites to depend upon that organisation: 
 Having a key role in the network's core activity. This factor gave the 
cardiologists their powerful role in Regional CHD Network and CHD 
pilot site; obtained for the ambulance trust an invitation to join the 
board of Urban CHD Network and in Child Mental Health Network an 
influential role to midwives and social workers (because they were 
important sources of referrals into the network's care pathways. 
 Participating in network co-ordination. Because evidence-based 
medicine played a large role in network co-ordination (as the next 
chapter explains), the members who could produce it were in a strong 
position to influence network decisions and policies. Although not 
always the most central member organisation in a structural sense, 
the organisations which hosted (e.g. employed) the network co-
ordinators naturally exercised considerable influence over the network 
agendas, decision-making process and subsequent implementation 
activity, although always by agreement with the rest of the network 
board.  
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 8  Coordination  
Our research question about co-ordination was: 
RQ4: What types of co-ordination processes mediate the above effects? 
We constructed the following hypotheses to test by social network analysis : 
H4A: Government intends PCTs to co-ordinate mandated networks. 
Hence: 
1. PCT members of networks will have the highest brokerage scores 
and; 
2. hierarchical reduction will show PCTs as the topmost member of 
any hierarchical relationships present. 
H4B: Mandated networks, compared with voluntary networks, are 
structured with: 
1. More 'hierarchical' in the sense of having public organisation as a 
core body; and hence a tendency to 'vertical' control (from core 
to other members) implying: 
2. low density 
3. flow is mainly from core to periphery 
4. relatively consistent separation (all members relate directly to 
the core, and to each other mainly via the core) 
H4C: Voluntary networks will have more relational, trust-based internal 
co-ordination and roles than mandated networks. 
And for the qualitative analysis we hypothesised: 
H4D: Voluntary networks have negotiated allocation of roles. 
H4E: Voluntary networks deal with conflicts by exit, mandated ones by 
negotiation and voice. Power distribution is more fluid and shifting in 
the voluntary network. In mandated networks, because exit is not 
possible, oppositional activities occur, both passive (self-isolation, non-
compliance) and active. 
H4F: Mandated networks show uniformity and formalisation of 
organisational processes and flows than voluntary networks do. 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         124 
 8.1  Organising structures 
Since networks can (and did) operate for many years through 'emergent' 
collaboration, the question arises of whether deliberate management of 
them added to their effectiveness ? The informants whom we interviewed 
expressed no doubts that deliberate management made the networks more 
effective. All the networks had some form of formal organising structure and 
concomitant appointment and accountability mechanisms. The key 
structuring mechanism was the use of a 'board' or 'steering group' (the 
name varied) and a management infrastructure. 
It was not surprising that the user-experience network in Self-Care Network 
had the least formal organising structure. Every month or so it held a 
meeting, which any member could attend and speak to. There the network's 
activities were planned or reported on, with any ancillary matters such as 
fund-raising. Outside people were sometimes invited e.g. a supportive local 
GP, a community psychiatric nurse and (most often) a PCT public health 
worker. Although the atmosphere and discussions were informal, written 
agendas, minutes, correspondence and accounts were kept. Other 
documents such as funding applications and the subsequent reports, 
including one evaluation, were also produced. 
Because City Children's Network was a strategic partnership network, it 
consciously modelled its organising structures on those of similar large-scale 
partnerships: 
Most of the partnerships for example have got a partnership director which is joint 
funded in some way and we've been agitating to have that for the children and young 
people's partnership board and we're getting there. We've got a smaller executive group 
now that meets on a regular basis as opposed to I told you, we dropped the 40 strong 
board and got down to about 20. But even that's too big to exercise a sort of managerial 
direction really. 
(PCT Chief Executive, City Children's Network) 
Whilst Child Mental Health Network remained a care network, it also had a 
steering group conducted on similar lines to Self-Care Network. As time 
passed its active membership widened with nurses in particular participating 
more fully. Small CHD Network also had a network wide co-ordinating 
group. Urban CHD Network was formally constituted with a Board, Chief 
Executive and Chair. Initially City Children's Network had a large number of 
sub-groups but by the end of the study period had culled them down to a 
set of subgroups focussing on specific activities of interests e.g. voluntary 
sector providers. 
All the enlarged networks except Self-Care Network set up sub-groups 
accountable to the main steering group to undertake particular aspects of 
their work. Often these groups had a life-time limited to completion of their 
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allotted task but CHD pilot site set up a permanent sub-committee of user 
representatives. Both the local CHD network in Small CHD Network and the 
sub-regional network in which it was nested were organised using a 
structure of a respective steering group and then sub groups. The sub 
groups would address specific issues. In Small CHD Network, 
each [of] the sub groups were formed out of identified need, and then each sub group 
was tasked with going away and doing a review of the current provision of service. 
(Deputy co-ordinator, Small CHD Network) 
These subgroups might meet only once or twice, or more often depending 
on the complexity of their task and whether they were required only to 
review a service, or to implement changes as well. In Small CHD Network 
the heart failure sub-group then subdivided into four sub-sub-groups to 
undertake more specific reviews (of diagnosis; acute care; discharge; and 
ongoing management). 
We also found this pattern in networks Child Mental Health Network, 
Regional CHD Network and CHD pilot site. Indeed, in Urban CHD Network 
the sub-networks did most of the network's work about: 
Things like policy and pathways so we've now got them working on a whole range of 
pathways. We've had a couple of individual people working on a transfer policy, working 
with the ambulance services to develop that. So it's those kinds of overarching policies 
and procedures that they're working on at the minute. 
(Co-ordinator, Urban CHD Network) 
Urban CHD Network had a designated managerial support team with clearly 
designated roles. 
From 2003, when its remit, widened Children's Hospital Project Network 
acquired sub-groups for paediatrics, CAHMS, obstetrics and neonates. The 
SHA was responsible for overseeing the network's work, but the network's 
sub-groups actually decided the details of the re-profiling of children's 
services: 
for example the Paediatric [Sub-]Network has got a programme of work which involves 
doing things like looking at day surgery and therefore then the links into anaesthetics 
and what that means for children, things around ambulatory care and A&E services. 
(Deputy co-ordinator, site B) 
Here as elsewhere the membership of these sub-groups was fluid, changing 
according to the task in hand. The larger CHD networks (Urban CHD 
Network, CHD pilot site) also made temporary ad hoc recruitments to advise 
and assist the network in dealing with a specific technical problem e.g. 
technicians advising on the shortage of laboratory technicians for CHD 
services and on the exact ways in which technicians could contribute to the 
development of local CHD services (CHD pilot site), or commissioning public 
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health studies (Urban CHD Network). The larger the network, the more the 
co-ordinating group and the sub groups differed in membership. 
As care networks changed into programme networks they experienced a 
corresponding change in the membership of their co-ordinating body. The 
original steering groups were, paradoxically, replaced with smaller ones in 
which hospital consultants and senior PCT managers (often the 
commissioning lead, sometimes the chief executive) played a larger, and 
primary care clinicians a proportionately smaller, role than previously. When 
PCTs merged, the networks based on them were also merged, as were the 
parallel sub-groups which in each of the earlier, separate PCT-wide 
networks had dealt with the same issue (e.g. heart failure, thrombolysis). 
Consequently the common structure of the co-ordinating body in each NHS 
network was with a central steering group having sub-groups accountable to 
the network's co-ordinating body. Members of the Small CHD Network local 
network commented that the well-organised nature of the steering group 
and its sub groups was important in signalling to new and existing members 
that this was a focused, reliable and well-led network which made concrete 
progress to visible, clear goals. 
 8.1.1  Management infrastructure 
Each NHS network had a variety of co-ordinating managers. In Child Mental 
Health Network the first co-ordinator was a CAMHS manager. Her successor 
was a PCT commissioning manager who was line-managed accordingly, 
although for network activities she was also accountable to a joint PCT-City 
Council Partnership for Children and Young People. In Regional CHD 
Network the co-ordinators were employed by the SHA and part of the 
hierarchy ultimately line-managed by its CEO. More often than not the non-
co-ordinator members of networks represented other organisations. The 
Chief Officer and Clinical Director of CHD pilot site were accountable to the 
lead PCT's Chief Executive. Network co-ordinators were thus appointed by 
the SHA (Regional CHD Network, Children's Hospital Project Network) or 
PCTs (Pilot Site CHD Network, Small CHD Network) or PCT and local 
government (Child Mental Health Network, City Children's Network). These 
co-ordinators were therefore accountable through line-management to a 
member, indeed the network's host, organisation and so in the last analysis 
accountable to it, not to the network as a whole. The exception was in the 
project network at Children's Hospital Project Network whose co-ordinators 
were accountable to an over-arching network supervisory board. The SHA 
appointed the Chair of a member-PCT as the chair of the Children's Hospital 
Project Network project network . The network co-ordinators were employed 
by the city's PCT but also accountable to the network board. 
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The co-ordinators of the non-NHS network Self-Care Network were 
volunteers accountable only to the other network members although there 
was no clear cut-mechanism for enforcing this accountability. 
The experience of Regional CHD Network made clear how necessary a co-
ordinator ('network manager') is for a large, dispersed network. During a 
period of many months until mid-2008 this network lacked a manager and 
service improvement managers, resulting in 'inertia and ambiguity' so that 
the incoming network manager's first necessary response was that: 
I did go round and made sure I went to hospitals … and to commissioners … I did spend 
quite a lot of time getting people together, getting them together in groups to rebuild. 
(Co-ordinator, Regional CHD Network) 
The combination of changes in post-holders and restructuring of member 
organisations, together with mergers and changes in network function, 
disrupted membership lists. Network Regional CHD Network only belatedly 
produced one for the researchers although it clearly possessed circulation 
lists. Indeed during one of the hand-overs between successive co-ordinators 
in Regional CHD Network the outgoing co-ordinator's computer was wiped 
clean of all data including mailing, distribution and membership lists. To that 
extent what one might have imagined were basic requirements for 
organising a network were absent. Child Mental Health Network, Small CHD 
Network and Self-Care Network had no such problems, although by causing 
changes in post-holders NHS restructuring also disrupted the Children's 
Hospital Project Network. 
Two study networks were nested in one or both of two kinds of wider 
network. Urban CHD Network had very active and regular engagement with 
the national network co-ordinator for cardio-vascular services. Small CHD 
Network was a local CHD network nested within a sub-regional CHD network 
also tasked with introducing the NSF. There was a division of labour 
between the local and the sub-regional networks, and sharing of ideas and 
resources, but this did not amount to one network being formally 
accountable to the other. Network Urban CHD Network was accountable, via 
its co-ordinator to the Heart Improvement Team at the Department of 
Health, sending regular reports on participation in the network.  
In every case, even the user-led Self-Care Network, there was considerable 
formalisation of decision making processes in the sense of recording and 
documentation in standard forms. During the study period, one of the 
member organisations began paying the most active of the Self-Care 
Network co-ordinators to work full-time. 
Becoming several times larger appeared to reinforce the merged networks' 
(City Children's Network, Small CHD Network, Regional CHD Network) 
tendency to adopt formalised NHS styles of management practice such as 
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the use of fixed-term ('task-and-complete') working groups. A shift in 
function from care network to commissioning support also necessitated 
more extensive and varied managerial input to the network. The concurrent 
move towards the commissioning of care networks (as providers) had much 
the same effect even in the non-mandated user-experience Self-Care 
Network, which sought advice from its local PCT about how to set about 
obtaining 'mainstream' funding through the commissioning system. Because 
that network had predominantly lay membership, the addition of managerial 
and professional language and culture into the meetings was more 
noticeable than in the other networks. To that extent, we found some 
support for our hypotheses (H2F, H4F) that mandated networks show 
uniform and formal organisational processes and flows than voluntary 
networks do. 
 8.2  Centralisation 
In order to co-ordinate the rest of the network, a network's co-ordinating 
body would have to be central to the network, linked to all the other 
network members and able to act as an intermediary between them. 
Table 12 shows how the network co-ordinating body ranked, in terms of its 
centrality on five measures, against the other members of its network. 
'Degree centrality' expresses the number of links each member organisation 
has to others in its network. Betweenness centrality expresses the extent to 
which an organisation lies on the path of links connecting other member 
organisations. The Freeman measure expresses how closely each member 
organisation comes to being the hub in a 'hub-and-spoke' structure. Reach 
centrality expresses what proportion of other network members each 
network member is directly linked to (rather than linked to via 
intermediaries). Flow centrality expresses the extent to which each network 
member is one the shortest set of links between the other network 
members. An entry such as '2/6' means that the co-ordinating body was 
ranked second highest out of six network members in terms of the measure 
shown at the top of the column. An equals sign means that the co-
ordinating body held this rank jointly with one or more other member 
organisations. 
Overall the pattern is that the co-ordinating body was generally in the top 
half of its network's organisations in terms of centrality on these measures, 
but in the NHS networks not generally the most central. Paradoxically the 
only co-ordinating bodies ever ranked first in centrality were those of the 
two small voluntary networks. So the networks were closely co-ordinated in 
the sense of being very dense (see previous chapter) rather than in the 
sense of being strongly centralised on the co-ordinating body alone. 
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Table 12. Centrality of co-ordinating bodies: rank within network  
 
Degree 
centrality 
Ego 
between-
ness 
centrality 
Flow 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Freeman 
Between-
ness 
Centrality 
Reach 
Centrality 
Small CHD 
Network 2/6 1=/6 2/6 2/6 1=/6 
Self-Care 
Network 4/8 1=/8 3/8 1=/8 1=/8 
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network  6=/23 2/23 5/23 7/23 5/23 
Urban CHD 
Network 7/14 8/14 6/14 14/14 8=/14 
Child Mental 
Health 
Network 3/31 2/31 /31 6/31 5=/31 
We hypothesised (H4Aa) that the network's co-ordinating body would have 
the highest brokerage scores of the member organisations. Its brokerage 
score expresses how often a node is an intermediary between two other 
network members which are directly connected to it but not directly 
connected to each other. Table 13 shows brokerage scores in normalised 
form (as percentages not as raw scores, so as to abstract from the different 
sizes of the networks). The higher the brokerage score, the more the 
organisation fills the role of broker (intermediary) between other network 
members. This and subsequent analyses treat informants (nodes) as 
representatives of organisations. As before, multiple entries in cells in table 
13 indicate tied results. 
Table 13. Brokerage scores and roles 
Normalised 
brokerage 
scores 
Small 
CHD 
Network 
Self-Care 
Network 
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
Urban CHD 
Network 
Child Mental 
Health 
Network 
Mean for 
network 
0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.08 
Range 0.00-0.1 0.00-0.05 0.02-0.14 0.00-0.24 0.00-0.18 
Co-ordinating 
body  
0.1 0.05 0.1 0 0.18 
1st highest PCT (co- Co- Local Co-ordinating CAMHS (co-
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scoring 
member  
ordinating 
body), 
Teaching 
Hospital, 
Regional 
CHD 
network  
ordinating 
body, two 
self-help 
groups, 
PCT.  
authority care 
improvement 
partnership 
body, 
teaching 
hospital, PCT 
ordinating 
body), Health 
visiting service, 
children's 
centre, three 
local 
government 
departments.  
2nd highest 
scoring 
member  
General 
practices of 
2 PCT 
leads, non-
teaching 
hospital.  
N/A (all 
others 
zero).  
Teaching 
Hospital, PCT, 
local 
authority, 
mental health 
trust 
Teaching 
hospital 
Commentary: 
On "A 
Taxonomy of 
Healthcare 
Networks and 
Systems: 
Bringing Order 
Out of Chaos" 
Speech therapy 
service 
3rd highest 
scoring 
member  
N/A (all 
others 
zero) 
N/A (all 
others zero) 
Teaching 
hospital  
PCT Jointly: 
children's 
centre, 
educational 
psychology 
service, adult 
mental health 
services, 
parenting 
support 
Network size 
(organisations) 
7 3 (but 13 
individuals) 
23 17 33 
In four of the five networks measured, the co-ordinating body did as 
predicted (H7a) have the highest normalised brokerage scores but across 
networks the association between these scores and co-ordinating status was 
not statistically significant. The co-ordinating body never had a uniquely 
high brokerage score. Some but not all of the other member organisations 
equalled it. Member organisations in the study networks often had direct 
links to each other (network densities were high), reducing both the scope 
and practical necessity for brokers within the networks. Hence the co-
ordinating bodies were towards the top of a range of brokerage scores that 
were generally low. The Small CHD Network members all had brokerage 
scores of zero because their network was so small that they could create 
any desired links directly. Brokerage roles, including that of the network co-
ordinating body, were practically superfluous. Although its co-ordinating 
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body was a third-sector organisation not a PCT, the same pattern appeared 
in the small local Self Care Network. 
For comparison, the hypothesis that PCTs (as the bodies responsible for co-
ordinating local 'health economies') have the highest brokerage scores 
(H7a) was also tested by testing whether a dummy variable ('PCT' vs. 'not-
PCT') was associated with both the raw and the normalised brokerage 
measures for each node. For this test we combined node-level data across 
networks. The test showed no significant correlation between PCT status 
and normalised brokerage score. So the high brokerage scores of the co-
ordinating body cannot be attributed, either, to them being PCTs. 
We made a similar analysis for the networks' Bonacich power scores (Table 
14). Bonacich power scores measure the extent to which each member 
organisation is connected to others who are not highly-connected, so that 
these others depend on the first organisation for links to the rest of the 
network. The co-ordinating body was in every network in the middle of the 
range across the member organisations and never had a uniquely high 
Bonacich power score. Indeed it was (by that criterion) never more than the 
third most powerful organisation. Neither did the Bonacich power measures 
show significant correlation with mandated status. 
Table 14. Power scores and roles 
Power scores Small CHD 
Network 
Self-Care 
Network 
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
Urban 
CHD 
Network 
Child 
Mental 
Health 
Network 
Range 1.675-3.351 0.297-4.984 -9.53-9.72 -0.634-
6.754 
1.456-
10.671 
Co-ordinating 
body  
1.68 2.88 1.82 2.392 
 
5.08 
1st highest 
scoring member  
Non-
teaching 
hospital NHS 
trust 
PCT Mental health 
trust 
Teaching 
hospital 
NHS trust  
Adult Mental 
Health Trust  
2nd highest 
scoring member  
Teaching 
hospital NHS 
trust 
Exercise group PCT2 PCT3 PCT (public 
health 
dept.)  
3rd highest 
scoring member  
Ambulance 
service 
Co-
ordinating 
body (3rd 
sector) 
PCT1 Teaching 
hospital 
NHS trust  
Midwifery 
service 
(hospital-
based)  
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Network size 
(organisations) 
7 3 (but 13 
individuals) 
23 17 33 
We had predicted (H4A) that Freeman degree centrality of the co-ordinating 
organisation would be higher in mandated than non-mandated networks. 
This hypothesis was supported. Flow betweenness centrality of the co-
ordinating organisation was, as predicted, also higher in mandated than 
non-mandated networks, but the prediction that reach centrality of the co-
ordinating organisation would be higher in mandated than non-mandated 
networks was not supported. The latter finding appears to reflect the 
relatively high proportions of direct links between member organisations in 
the networks studied. So although the co-ordinating bodies are somewhat 
more connected than other member organisations, a 'hub-and-spoke' model 
of network links has little application to the networks we studied. 
In summary, the co-ordinating bodies each had high brokerage scores 
within their networks, but high only in comparison with brokerage scores 
that were generally low in all the study networks. In terms of Bonacich's 
measure of power, the co-ordinating bodies were undistinguished from 
other network members. The co-ordinating bodies mediated between other 
network members who were also well-connected to one another. Co-
ordinating bodies were not the centre of a star-shaped or 'hub-and-spoke' 
network structure, except for one layer (money) in one network (Child 
Mental Health). The sites did demonstrate core and periphery patterns but 
these were more lateral or 'horizontal' in shape as opposed to the vertical 
shapes found in a classical hierarchy. 
 8.3  Co-ordination and hierarchy 
Some studies have described certain networks as having a 'hierarchical' 
character (see chapter 2). We had therefore hypothesised that (H4B) 
compared with voluntary networks, mandated networks:  
1. are more 'hierarchical' in the sense of having a public organisation as a 
coordinating body (and hence tend to have a pattern of 'vertical' control 
links from that coordinating body to the other members) 
2. are of low density 
3. decisions and resources flow mainly from core to periphery 
4. have relatively consistent separation (all members relate directly to the 
core, and to each other mainly via the core) 
Certain social network analysts have assumed that hierarchies (in the sense 
of organisations which hierarchically structured on Weberian or 'Fordist' 
lines) can be considered as a special type of network. Krackhardt (161) and 
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Burt (201) have formally defined such hierarchies and developed measures 
to show the extent to which observed networks approximate in this to 'pure' 
(Weberian or Fordist) hierarchies. We therefore applied Krackhardt's and 
Burt's measures to our study networks to ascertain how far the study 
networks might be described as 'hierarchical'. 
Because such high proportions of network members were directly-linked 
(see above), one condition for the networks to be strongly hierarchical was 
not met. Nevertheless, one might expect the mandated networks to come 
closer to the 'hierarchical' model than the non-mandated networks did. We 
therefore compared (Table 15) the mandated (Children's Hospital Project 
Network, Small CHD Network, Urban CHD Network) and non-mandated 
networks firstly in terms of hierarchical reduction, using Krackhardt's GTD 
measure (161). 
Table 15. Hierarchical properties of networks  
Krackhardt GTD measure 
 
Number of 
nodes Density Connectedness Hierarchy Efficiency LUB 
Small CHD Network 6 0.6624 1 0 0.2000 1 
Self-Care Network 8 0.9286 1 0 0.9500 1 
Children's Hospital 
Project Network  23 0.6285 1 0 0.2500 1 
Urban CHD Network 14 0.5110 1 0 0.4700 1 
Child Mental Health 
Network 31 0.6624 1 0 0.3609 1 
All four dimensions of the GTD measure (connectedness, hierarchy, 
efficiency, least upper bound (LUB)) must score 1.0 for a pure hierarchy to 
exist. That is, to be hierarchical the network must display connectedness (all 
actors are in same structure); 'efficiency' (in the non-standard sense that 
each node has only one 'in-degree' link to its superior); a Least Upper 
Bound (unified command or co-ordinator); and 'hierarchy' (in the sense of 
there being no reciprocated ties). All our study networks displayed full 
connectedness, i.e. they all had at least one organisation with the links 
necessary to enable it, if it had the authority or power, to co-ordinate the 
whole network in an hierarchical manner. But the low 'efficiency' scores 
mean that in all the networks except Self-Care Network, most members 
have links to many other members besides the co-ordinating body. No one 
organisation monopolised the links to other network members. The 
hierarchy scores of zero are an artefact due to our using symmetrised data 
matrices, but every matrix had some reciprocal ties before we symmetrised 
it. Even if that element had been positive, though, none of the study 
networks would have counted as pure hierarchies on Krackhardt GTD 
measures. 
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Neither was there correlation between any of the Krackhardt GTD variables 
and mandated or voluntary status. This was immediately obvious for scores 
which did not vary across networks, and the Krackhardt efficiency variable 
did not significantly correlate with non/mandated status either. Density had 
been predicted to be lower in mandated networks. Density had been 
predicted to be lower in mandated networks, but we did not find the 
predicted significant correlation between the densities of the mandated and 
the non-mandated networks (table 16).  
Table 16. Density and separation: significance of differences between 
mandated and non-mandated networks  
Variable p 
Aggregated density 0.39 
Co-ordinator reach centrality 0.12 
Co-ordinator degree centrality* 0.00 
Co-ordinator flow betweenness centrality* 0.03 
Burt hierarchy scores 0.06 
* = significant at p=0.05. Unpaired samples, one-tailed t-test. 
The Burt hierarchy scores of the co-ordinating bodies narrowly failed to 
correlate with mandated status (t-test, p=0.05). However the Burt 
hierarchy scores themselves were modest (0.32) for Small CHD Network 
and lower again (0.1 or less) for the others. These low scores mean that 
network members were, in general, not heavily dependent on (nor, 
therefore, constrained by) just one other member as a link to the rest of the 
network. The correlation depended on the presence of one outlying value 
(Small CHD Network). Repeating the t-test without it removed the 
correlation. 
Because hierarchical structures were absent, neither the networks' co-
ordinating body nor the PCTs (where not the co-ordinating body) were the 
topmost member of such a hierarchy. That finding refutes our hypothesis 
(H4Ab) that PCTs would be the topmost member of any hierarchical 
relationships present. 
Co-ordinating bodies were more likely to be linked to other member 
organisations in mandated than non-mandated networks. They had 
somewhat more power (in the sense defined by the Bonacich measure) in 
mandated than in non-mandated networks. Yet none of the study networks 
were hierarchical in any stronger structural sense. In that respect, the 
mandated and non-mandated networks did not materially differ. So 
although the study networks were centralised, they were not hierarchical in 
the sense defined by the formal measures described above. 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         135 
 8.4  Prudent reciprocity 
Prudent reciprocity, meaning mutual help-in-kind, is often regarded as a 
distinctive and typical co-ordination mechanism in networks. Network co-
ordinators persuade other network members to contribute time, work and 
other resources to the network on the basis that the other network 
members will do likewise, so that each network member will eventually 
receive benefits from the others in turn. Prudent reciprocity has the 
advantage, as an exchange mechanism, of being applicable to both the core 
process and the co-ordination activities of the networks. This co-ordination 
mechanism presupposes that network members trust one another. 
We hypothesised (H4C) that voluntary networks will have more relational, 
trust-based internal co-ordination and roles than mandated networks. One 
way of operationalising this hypothesis for network analysis purposes is to 
contrast relational, trust based co-ordination with hierarchy. Thus the 
voluntary networks would have less hierarchical network structure, in the 
SNA-specific sense described above, than would the mandated networks. 
Whilst, as reported above, one of the Krackhardt GTD indicators (efficiency) 
was lower in the voluntary networks, indicating greater redundancy of links, 
none of the study networks was hierarchical, so it cannot be said that the 
voluntary networks were 'less hierarchical' than the mandated ones. Also, 
network density in other of the voluntary networks (the user-experience 
network) was higher than in the mandated networks, but the density of the 
other voluntary network (Child Mental Health) was not. 
Another way to test H4C is to contrast help in kind, as one form relational, 
trust-based co-ordination link, with co-ordination through financial links. 
Then, H4C would be supported if the help-in-kind layer were denser in the 
non-mandated than in the mandated networks. A similar test is whether the 
difference in density between money-layer and the help-in-kind layer (in 
favour of the help-in-kind layer) was greater in non-mandated in mandated 
networks. As reported in greater detail below (chapter 9) the help-in-kind 
layer in the study networks was significantly denser in all the networks save 
one, whether mandated or not, and in the remaining network (which was 
mandated) the two layers did not significantly differ in density. However the 
size of the differences in density between the two layers did not reflect 
whether a network was mandated or not, as Table 17 shows. 
We therefore conclude that the non-mandated networks did tend to have 
more relational, in the sense of less-financially mediated relationships than 
the mandated networks. The non-mandated networks also had a non-
hierarchical structure, but so did the mandated networks. These findings 
tend, albeit equivocally, to support H13. 
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Table 17. Mandated status and relative density of help-in-kind and money 
layers 
 Status Relative 
Layer 
densities 
Significant 
difference? 
Difference in layer 
densities (maximum is 
±1.0) 
Child Mental 
Health Network 
Non-
mandated 
HiK > Money Y 0.09 
Self-Care Network Non-
mandated 
HiK > Money Y 0.34 
Urban CHD 
Network 
Mandated Money > HiK NS -0.03 
Small CHD 
Network 
Mandated HiK > Money Y 0.5 
Children's Hospital 
Project Network 
Mandated HiK > Money Y 0.08 
HiK = Help in kind. Significance level = 0.05. 
Our qualitative data also include instances of prudent reciprocity. Self-Care 
Network members attended events in one another's member organisations 
and provided practical services such as catering at them. They also offered 
spare places on trips out to one another's non-Self-Care Network members. 
In Child Mental Health Network a common form of mutual assistance 
between members was the cross-posting (secondment) of staff and, for a 
handful of staff members (mainly managers and psychologists) there had 
been over the years something approaching a 'revolving door' regime with 
the same individuals being employed now by the city council, now by the 
NHS. 
In addition many informants told us that the benefit of being in the network 
was specifically that it enabled the members to pool ideas and other 
resources, and solve problems collaboratively, producing benefits which 
each network member could not have obtained alone. Thus: 
One of the values here, one of the norms here is, well what's the point of not working 
together? We achieve more if we share. 
(Heart Failure Nurse specialist, Small CHD Network) 
Urban CHD Network informants also emphasised the importance of sharing 
the work of caring for CHD patients across the network members, Its 
espoused values included collectivity and mutual support. From its origins as 
a collaborative, the network inherited a tendency to espouse the value of 
information-sharing. In the user-experience Self-Care Network too, 
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members expressed one of their main aims as being to encourage the 
individual participants to feel empowered through doing more for others and 
over time to develop trust between the individuals and organisations 
involved. 
 8.5  Resource allocation 
The six NHS networks had by NHS standards relatively few resources of 
their own, and none of a kind or quantity that could constitute material 
incentives, beyond the offer of practical help, to the clinicians or 
organisations that did. Neither did the Children's Hospital Project Network 
directly control the building programmes on which the service re-profiling 
centred. Except for Self-Care Network and Child Mental Health Network, the 
study networks directly controlled few or none of the resources which their 
core processes used. 
Rather, the other five (programme) networks influenced the allocation of 
resources to patient care in two ways. They influenced, indeed helped draft 
and undertake pre-negotiation discussions about, service contracts and 
specifications for the relevant services. The network thus influenced the 
service contract but did not determine the final draft, which the PCT might 
amend again before negotiating with the providers. It was then up to the 
providers to implement the contract and to decide exactly how they did so. 
So the networks' influence on resource allocation by this route was indirect. 
Nevertheless, because it made such a large contribution to the 
commissioning cycle, Urban CHD Network was confident that it could 
indirectly remove resources from NHS providers that didn't accept the 
network's policies: 
Well I suppose if an acute trust that was providing either cardiac or stroke services and 
we have one at the moment wasn't performing then I suppose the end result would be 
that they could lose that service. 
(Co-ordinator, Urban CHD Network) 
A second route, also indirect, was via the provider representatives, often 
senior clinicians or other practitioners, who participated in network 
activities. These acted as boundary-spanners transmitting the network's 
decisions into the hinterlands of their own organisations. This was bound to 
be an uneven process. A chief executive could credibly promise to 
accomplish it, although in CHD pilot site the two hospitals with the most 
persistent overspends and referral problems were represented not by 
managers but each by one cardiologist. A consultant can control her own 
referrals and clinical practice, and her juniors'. If medical director she might 
also influence those of other consultants in her specialty. Beyond that the 
consultant's influence wanes and the same applies to other departmental 
representatives. 
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Unlike third sector providers, no commercial providers participated in the 
networks. So the networks' influence of how their resources were allocated 
was only via the commissioning process and technical guidance, if at all. 
All the networks could call upon the services of paid staff to assist (in Self-
Care Network) or simply to carry out the tasks of co-ordination. The 
Children's Hospital Project Network project network had 11 (later 13) 
support staff who inter alia supported a 'massive' communications function 
and HR activity for the network, besides the education and training 
described elsewhere. For its major public consultation the network hired in 
management consultancy support, and City Children's Network did the same 
to take stock of its local policy options as the guidance and policy 
statements about children's services multiplied. Conversely lack of 
managerial staff, due to the uncertain terms of employment described 
above was a crippling barrier to activity in Regional CHD Network. In 
contrast, the managers supporting Urban CHD Network regarded the posts 
as offering good individual career development potential for the managers 
holding them. 
Unlike the NHS-hosted networks, Self-Care Network had meagre managerial 
resources. Those which it did have were contributed gratis by one of the 
member organisations, which already had buildings and some administrative 
support, the costs effectively being met by the Baptist Church who owned 
the premises. Self-Care Network was initially co-ordinated by two volunteers 
but once the largest member organisation became part-funded through its 
own contract with the city council, one of them (who is trained in leisure 
and recreation services work) became a full-time co-ordinator. Even then, 
one member-organisation entirely relied on self-help but this was precarious 
because if, as happened, an active member became ill, the group struggled 
to operate. When Self-Care Network sought to be commissioned, however, 
it members became conscious that they lacked the bureaucratic skills, and 
even such resources as ready access to a computer, required to produce the 
contract documentation which prospective commissioners demanded.  
An unexpected finding was that the Self-Care Network did not spend all of 
their £5,000 allocation from NIMHE but only £2, 000 of it. They used the 
rest to purchase a digital camcorder and laptop which they used to film and 
watch the physical activities they organised. Nevertheless the Self-Care 
Network member organisations were keen to obtain practical or extra 
financial help from outside bodies and had some success in getting it. 
 8.6  Shared values 
Various categories of shared values were found in the study networks. To 
the extent that networks expressly negotiated goals at their foundation (see 
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chapter 5), these goals provided one source of values to which network 
members and co-ordinators could appeal. 
Mandated networks had shared values externally supplied, so to speak, by 
policy-makers (see chapter 5). These shared values were national priorities 
and targets, managerial norms and formalised managerial techniques. That 
managers should adopt such norms was hardly surprising but we less 
expected that senior hospital doctors would do so too. Although originating 
outside the network, these mandates appealed to what might be described 
as tacit political values already held by network members themselves; 
almost no-one questioned the legitimacy of these policy mandates. Rather, 
the NHS quasi-hierarchy (198) resulted in the NHS member organisations 
having to comply with a common set of policies, guidance documents, and 
strategic managerial decisions (e.g. about cross-regional referral patterns). 
Adherence to these precepts coloured and constrained the agenda and 
decisions of network meetings. 
Certain normative assumptions were apparent in network members' 
decisions and discourse, although seldom formulated explicitly. In Child 
Mental Health Network for instance the tacit assumptions among network 
members included, for some occupations (e.g. midwives), a strong 
professional identity which pre-dated their role in the network. In the user-
controlled network a fundamental underlying assumption was that the 
network relied entirely on self-help, making it critical to retain existing and 
recruit new members. Although welcome, practical or financial help from 
outside bodies was a bonus. At exercise events any level of participation 
was acceptable, even just turning up and doing little physical exercise itself, 
notwithstanding the (unavailing) presence of a physical exercise trainer 
provided by the city's umbrella organisation for the third sector. We take 
this as evidence of an underlying assumption that the network existed more 
for the members' use than to impose expert norms of what constitutes 
healthy exertion. In the CHD networks it was largely taken for granted that 
clinician, especially medical, participation would enable the network to 
influence the design and commissioning of cardiac services in ways that 
served patient interests. In the mandated NHS networks, the allocation of 
roles was usually on the basis of the individual's profession, rank and job 
title. In the non-mandated child mental health networks, certain network 
roles (above all, that of co-ordinator) were also allocated in that way, but 
other roles were allocated on a voluntary basis. All roles in the self-care 
network were allocated according to who volunteered and was endorsed in 
group discussion. These patterns tend to confirm our hypothesis (H4D) that 
voluntary networks have a negotiated allocation of roles. 
Shared values were also produced on occasion by debate and negotiation 
within the network, as part of its co-ordination process. Decision-making 
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was generally consensual, but the style of decision-making varied between, 
and within, networks. For instance, Urban CHD Network was strongly 
integrated and cohesive, with a strategic perspective, but this occurred 
through the dominance of a few powerful individuals rather than through 
any more formal decision making process or other managerial systems. 
When it came to allocating work its style of decision was to start with 
informal discussion about who among the network staff would undertake 
what work for cardiac specific and stroke specific areas, and generic of work 
concerning governance, finance and patient involvement. The network 
board would then ratify the proposals, which would finally be formalised as 
a work plan with key performance indicators. In Small CHD Network the co-
ordinator was reported as playing an important role in getting proposals for 
service changes properly discussed: 
Quite often you sit in a meeting, you have a great idea and it doesn't go anywhere, 
whereas [co-ordinator]'s able to help you, she often knows the man who can, even if it's 
not her, and I think that is as much as anything is incredibly valuable. 
(Heart Failure Specialist Nurse, Small CHD Network) 
In the children's services networks where there was substantial non-NHS 
membership and with statutory organisation members under the aegis of 
different central government departments, it was still less feasible for a 
single body to control network decision-making. The Children's Hospital 
Project Network board, exceptionally, had powers of veto over local health 
organisations' proposals for changes in children's services. 
In Self-Care Network, the PCT worker described differential levels of 
leadership between the member organisations. This affected the groups' 
respective ability to initiate activities and we found no evidence that the 
network was able to change this. The main member organisation and one of 
the PCT's health development workers were the de facto 'leaders' of the 
network. The largest member organisation was strongly driven by Christian 
values, but not the other two organisations nor the network membership as 
a whole. 
Evidence based practice, discussed below, was the remaining and perhaps 
most important source of shared values. 
Lack of shared values was also apparent, in two ways. The more common 
was the simple lack of shared assumptions about the remit, or even the 
existences of a network. Within each of the main occupational groups in 
Child Mental Health Network we discovered disagreements about the 
definition of child mental health problems, indeed about whether children 
under five can meaningfully be said to have mental health problems at all. 
Many informants, who in fact collaborated in caring for young children, did 
not perceive themselves as network members. They found the network 
opaque: 
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I'm still working hard to understand how a network can exist in a way that isn't just a 
group of services cooperating. What can a network do that belongs to it, and even though 
it's not an organisation - how can it be seen, how can it be commissioned, how can it be 
performance managed? 
(Social worker) 
Few informants appeared to know or understand the network's care 
pathway structure as a whole. As explained below, many members in the 
larger networks did not regard themselves as network members; among 
them, a network identity was absent. The practical expression of this was 
non-participation (a passive form of 'exit') from network meetings they were 
repeatedly invited to. In Child Mental Health network, paediatricians, adult 
mental health services and social services representatives rarely attended 
meetings. 
Conflict was the other evidence that values were far from shared. We were 
able to analyse the expression of conflict and power via decision making, 
leadership and the control of resources and to a degree the expression of 
culture within the networks. In the CHD pilot site network a leading 
cardiologist stated that the clinicians saw one role of the network as being 
to prevent managers making misguided commissioning decisions. The most 
overt conflict occurred in Regional CHD Network, over the role of GP 
members and the network's remit following the merger of PCT-based 
networks into a regional network. It is described above (chapter 7). This 
was the clearest example of conflict over the transition from care to 
programme network, a transition making some primary care professionals 
and managers more marginal to the networks. Such conflicts also 
represented a shift in the network's shared values from its founding goals to 
those of a mandated programme network. 
Considering the importance of occupational identity in health systems it 
might be expected that networks with more heterogeneous membership 
would be more likely to experience internal disputes, leading to delayed 
decision making and reduced network effectiveness. In our study the CHD 
networks had less heterogeneous memberships (mostly or all NHS 
organisations) than the children's services programme and project 
networks. In general, we did not observe that the children's services 
networks were more prone to controversy and dispute than the CHD 
networks. In fact meetings in these networks were marked, although at 
times by debate, always in our observation by an atmosphere of amity and 
cooperation. Two of the children's services networks were relatively old, and 
in the third many of the individuals leading it had been collaborating for 
some years, allowing strong relationships to develop. Especially in Child 
Mental Health Network, value-conflicts about the the nature of the health 
problems the networks were addressing and the best ways of addressing 
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them were accommodated by the peaceful co-existence of the differing 
attitudes (202). 
 8.7  Knowledge management: evidence based practice 
Knowledge management in the form of production and dissemination of 
technical guidance, usually based on concepts of evidence based medicine 
or practice, was ubiquitous in the NHS networks. A large proportion of 
network artefacts concerned evidence-based medicine (see chapter 12). The 
innovation-related activities about which we collected survey data included 
several activities (e.g. evidence reviews, plan-do-study-act cycles) 
connected with evidence-basing. They were reported in all but four of the 55 
organisations about which we had data. 
Evidence-basing had an important role in network co-ordination. At simplest 
it was used to disseminate and promulgate the network's decisions and 
mandates to others; and as evidence of the network's productivity and 
value. Insofar as its scientific bases are valid, evidence-based technical 
guidance rests upon what, following Therborn (109), we have called an 
'impersonal mandate' . It was thus open to network co-ordinators to use the 
appeal to scientific validity to depoliticise and depersonalise the decisions 
and norms which the network promulgated, and so pre-empt or resolve 
conflicts. They could say: it is not the government or we managers or 
consultants who require this, but the evidence. Additionally technical 
guidance was used as a way of creating trust between co-ordinators and 
clinicians by recognising the value of the clinicians' inputs into the network 
in a way that conserved rather than threatened, the clinicians' professional 
jurisdictions. Thus in Children's Hospital Project Network, the network 
legitimated its activities and decisions partly in terms of being a means to 
ensure the implementation what the clinicians themselves had pronounced 
to be good practice: 
they will tell us what that is so we will say to them “you tell us what the evidence is and 
best practice and we'll work the logistics through and look at the implications for the 
workforce etc, etc.” 
(Deputy co-ordinator, Children's Hospital Project Network) 
Network Urban CHD Network co-ordinators could draw on an external 
source of technical authority by exploiting their links to the lead for the 
national heart improvement programme. Its public health doctor also 
provided epidemiological data that transcended the views of the individual 
PCTs about CHD and the relevant services. 
Self-Care Network was the exception to these patterns. Except for one 
evaluation report it undertook no evidence-basing of its activities. Otherwise 
the nearest it came to evidence-based activity was that it took on trust that 
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there is evidence that self-care activities it provided would actually improve 
the participants' physical health. 
The conspicuous role which knowledge management played in the NHS 
networks was due to the fact that knowledge management had several 
advantages as a co-ordination mechanism. It provided an impersonal 
mandate for network activity and the intended consequent changes in 
service provision. This mandate appealed to professionals' (and not only 
clinicians') intrinsic motivation to provide better care. We found that it 
applied across professions and its legitimacy was practically unchallenged. It 
was a source of artefacts which could demonstrate network activity and 
contribution to the local health economy. For care and self-care networks, 
the resulting guidance was of immediate practical application and increased 
the effectiveness of network activity. For programme and project networks, 
evidence-basing provided the content for many of the artefacts which the 
networks were mandated to produce i.e. policy advice, material for 
contracts, project plans and re-designs of services and infrastructures. Even 
when network members had no shared view of the rationale or goals of the 
network as a whole, evidence-basing created normative agreement at least 
about how (if not about why) the network's core process should be 
undertaken. Lastly, evidence-basing was a co-ordination mechanism that 
did not require other governance structures. It could be (and was) used in 
the absence of contracts, command or coercion as co-ordination 
mechanisms. 
The important differences in how the highly medicalised CHD networks, the 
moderately medicalised children's networks and the non-medicalised self-
care network were co-ordinated lay not in their network structures, but in 
the extent to which knowledge management was available to them as a co-
ordination mechanism. Partly this reflected the differences in the 
composition of their membership, because knowledge management in itself 
presupposes a certain level of technical expertise on the part of those whose 
knowledge is managed. Much more, however, it reflected the availability of 
relevant evidence-based technical guidance and of the means of managing 
the development and application of such knowledge. 
 8.8  Governmentality and identity 
Management by means of governmentality requires transparency of the 
network members' activity to the co-ordinators or the rest of the network; 
and a strong network macro-culture which promotes the requisite value-
beliefs and self-image. The self-image ('identity') element of the cultural 
requirement was often weak in the NHS networks although as explained 
below other value-beliefs were stronger, especially belief in evidence-based 
practice. As explained in our findings about the different layers of network 
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links, the information systems which would make network members' activity 
transparent to the rest of the network were only partially present. 
Network identity was not well-developed. As noted above (Table 6) many 
people who we were told were network members did not regard themselves 
as such. This pattern was clearest in Child Mental Health Network, one of 
the longest-established. In Child Mental Health Network many informants, 
all of whom in fact collaborated in caring for young children, did not 
perceive themselves as network members. They found Child Mental Health 
Network complex and opaque. Few informants appeared to know or 
understand the underlying care pathway structure as a whole. Whilst they 
understood quite clearly their own professional roles and de facto 
contributions to the wider activity of co-ordinating mental health care for 
young children, the fundamental property of having an explicitly-defined 
membership was largely absent from Child Mental Health Network. 
In Small CHD Network the fact that one network was nested within another 
also confused network memberships and identities: 
they're aware that it's a [city] CHD network, because we use the word network and we 
think we're working in the [sub-region] cardiac network and so the word “network” is 
sometimes a bit confusing, there are that many agencies, people are not always sure 
about which one they should go to between the trust and the network, it can get 
confusing really. 
(Ambulance Trust representative, Small CHD Network) 
We assume that a person who does not see themselves as a network 
member will hardly see themselves as having much claim upon the 
network's decision-making processes or its resources, nor be likely to feel 
much obligation to implement its decisions. 
Network information systems (described more fully in chapter 9) were not 
always sufficient to monitor the effectiveness of the network as a whole, let 
alone the exact contribution of each member organisation. Furthermore, 
much of that contribution was made in the hinterland of the member 
organisations beyond the reach of the networks' information systems. If it 
was known even to the member organisation, this information was not 
necessarily made available to the networks. Less formal information was 
however available; network members could and did notice whether, for 
example, other network members completed tasks they had undertaken to 
perform. 
There was thus only a limited role for governmentality as a co-ordinating 
mechanism in the study networks. Evidence-based practice, rather than 
values particular to the networks, was the main mechanism of 
governmentality. 
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 8.9  Summary 
In summary, all the networks had well-developed co-ordinating structures 
on a 'steering committee plus working groups' model with, in the NHS 
networks, a managerial support infrastructure. The co-ordinating body was 
quite central to the networks, but the networks were not in any formal 
structural sense 'hierarchical'. Prudent reciprocity i.e. the exchange of help 
in kind was an important means of network co-ordination. In all except the 
experience network, so was evidence-basing. Decisions were mostly 
reached by negotiation of a consensus, although always within the 
constraints of policy mandates in the mandated networks. Shared values 
played a part in network co-ordination but the sense of network identity was 
patchy and a small number of disputes occurred. Resource allocation played 
little role as a means of co-ordination and governmentality not much more.  
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 9  Layering  
Here we answer the research question: 
RQ5: How do the different layers of network, dealing with different 
media or contents, co-exist and influence each other? 
Our analytic framework distinguished two main types of 'layer' of links in 
clinical and professional networks. These layers consist of the links which 
are: 
1. Productive links, producing the activities and artefacts, and through 
them the outcomes, which the network's objectives state. 
2. Co-ordinating links, stimulating network members to participate in 
the core process by (for example) financial incentives or, especially in 
networks, mutual help-in-kind. 
In the above sequence we present our findings network by network about 
how the different layers co-exist and influence each other; and then 
describe patterns across the networks. In the tables which describe each 
network we wanted to anonymise sites in a way that still enabled us to 
represent the type of organisations or organisational units that were 
network members. We therefore gave each member organisation a 
pseudonym composed as follows: 
1. The first group of characters shows the type of organisation (e.g. 
'PCT') and, if there were several of that kind, which particular one 
('PCT2', 'PCT3' etc.). 
2. For the Child Mental Health network only, a second group of 
characters (where used) shows a department within that organisation. 
When several organisations are mentioned in the same cell of a table, it 
means they all equally shared the relevant characteristic. 
 9.1  Core layer and non-core layers 
We predicted that network layers through which the core process of a 
network are delivered (direct client care in care networks; client care 
organisation in programme networks; general administration, in project 
networks; help-in-kind in user-experience networks) will be denser than the 
other layers (H5A). 
Which of the three layers direct patient care, patient care organisation and 
administration contains a particular network's core process depends on what 
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the goals and therefore function of that network are. To explore the 
relationship between the layers in each network we ascertained for each 
layer in each network its density, which were its isolated and its pendant 
nodes (member organisations), and which nodes had greatest (Freeman) 
degree-centrality and flow centrality. (A pendant node is one which has only 
one link to the rest of the network. Isolates are member organisations 
without any link to the rest of the network.) 
 9.1.1  Small CHD Network 
Table 18 shows these findings for the small CHD network. 
Table 18. Layer characteristics, small CHD network  
SMALL CHD 
NETWORK 
Direct 
client 
care 
Client care 
organisatio
n 
Administrati
on 
Help in 
kind 
Money Overall 
Density 0.57 0.83 0.57 0.73 0.23 0.66 
Isolates DGH 
Pendants 
None 
 PCT 
None 
Highest 
degree 
centrality  
Highest flow 
betweenness 
 
TH 
 
DGH = District General Hospital. TH = Teaching Hospital. 
As a care network, direct patient care was the core process of Small CHD 
Network. The local teaching hospital was on both measures and for all 
network layers the most central body, even though the local PCT was 
officially the network co-ordinating body. This was also a very dense 
network partly due, we infer, to its small size. This network therefore had 
the classic structure of a local referral network, centred on the local district 
hospitals. 
 9.1.2  Self Care Network 
Table 19 shows the main characteristics of the five layers examined in the 
network providing physical self-care for adults with long-term mental health 
problems. As a self-help network, direct client care was its core process. 
Because it was a user-experience self-help network whose active members 
were mostly patients or ex-patients, care has to be taken in interpreting the 
descriptions of layers. 'Help in kind', 'money' and 'direct client care' have 
the same meaning as in the other networks. 'Clients' means 'network 
members themselves'. We asked our informants to interpret 'client care 
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organisation' as any exchange of information about the selection and 
running of self-care activities for the network members, and 'administration' 
to refer to any more general activities that supported the network (e.g. 
fund-raising, recruitment). We know from our qualitative data that the maps 
and matrices omit groups like Remploy, a local social enterprise and the 
PCT's smoking cessation service. They attended early network meetings to 
provide advice on returning to employment or training and giving up 
smoking (which for this network were direct patient care activities), but only 
attended once or twice. 
Table 19. Layer characteristics, self-care network  
SELF-CARE 
NETWORK 
 
Direct 
client care 
Client 
care 
organisati
on 
Administrat
ion 
Help in 
kind 
Money Overall 
Density 0.82 0.77 0.25 0.48 0.14 0.93 
Isolates VO1 None MH; VO4 
Pendants 
 
None 
 
MH; PCT1 MH1 PCT; VO1; 
VO3; VO5  
 
None 
Highest 
degree 
centrality  
VO1; VO2: 
VO3; VO5: 
PCT  
VO1; VO2; 
VO3; VO5: 
PCT  
PCT; VO2; 
VO5 
PCT; VO5 
Highest flow 
betweenness 
VO1; VO2; 
VO3; VO5; 
PCT 
VO1 PCT VO1 
 
PCT 
VO = Voluntary Organisation. MH = Community Mental Health Unit. 
MH appears as a member of the network purely because one of its workers 
accompanied some of the patients to the mental health groups.  
Self-Care Network was very decentralised partly due, we infer, to its small 
size. For the administration layer, three members of the eight had equal 
highest degree centrality. For both the direct client care and the client care 
organisation layers, five of the eight members had equal highest, indeed the 
highest possible, degree centrality. The same applied to flow betweenness 
in the direct client care layer (but not in the client care organisation layer). 
In all layers except money the network organising body was among the 
most central. The PCT's public health department was also central, but most 
clearly in the money layer, because (we infer) of its role in helping the 
network obtain evaluation project status and a grant from NIHME. Later, a 
PCT public health worker helped the network co-ordinating body to get 
mainstream funding by helping them write the bid and persuading the 
relevant commissioner (the city council) to go and see their work. After 
these two organisations, one of the two founder voluntary organisations was 
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third most central, especially on the flow-betweenness measure. It and 
another voluntary organisation are at the centre of the direct client care 
map and among the most connected because as the study period 
progressed they took over much of the responsibility for providing the 
network's client care activity – in this case physical exercise. Nevertheless, 
the map of direct client care layer places the PCT public health workers at 
the centre because they carried out physical health checks of network 
members, offered health advice when issues were found, and attended and 
helped organise these events.  
Self-Care Network's core process layer (direct client care) was the most 
dense. Although not significantly more dense than the client care 
organisation layer, it was significantly denser (by at least a half) than the 
other layers. 
In summary, this network had the classic structure for a referral network: 
small, decentralised and focusing on mutual practical help in everyday 
service delivery. 
 9.1.3  Children's Hospital Project Network 
The five layers in the children's services project network had the 
characteristics reported in Table 20. 
Table 20. Layer characteristics, Children's Hospital Project Network  
CHILDREN'S 
HOSPITAL 
PROJECT 
NETWORK 
Direct 
client 
care 
Client care 
organisation 
Administration Help in 
kind 
Money Overall 
Density 0.60 0.53 0.26 0.32 0.24 0.63 
Isolates None LA4 None 
Pendants None LA4 None LA3 None 
Highest 
degree 
centrality  
DGH4; 
TH1; 
PCT1; 
PCT2;  
LA3; PCT1; 
DGH4 
DGH4 PCT1  DGH3 
Highest flow 
betweenness 
PCT1; 
PCT2; 
DGH4 
PCT1; DGH4 DGH4 TH1 
(closely 
followed 
by DGH3)  
PCT1 
DGH = District General Hospital. TH = Teaching Hospital. LA = Local 
Authority. 
The most central bodies in terms of reported linkages were an acute 
hospital NHS Trust and one particular PCT, the former on the edge of the 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         150 
city and the latter about 30km from it. Local authority members played a 
rather marginal roles (as pendants or isolates, in some layers) except for 
patient referrals, for which they have high centrality, due to their role as 
providers and commissioners of domiciliary social care. By no measure was 
the nominal co-ordinating body the most central in terms of linkages. It was 
least central of all in regard to patient referrals but given the function of this 
network as a project network that was only to be expected. In terms of 
direct client care and help in kind, three of the NHS acute trusts were most 
central. For client care organisation, a non-teaching acute trust some 30km 
from the city was most central. In general the network was quite dense. 
Only the administration and the money layers had any isolated or pendant 
members. Only two member organisations, both local authorities, fell into 
these categories. 
The core function of this project network would be expected to be 
administration, but this was the least dense layer of the network apart from 
money. There was no significant difference in density between the 
administration and money layers; nor between the administration and help-
in-kind layers; nor between the direct client care and the client care 
organisation layers. The direct client care and client care organisation layers 
were approximately twice as dense as the administrative layer and this 
difference was highly statistically significant (p=0.0002). 
So this network was more paradoxical and its structure raises some 
questions. The layer most relevant to its mandate (administration) was the 
least dense but one. The pattern of layer densities was like that pattern 
which our chosen taxonomy (169) would impute to a referral or a 
programme, not a project, network. This requires explanation. 
 9.1.4  Urban CHD Network 
Turning to the Urban CHD Network, Table 21 shows each layer's 
characteristics. 
A striking characteristic of this network is that just two nodes were central 
(on both measures) across all the different network layers. On both 
measures the network co-ordinating body (hosted by one of the member-
PCTs) had greatest centrality for all four layers except direct patient patient 
care, where the largest, best-known teaching hospital had greatest 
centrality. But although direct client care was (jointly with direct client care) 
the least dense network layer, this teaching hospital was sufficiently central 
in the other layers to make it the member organisation with highest 
centrality on aggregate. No member organisations were isolated 
(unconnected to any other member organisation) and only one was a 
pendant. This was a PCT which had only one link for the purpose of direct 
client care. As this was a programme network, our analytic framework 
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would predict the client care organisation layer to be the one 
accommodating this network's core productive activity. There were no 
significant differences in density between that layer and the other four 
layers however. 
Table 21. Layer characteristics, Urban CHD Network 
URBAN CHD 
NETWORK 
Direct 
client care 
Client care 
organisati
on 
Administrat
ion 
Help in 
kind 
Mone
y 
Overall 
Density 0.19 
 
  
0.32 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.51 
Isolates None 
Pendants None PCT6 None 
Highest degree 
centrality  
Highest flow 
betweenness 
 
TH1  
 
Co-ordinating body (PCT7) 
 
 
TH1  
Together these findings describe a relatively cohesive network with deep 
(multidimensional) links between its members. Like the project network, but 
to a lesser extent, this network also had a paradoxical layering. No single 
layer was clearly the most dense, although our chosen taxonomy of 
networks predicts that in a programme network, the client care organisation 
layer of links will be the most dense. Of the study networks, the co-
ordinating body in this one also came closest to Provan and Kenis' (76) 
concept of a unique 'network administrative organization'. 
 9.1.5  Child Mental Health Network 
As before, Table 22 shows the layer characteristics of the network. All these 
data pre-date PCT mandate, control and shift to commissioning focus. 
Across all layers in the Child Mental Health Network CAMHS, the network 
co-ordinating organisation, was consistently the central node in terms of 
betweenness centrality, and jointly so for the direct client care and client 
care organisation layers in terms of degree centrality. Local authority 
children's services had (joint) highest degree centrality for all layers except 
one (help in kind) and in the aggregate. To put this finding in perspective of 
the qualitative data, it should be noted that nevertheless CAMHS was never 
a very centralising body. It and the whole network were vague about the 
network's purpose until quite late in the study period. In practice one of the 
Children's Centres provided most of the administrative support for meetings 
etc. until the very end of the study period, when the PCT took over that 
role. 
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Table 22. Layer characteristics, Child Mental Health Network 
CHILD 
MENTAL 
HEALTH 
NETWORK 
Direct 
client care 
Client 
care 
organisati
on 
Administr
ation 
Help in 
kind 
Money Overall 
Density 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.66 
Isolates DGH-
paediatrics 
CC1; DGH-
Clinical 
Psychology
; LA-Early 
Years 
Inclusion; 
LA-
Parenting 
Support 
Pendants 
 
 
None 
DGH-
Clinical 
Psychology
; AMH 
CC1; LA-
educational 
psychology
; DGH-
speech 
therapy; 
DGH-
paediatrics; 
AMH; HV 
 
 
None 
Highest 
degree 
centrality  
CAMHS; LA 
- children's 
services 
CAMHS; LA 
- children's 
services; 
HV 
LA - 
children's 
services; 
HV 
CC1; LA-
Early Years 
Inclusion 
 
LA - children's services 
Highest 
flow 
betweenne
ss 
 
CAMHS 
AMH = Adult Mental Health Services. CAMHS = Children's and Adult Mental 
Health Services. HV = Health Visiting Service (PCT-managed). CC = 
children's Centre. DGH = District General Hospital. LA = Local Authority. 
This network's core process was direct patient care. This layer was not 
significantly denser than the client care organisation layer. Neither was it 
significantly denser than the administration layer but it was significantly 
denser than the help in kind and money layers. It was noticeable how 
visually similar the direct client care and client care organisation maps were. 
In practice the greatest referrals were from other nodes to and from the 
Children's Centres. As noted certain nodes (member organisations) were 
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central for all the layers except help-in-kind. These were a newly-built 
children's centre, the joint commissioning body, city council's child 
protection services and CAMHS. 
Our qualitative data show that certain member organisations which appear 
in the network maps as linked to the rest of the network actually played 
rather marginal roles in the network. Clinical psychology like adult mental 
health services were mainly oriented at adults, getting involved in child 
mental health only if the carer/ parents' problems (e.g. addiction) had 
generated mental health problems for their children, or were expected to. 
Midwifery was bound to be peripheral because midwives' involvement ends 
so early in a child's development. Conversely parenting support was 
something of a last resort, afforded to parents only after the parent(s) and 
child had gone through other services. The early years inclusion service was 
only involved if a child already had mental health or behavioural problems, 
and was an educational not a clinical service. Paediatricians rarely attended 
meetings, nor did adult mental health representatives, nor social services 
representatives. The links to these network members therefore operated 
outside formal meetings. 
In terms of which layers were most dense and which organisations were 
most central, this network conformed to type as a referral network. 
Although the network was long-established (only the project network was 
older), its density was lower than that of more recent networks. This 
comparison calls into question the assumption that the passage of time, 
alone, allows network links to accumulate and become denser. 
 9.2  Money versus help-in-kind 
The money-mediated layers of links distributed only those monies which 
member organisations allocated to each other through the networks. Not all 
the funding links between member organisations were mediated through, or 
even visible to, the (rest of) the network. Indeed by far the most substantial 
financial links (service contracts, budgets. PBC) were usually outside of the 
network, running in parallel to network links and not through them. The 
NHS networks had at most an indirect, advisory influence on those 
allocations, and the user-experience network had none. 
With that interpretive proviso we used the findings above to compare the 
density and other characteristics of the money-layer and the help-in-kind 
layer, again presenting our findings by network and then drawing out the 
general pattern across networks. We assume that the denser a layer, the 
greater the part it played in stimulating co-ordination among network 
members. 
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Two different patterns were found in the relationship between the money 
and the help-in-kind layers. 
In three networks, the help-in-kind layer was considerably and significantly 
more dense than the money layer. The help-in-kind layer in Child Mental 
Health Network was almost three times as dense as the money layer. The 
former had fewer (and different) isolate and pendant nodes. These findings 
suggest that money flows (hence, financial incentives) played little part in 
the co-ordination of this network. The money layer had the same most-
central organisation (viz. the PCT public health department) as the other 
layers but was not otherwise structurally similar to them. Only the money 
layer of the network in Small CHD Network had any isolate or pendant 
nodes at all. Its density was also less than one-third that of the help-in-kind 
layer. In Self-Care Network, the money layer had less than one fifth the 
density of the direct client care layer. In all three layers the difference was 
highly statistically significant. 
In the two other networks, the money and help-in-kind layers were not 
significantly different in density. At Children's Hospital Project Network the 
help-in-kind layer was less dense than the money layer, but the difference 
was only just at the declared threshold of significance (on a one-tailed but 
not a two-tailed t-test). In any event, the member organisation with 
greatest centrality in both these network layers was one of the member-
PCTs, not the network co-ordinating body. Both the money and the help-in-
kind layers in Regional CHD Network had similar density. (Although the 
money layer was slightly denser the difference was not statistically 
significant.) In both of these layers the same organisation – the network co-
ordinating body – had the greatest centrality. This finding is consistent with 
inferring that money and help-in-kind played approximately equal roles as 
media of network co-ordination. 
We return to these finding in discussing the role of incentives (RQ7). 
 9.3  Information 
 9.3.1  Feedback from patients and careers 
Across all the NHS networks, consumer feedback was obtained through 
meetings and consultations rather than consumer research (in contrast to, 
say, recent trends in general medical practice). The NHS networks' collected 
user feedback through user involvement in network committees or sub-
groups, and ad hoc surveys. The latter were not frequent; in none of the 
networks did they occur more than once in the study period, and not at all 
in two of the three children's services networks. In contrast the remaining 
children's network (Children's Hospital Project Network) had taken by far 
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the most extensive and sophisticated user-experience survey of the NHS 
networks studied. 
After some of its physical activity events (more often the sports and games 
events than food events or excursions) Self-Care Network ran feedback 
questionnaires to elicit users' opinions of the events. Until late in the study 
period this was its only systematic information feedback system besides 
turning up and speaking at network meetings, which any member could do. 
User feedback was however of great importance to Self-Care Network, for 
recruiting and retaining new members was essential to its sustainability. 
 9.3.2  Information from the network to patients and carers 
Information for the public to scrutinise was disseminated with varying 
degrees of thoroughness. CHD pilot site had by far the most comprehensive 
and detailed website (we downloaded over 300 items), on which a mixture 
of policy documents, guidance, network administrative documents and data 
about activity in the CHD services it covered. 
 9.3.3  Clinical activity 
The CHD networks tended to rely on national standards and targets for both 
the criteria (e.g. for clinical quality and service access times) and data by 
which to judge the network's and its member organisations' activities. Urban 
CHD Network used as its performance data comparative survival rates 
provider by provider. For example, they were in 2008 considering removing 
services from one provider (member organisation) with a mortality rate for 
CHD patients four times the national average. To check adherence to their 
care pathways and targets, they instituted clinical audits, initially of waiting 
times for cardiac disease treatments, and later for revascularisation, heart 
attack, acute coronary syndrome, cardiac rehabilitation, heart failure and 
arrhythmia. Network Urban CHD Network attempted to monitor providers' 
performance 6-monthly, but for some activities monitoring only 12-month 
or ad hoc, obtaining the information from the relevant member-PCT leads. 
However the network also relied upon data from the DH, its regional health 
observatory and local academics. Similarly, Regional CHD Network obtained 
and circulated both national data on access to and the impacts of CHD 
services, but also circulated quite detailed local data about the performance 
of each local trust (for example, SMRs per trust for specific cardiac 
conditions). This pattern of re-use of national standards and data collection 
systems for monitoring network activity was also found in the large project 
network for children's services (Children's Hospital Project Network). 
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Informants in these networks tended to be quite conscious of the necessity 
for, and of the networks' plans to strengthen, the sharing of clinical data. 
Their reasons for doing so were so that: 
the [Small CHD Network] network, and the [overarching] cardiac network are able to 
share that information around so everybody can see what the performance is in other 
hospitals because its out there and you can't hide away from it any more and its there 
and you, if you've got a problem in your own hospital, like in [hospital], they were unable 
to meet the call to needle figures, you're able to see you're not and everybody else is, so 
its not, you're not putting your head in the sand, you've got to identify, you've got to 
recognise that there's a problem here that other people have managed to solve. 
(Ambulance representative, Small CHD Network) 
CHD pilot site network attached high importance to collecting monitoring 
information, spending most of its budget on a database supporting clinical 
audit, with the intention in doing so of developing an infrastructure for 
collecting other kinds of data across the network. The principle at issue in 
this activity was: 
transparency is one of the biggest things that we ask of the network and that's we have 
with them, and a commitment to share goals really, those two things, a commitment to 
share goals and their commitment to transparency. And its something we have with 
[network place-name] and it's improving elsewhere too. 
(Deputy co-ordinator, Small CHD Network) 
Thus in Small CHD Network this informant advocated creating a web-based 
referral monitoring system because at present, 
we've even got a situation where patients who have been referred for angioplasty have 
their angiograms sent from the secondary hospital to the tertiary hospital in taxis, you 
just think, well this is the 21st century and we're sending taxis with CDs in, we should 
be able to email this stuff electronically. 
(Ambulance representative, Small CHD Network) 
As for the automated information system which Urban CHD Network had 
promised, 
Yeah, I've been frequently told it's going to be very useful but I've never actually got onto 
it. 
(PCT public health doctor, Urban CHD Network) 
Network Urban CHD Network introduced clinical audits to check adherence 
to its policies and care pathways. 
In contrast, two of the children's networks (Child Mental Health Network and 
City Children's Network) still lacked well-organised systems for monitoring 
their members' clinical activity. In Child Mental Health Network especially, 
there was a technical reason for this; the evidence base for service models 
for mental health care for young children is very small and generally of poor 
quality (Stenhouse et al, submitted). 
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Self-Care Network had no routine information-collection about the health 
outcomes of their activities, but considering that these outcomes are mostly 
likely to be very long-term (decades, for say life-time incidence of heart 
disease) this was not surprising. The network enabled its members to get 
weighed and estimate their BMI, but the network itself did not record those 
data. 
 9.3.4  Management information 
Child Mental Health Network had little in the way of systematic management 
information collection (e.g. on budgets, compliance with mandates, 
workloads), relying more on ad hoc measures. It sometimes circulated and 
discussed information provided from member organisations. It also 
commissioned external researchers to carry out evaluations, one of which 
(of the new children's centre) included data about referral and activity 
patterns there. That however was a once-only piece of information-
gathering undertaken to support funding bids. 
Again Children's Hospital Project Network was a contrast. Long-term and 
large-scale data on needs and demands for children services was the 
information most needed for the Children's Hospital Project Network's 
project. Its sub-network working groups collected some kinds of monitoring 
information for the network: 
if we want to know “how many” of something, we're usually talking about people at this 
point because you wouldn't expect them to count activity but if we want to know how 
many advanced practitioners we've got or how many consultants and what's your on-
call rota look like, they [sub-networks] collect that for us. 
(Co-ordinator, Children's Hospital Project Network) 
So far as service planning was concerned, a problem for the Children's 
Hospital Project Network was that of trying to predict future demographic 
changes in the city and its environs, and the implications for children's 
services: 
you have an influx, let's say from Eastern Europe, who feel secure, bring their families, 
have other families, they have babies – the national statistics haven't caught up with 
that. We have to take the best guess of what that means to us? Will these people stay? 
Will they stay in [city]? Will they stay in this bit of [city]? Will they have their babies and 
go back when we hit a recession? What effect does that have on the children's 
population? … So we're constantly having to adjust our figures, based as far as we can 
on local knowledge. 
(Co-ordinator, Children's Hospital Project Network) 
For this sort of information the network had to rely on its member 
organisations and publicly available data. Concomitantly, the annual 
budgetary costs for the re-profiled services were constantly having to be re-
estimated and re-apportioned among the member organisations. 
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Less formal information was however available for managing network 
activity in Self-Care Network; network members could and did notice 
whether, what other network members practically contributed to the 
network. In this network the few information systems were informal and 
straightforward. Its activities were of a scale and character that all members 
could readily understand. The network had practically no information links 
beyond what immediately emerged from the exercise and other events 
themselves. Monitoring information about attendance at events and costs 
were collected, besides the recording of decisions, actions, membership and 
contact details; but little more information was collected or necessary. 
Mostly this information was held in paper records, but at times the members 
had access to word-processing and the internet. More recently, city council 
funding of the largest member organisation necessitated their collecting 
performance data about their contribution to Self-Care Network. 
 9.3.5  Network information systems 
Among links transmitting information, the following patterns thus appeared: 
1. Though still far from comprehensive, the CHD networks' information 
systems for monitoring clinical activity by member organisations and 
across the network as a whole were relatively well-developed 
compared with those for information about patient and carers' 
subjective experiences and feedback. Where the latter were 
monitored at all, it was through ad hoc surveys and patient 
representatives on network managing bodies or sub-groups. In the 
user-led self-care network, the reverse pattern was found; well-
developed user feedback with almost no clinical (or equivalent) 
information. Of the children's networks, only the project network had 
well-developed methods of service planning and modelling; and 
collected analogous kinds of clinically-related information to that 
found in the CHD networks. 
2. The NHS networks were generally aware of the information 
requirements arising from their work, and of gaps in the availability of 
the information, and therefore information links, available. The 
networks continued to develop their capacity for monitoring through 
information systems but from a low starting point. Mostly the 
networks relied on their member organisations, especially the SHA 
and PCT, collection of monitoring data but as other studies testify, 
those systems themselves have trouble collecting basic monitoring 
data (18). In these circumstances the networks constructed 
information links in two ways. Either the networks, in an ad hoc way, 
pooled or re-used existing NHS data-sets or they set up new data 
collection from their own budgets. 
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3. The transparency of network activity which management of the 
network by means of governmentality would require was generally 
regarded as desirable, but still constrained in practice by the absence 
of the necessary information systems in the NHS networks. In the 
experience network, informal mutual scrutiny ('concertive co-
ordination') was a substitute. 
 9.4  Summary 
Taking the above patterns of layering across the five networks for which we 
had SNA data, the following patterns appear. 
The layer containing the network's core process was the densest layer in 
three of the networks but not, apparently, in the project network. There, 
direct client care was the densest layer and the client care organisation layer 
was not significantly different. In the larger of the two CHD programme 
networks (Urban CHD Network) the layer (client care organisation) containing 
the core process did not significantly differ in density from any of the other 
layers except direct patient care (which was less dense). In three networks, 
the hypothesis that the layer containing the care process is densest is 
supported, as it would be in a fourth network if one allowed the hypothesis to 
stand when no other layer was denser than the one containing the core 
process (and at least one other layer is less dense). Where the layer 
containing the core process is not the most dense possible inferences are to: 
1. count this as evidence against the hypothesis (though 
countervailed by evidence from a greater number of networks) 
2. pose a new research question as to what the conditions are, 
under which the layer containing the core process is not the 
most dense layer. 
3. conclude that this fifth network was not in practice a project 
network as its official mandate supposed, but that in fact it 
functioned as a either care or a programme network (since direct 
client care and client care organisation were the joint densest 
layers). This conclusion saves the original hypothesis but poses 
the further question of how a putative project network came to 
function as a care or as a programme network. 
Our qualitative data tend towards supporting (3) because in terms of 
membership, activity and artefacts the project network also undertook a great 
deal of activity more typical of the other care and programme networks (e.g. 
implementation of service quality standards, re-organisation of referral 
routes) which are neither specific to, nor typical of, the management of large 
capital projects. If we re-interpret the function and therefore core process of 
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Children's Hospital Project Network in this way, it fits into the pattern found 
elsewhere. For the client care organisation layer in Children's Hospital Project 
Network was nearly two-and-a-half times as dense as the money layer and 
this difference was highly statistically significant (p=0.0002). 
Unexpectedly, considering that tertiary hospitals stand at the apex of referral 
hierarchies and as centres of clinical training and knowledge-generation, 
teaching hospitals were not especially central in the study networks. Contrary 
to what one might have expected given the distribution of resources across 
the NHS, except in Small CHD Network the most central organisations were 
not mainly acute teaching hospitals. 
Neither was the co-ordinating body especially central in the two small 
networks; it was more central to the three larger ones.  
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 10  External links and openness 
The research question on network openness was: 
RQ6a: How are member organisations within a network tied to 
organisations outside it, how are these relationships structured? 
RQ6b: What effect do these relationships have on how effectively 
member organisations use relational co-ordinating structures? 
For outside links to have maximum effect on how effectively network 
member organisations use relational co-ordinating structures required, we 
hypothesised, that external relationships had a specific structure. Network 
members with external links would have also to have the internal links by 
which to transmit to other network members the knowledge and other 
resources obtained through links outside the network. For this transmission 
to occur by the most direct routes, the nodes with most external links would 
also have to have most internal links; the numbers of external and internal 
links per node would correlate. For the transmission of knowledge from 
outside the network to within it to be a managed activity, one would also 
expect the network co-ordinating body to have the highest numbers of 
external (and of internal) links. Then, as previously discussed, external links 
might have the effect either of enabling network members to acquire 
knowledge and innovations, and so decrease in hospital admissions 
preventable by primary-secondary care co-ordination; or the effect that 
professional interests and norms constrained or countervailed the networks' 
own goals, mandate or activity. 
 10.1  Structure of external and internal links 
Every node in every network for which we had data had a negative E-I 
index. The E-I Index for each network node shows whether, and how far, its 
links outside its network outnumbered its links to other network members. 
A positive E-I Index means the network has more external than internal 
links, a negative score the opposite. Thus, every node reported more links 
within the network (to other network members) than to organisations or 
further networks outside it.  
Network by network we calculated whether there was any correlation 
(Spearman) between the numbers of reported intra-network and extra-
network links for each node. Table 23 shows the results. 
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Table 23. Balance between internal and external linkage 
 Mean E-I 
Index 
Correlation (Spearman) 
between numbers of 
nodes' internal and 
external links  
Small CHD 
Network 
-0.6738 0.00 
Self-Care 
Network 
-0.8426 0.42 
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
-0.7643 0.46* 
Urban CHD 
Network 
-0.6191 0.53 
Child 
Mental 
Health 
Network 
-0.8675 0.12 
* = Significant at alpha=0.05 
At a single-network level of analysis there was a significant correlation only 
in one network (Children's Hospital Project Network) between the number of 
internal links a member organisation had and the number of its external 
link. Taking all nodes together (across the networks) the mean E-I index 
was -0.7551, showing that internal links were considerably more prevalent 
than external ones. The correlation between numbers of nodes' internal and 
external nodes was 0.4281, which implies that at most only a small 
proportion (18%) of the variation in nodes' numbers of intra-network links 
could be explained by the variation in the number of extra-network links. 
Hence there was no strong evidence that, for member organisations, 
internal and external links were substitute (alternative) sources of 
innovations or other resources. Neither was there strong evidence that the 
presence of internal and of external links was mutually reinforcing (H6A). 
 10.1.1  Geographical scope of external links 
Network members' participation in external committees was, not 
surprisingly, greater in local than regional, and greater in regional than 
national committees. The two networks which were care networks when the 
data in Table 24 were collected had no survey respondents who participated 
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in national committees or similar bodies. For care networks, liaison with 
other local organisations is of practical importance. Participation in regional 
and national policy-making bodies is almost superfluous for care networks, 
but directly relevant to the core processes of programme (commissioning 
support) networks. Since the project network was managing a city-wide 
project (in a large city) there was also a practical reason why it had as 
many respondents who participated in regional as in local bodies outside the 
network. 
Table 24. Network respondents' external links 
Network  Respondents with 
local external links 
N (%) 
Respondents with 
regional external links 
N (%) 
Respondents with 
national external 
links 
N (%) 
Child Mental 
Health Network 
17/42 (40%) 5/42 (12%) 0/42 (0%) 
Children's 
Hospital Project 
Network 
20/36 (56%) 20/36 (56%) 5/36 (14%) 
City Children's 
Network 
6/8 (75%) 3/8 (37%) 1/8 (12%) 
Small CHD 
Network 
2/5 (40%) 2/5 (40%) 0/5 (0%) 
Regional CHD 
Network 
No data No data No data 
Urban CHD 
Network 
19/39 (49%) 5/39 (13%) 2/39 (5%) 
Self-Care 
Network 
6/12 (50%) 0/12 (0%) 0/12 (0%) 
Overall 58/122 (48%) 32/122 (26%) 7/122 (6%) 
Two apparent explanations for the uneven distribution of national-level links 
outside the networks are: 
 Size. By the law of large numbers the larger a network is, the more 
likely it is to include as individual members experts who participate in 
regional, national and international arenas for policy-making, 
professional or scientific work. Conversely, larger networks are more 
likely to be visible in regional and national arenas, and to attract the 
attention of (hence links with) policy-makers and professional leaders 
at those levels. 
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 Function. The practical activities of care-networks require essentially 
local resources (hospital or other beds; professional staff; community 
care), obtained or accessed through local rather than regional, 
national or international links outside the networks. Programme 
networks, whose tasks are dissemination and implementation of 
policy and knowledge, have the reverse pattern of resource 
dependencies. 
However, Child Mental Health Network (a large network in terms of 
individual membership) had the same pattern of absence of national links as 
the small networks in sites D and G. On that basis, function appears a 
likelier explanation than network size for the absence of national-level links 
external to the networks. 
 10.1.2  Openness of the networks 
Furthermore, networks' links to external bodies were not dependent on 
brokerage or mediation via the networks' co-ordinating bodies. Simple 
counts of their reported external linkages show which network members 
were most and least important as intermediaries between the study 
networks and other networks or organisations external to them. Table 25 
shows the pattern found. (More than one entry in a cell indicates a tie.) 
Table 25. Nodes with most and fewest external links 
 Most links outside network Fewest links outside network 
Small CHD Network Ambulance service PCT 
Self-Care Network Mental Health Self-Help Group PCT; community psychiatric 
centre; children's centre  
Children's Hospital 
Project Network 
Non-teaching hospital  Two non-teaching hospitals; 
community health services trust 
Urban CHD Network Network co-ordinating body 
(host PCT) 
Five PCTs; two peripheral 
teaching hospitals; ambulance 
service 
Child Mental Health 
Network 
Local authority children's 
services 
Health visiting service; 
eduational psychology; 
children's centre; parenting 
support service.  
In only one network (Urban CHD Network) was the co-ordinating body the 
most important link to relevant bodies outside the network. With that 
exception, network co-ordinating bodies did not have any unique role as 
mediator between the network and health system 'outside' the network. In 
the other four networks, the co-ordinating body was in the middle of the 
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range in terms of numbers of reported links to bodies outside the network. 
The tendency of many (but not all) PCTs to have few external links was 
noticeable. We had expected that teaching hospitals would have the most 
links outside the network but this was not found in the three networks which 
included such hospitals. In Small CHD Network the ambulance service had 
the most external links because its representative was also a member of 
another, region-wide cardiac network. 
In general, therefore, links within the network were, for most organisations, 
structured independently of their links outside the network, and in any 
event links within the network were more numerous, hence prima facie 
more important. The structure of links outside the network was not closely 
matched to the structure of links inside. Such a structure is better-adapted 
to the transmission of knowledge and other resources within a network than 
to the transmission of knowledge and other resources from outside the 
network to members within it. 
 10.2  External links as sources of knowledge 
External links were used for knowledge-gathering, but only by a (large) 
minority of respondents. Our questionnaire asked respondents about what 
resources inside and outside the study networks they used to support 
innovation-related activity. This large minority used external evidence-based 
studies, external expert committees and comparative data in roughly equal 
proportions. External guidelines and site visits were less used (Table 26). 
There were no obvious difference of patterns of use of external knowledge 
between the different kinds of network. 
Table 26. External knowledge sources respondents used in the previous 6 
months  
Network  Reviewed 
external 
evidence 
N (%) 
External 
Committees 
N (%) 
External 
data-sets 
N (%) 
Visited other 
sites 
N (%) 
External 
guidelines 
N (%) 
Child 
Mental 
Health 
Network 
22/42 (52%) 20/42 (48%)  17/42 (40%)  8/42 (19%)  20/42 (48%)  
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
14/36 (39%) 17/36 (47%) 12/36 (33%)  6/36 (17%)  13/36 (36%)  
City 
Children's 
5/8 (62%) 5/8 (62%) 4/8 (50%) 3/8 (37%) 3/8 (37%) 
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Network 
Small 
CHD 
Network 
3/5 (60%)  3/5 (60%)  2/5 (40%)  1/5 (20%)  2/5 (40%)  
Regional 
CHD 
Network 
No data No data No data No data No data 
Urban 
CHD 
Network 
8/39 (21%) 7/39 (18%) 8/39 (21%)  5/39 (13%)  7/39 (18%)  
Self-Care 
Network 
Incommensurable – see below 
Overall 52/130 
(40%)  
51/130 (39%)  53/130 (41%)  23/130 (18%)  45/130 (35%)  
Self-Care Network requires separate explanation. Because it did not supply 
a clinical service, innovation-related activities oriented towards evidence-
basing its working practices were not directly relevant to it. In Self-Care 
Network the main external knowledge links were health education events for 
the benefit of its members. Self-Care Network transmitted this knowledge 
(in condensed, accessible forms) from the diverse external organisations 
which had produced it over many years (universities, other researchers, 
WHO, NICE etc.) to their members. The Self-Care Network had no layer of 
links for the formal transmission of knowledge (no equivalent to publication 
of 'best practice' findings) but drew upon the direct experience and 
awareness of mental health problems from their users and the volunteers 
active in the three member organisations. Of our study networks, Self-Care 
Network was the most open to new membership, indeed depended on 
recruiting users to sustain itself. It also continually tried out new artefacts 
(see RQ8) for health promotion and related activities. It also sought out new 
sources of funding, including funding from NHS and local government 
commissioners. 
The above findings enable us to decide between the two alternative 
hypotheses (H6Aa and H6Ab) as to whether external links complement or 
substitute for links within the network as a source of knowledge: 
H6A: (Alternative hypotheses) Individuals with greater local, regional and 
national links outside the study network will have 
a) more extensive links within the network (because they obtain 
resources from outside the network to share within the network). 
Alternative hypothesis: 
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b) fewer links within the network because non-network links substitute 
for the network. 
As reported above, the numbers of a member organisation's links internal to 
the network and external to it were associated only weakly, if at all. That 
pattern tends to support hypothesis 4A, but only weakly, and not alternative 
hypothesis H4B. 
 10.3  Occupational patterns of links outside the 
networks 
At individual respondent level the EI indices for network members did vary 
by occupation but not in the way predicted. We had predicted: 
H6B: More strongly professionalised occupations (i.e. doctors) are 
more likely than other professions to have contacts outside the 
network (hence rely on the network less as a means of obtaining 
information; hence, be less engaged with network). 
We therefore analysed the relationship between connectedness inside and 
outside the networks by respondent's occupation (H5) and by occupational 
group of the respondents' contacts with bodies outside (H6) their own 
organisation. The occupational groups were: Allied health professional; 
Doctor; Nurse; Secretarial / clerical; Manager; Social worker; Other. Since 
Self-Care Network was predominantly a user network, we counted 'users' as 
another occupational group (i.e. an occupation other than health 
professional). In the event no respondents described themselves as having 
a clerical or secretarial role so we excluded this category when analysing the 
data. Two informants of the 11 in the 'other' category were fitness 
instructors and two were teachers. The remainder were in roles that people 
of any occupation could fill, e.g. BME development worker. Table 27 shows 
the results. 
Table 27. E-I index by occupation (pooled data)  
Occupation Mean EI 
Index  
AHP -0.96 
Doctor -0.77 
Nurse -0.78 
Manager  -0.77 
Social Worker -0.83 
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Other profession  -0.79 
Users (no profession in network 
context)  
-0.85 
The association between E-I index and occupation was highly significant (F 
= 7.25, critical F = 2.20, p=0.00). However the E-I index did not vary 
according to whether an occupation was strongly or weakly professionalised. 
Rather, it varied between two groups of occupations. The first group – 
doctors, nurses, managers and the 'other professions' - had higher E-I 
indices, i.e. were more likely to have links outside the network, than the 
second group (social workers, allied health professional and users) were. We 
had hypothesised (H6B) that more strongly professionalised occupations 
(i.e. doctors) are more likely than other professions to have contacts 
outside the network (hence rely on the network less as a means of obtaining 
information; hence, be less engaged with network). The present findings do 
not support this hypothesis. Whilst doctors were as predicted an occupation 
with relatively many links outside the networks, nurses (less strongly 
professionalised) and managers (not professionalised at all, in the senses 
that doctors are) had similar mean E-I indices. The allied health 
professionals, whose level of professionalisation is similar to that of nurses, 
had a significantly lower E-I index, as did social workers. We therefore 
reject hypothesis H6B. In any event all the occupational groups had strongly 
negative E-I indices; their links within the network were more numerous 
than their links to bodies outside the network. Even the occupations with 
higher E-I scores appeared to rely much more on the network than on 
external bodies for obtaining or sharing resources. Note that these results 
concern only links to external bodies which the informants attend in the 
capacity of a network member or representative. Insofar as number of links 
are a proxy for power or influence, this finding also tells against that part of 
H6 which predicted that links outside the network to professional networks 
are more powerful or influential than those within and through the study 
networks. 
We also had predicted that (H6C) each profession is more likely to have 
contacts outside the network with fellow-professionals than members of 
other professions. This has the apparent implication (assuming that 
numbers of links reflect strength of influence) that links through 
professional networks are more powerful or influential than those through 
the study networks. To profile informants' contacts outside the network, we 
listed for each informant the non-network bodies she participated in at local, 
regional and national level. We coded these bodies according to whether 
they were uni-professional bodies (of the informant's own profession), 
multi-professional bodies or of an occupational composition unknown to the 
researchers (because the response did not make it clear). Pooling data 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         169 
across the study sites, we collated the data by informants' occupation. We 
then calculated what we labelled a 'Uniprofessional-versus-Multiprofessional' 
('UM') index of the balance between the numbers of each informant's links 
to uni-professional (her own profession's) bodies outside the network and to 
multi-professional bodies. When we calculated this index from data only 
about the external bodies on which the respondent participated in her 
capacity as a network member, we called the resulting figure her 'network-
capacity UM index'. Table 28 shows the mean network-capacity UM index for 
each occupation. 
Table 28. Occupation and network-capacity UM indices 
Occupation Mean 
'Network 
Capacity' UM 
Index  
AHP -0.33 
Doctor -0.14 
Nurse -0.69 
Manager  -0.82 
Social Worker -1 
Other profession  -1 
Users (no profession in network 
context)  
-1 
Taking all the occupations together, there was no significant association 
between occupation and network-capacity UM index (Anova, F=1.18, critical 
F = 2.19). This pattern persisted when we excluded from the analysis the 
three occupations (social work, other professions, user) with 10 or fewer 
respondents. Although the difference between the mean index for doctors 
appeared noticeably higher than for other occupations, a comparison of 
doctors with the combined set of AHPs, nurses and managers showed that 
this difference was not statistically significant either. 
Besides the non-network bodies which informants attended in the capacity 
of network member, we also collected data about which uni-professional 
bodies (of the informant's own profession) outside the network they 
attended, irrespective of whether they represented their network there. 
When using these data we called the resulting UP index the respondent's 
'personal capacity UM index'. Table 29 shows the mean personal capacity 
UM index for each occupation. 
Table 29. Occupation and personal capacity UM indices 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         170 
Occupation Mean 
'Personal 
Capacity' UM 
Index  
AHP -0.45 
Doctor -0.47 
Nurse 1.18 
Manager  -0.15 
Social W 1.8 
Other profession  0.87 
Users (no profession in network 
context)  -1.00 
There was no significant association between occupation and personal-
capacity UM index (Anova, F=0.79, Critical F = 2.7) either. This pattern too 
persisted when we excluded from the analysis the three occupations with 10 
or fewer respondents. In Table 29 the most apparent difference was 
between nursing (not medicine) and the other professions, but this 
difference was not statistically significant either. 
Both the network-capacity and the personal-capacity UM indices tended to 
be negative; informants generally had more links to multi-professional than 
to single-professional (their own profession's) bodies outside the network. 
This pattern did not significantly vary by occupational group. These findings 
are evidence against hypothesis (H6C) that each profession has contacts 
outside the network with fellow-professionals rather than with members of 
other professions. They are therefore also evidence against the supposition 
that external links are the media for professional bodies outside the 
networks to control or constrain network activity. If it does occur, such 
control or constraint must therefore be effected by other means. 
 10.4  External links and innovation 
External links had little relationship with innovation-related activity. H6D 
predicted that inter-group brokerage allows exchange of ideas. Networks 
with proportionately more external links, i.e. a higher EI index, would report 
higher level of innovation-related activity. At network level of analysis, there 
was no significant correlation (Spearman) between networks' mean EI 
indices and their mean innovation-related activity scores. Node-level 
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analysis showed either no significant correlation between EI index and 
innovation-related activity or a significant but negative correlation between 
EI index and innovation-related activities (Table 30). 
Table 30. External linkage and innovation  
 E-I Index 
(mean 
score) 
Innovation 
Score (mean) 
Correlation (node 
level) (Spearman)  
Small CHD 
Network 
-0.6738 5.75 -0.8* 
Self-Care 
Network 
-0.8426 4.83 -0.55 
Children's 
Hospital Project 
Network 
-0.7643 3.21 -0.29 
Urban CHD 
Network 
-0.6191 4.5 -0.61* 
Child Mental 
Health Network 
-0.8675 5.73 -0.35 
* = Significant at alpha=0.05 
Our qualitative data showed (see RQ2) that by far the most important 
source, outside the study networks, of ideas for changing clinical practice or 
service configurations were national policy and guidance, that is the NHS 
networks' mandates. For the consequence of the mandates was that 
mandated networks became implementation structures rather than 
structures to promote 'bottom up' innovations. H6D is therefore not 
supported by the evidence of these study networks. 
 10.5  External links and referral patterns 
No correlation at all was found between member organisations' E-I index 
(proportion of links outside the network) and the relevant referral patterns. 
Network openness to external links was not significantly associated with 
changes in the kinds of admission preventable by better primary-secondary 
care co-ordination in any of the networks for which we had both SNA and 
outcomes data. These data lead us to reject the hypothesis (H6E) that 
providers with more external links will have more up-to-date working 
practices, hence report between outcomes (in terms of admissions 
preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination). 
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 10.6  Role of external links in the study networks 
Since network members' external links tended to be fewer than their links 
internal to the networks, or absent, our findings about what effect these 
relationships have on how effectively member organisations use relational 
co-ordinating structures are largely negative. They suggestthe absence of 
effects and patterns of effective use of relational co-ordinating structure that 
studies outside the NHS might have led one to predict. Specifically 
 Internal linkages were proportionately much more numerous, from 
which we infer important, to the networks than external links. 
 External linkages were used as a way of gaining knowledge, but even 
in this regard network mandates were a most important influence on 
network objectives and activities (see RQ2), rather than other 
external links. 
 Except for the mandate, inter-group brokerage as a source of 
external ideas or of innovation was not very apparent. Neither, 
mandate apart, did the network co-ordinating body act in any distinct 
way as a broker for external knowledge or innovations. 
 Uni-professional external linkages that could act as a medium for the 
exercise of external professional power over the networks were 
generally weak or absent. But since NHS clinical occupations, and 
indeed networks, tend to be highly professionalised, professional links 
and discipline must operate through other channels than direct links 
between external professional organisations and networks such as 
those studied. Instead professional links and discipline may operate, 
for instance, through structures operating within, rather than 
between, the member organisations of the networks; or through 
structures at national level or outside the NHS. Our quantitative tests 
of H6B and H6C relied on taking the numbers and balance of links 
(e.g. the E-I index) as a proxy for the influence which internal and 
external linkages have upon network members. However it remains 
an open question whether, although fewer, professionals' uni-
professional links are of a different quality and influence their practice 
more than their links inside an NHS-style 'clinical and professional' 
network do. 
As previously, we interpreted network effectiveness in terms of innovation 
and avoidable hospital admissions. 
 10.7  Summary 
The study networks' member organisations had relatively few links to bodies 
outside the network. Their links to other organisations within the networks 
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were more numerous and appeared stronger. The networks were not 
particularly open to external resources. Professional (in the sense of uni-
professional) networks had little direct influence either. Such links outside 
the networks as were present tended to be with inter-disciplinary bodies 
rather than with (uni-) professional networks, though it should be borne in 
mind that our study focussed on links which our informants reported in their 
capacity as network members rather than in their capacity as members of a 
particular profession. Relationships to networks and organisations outside 
the study networks therefore appeared to have little perceptible effect on 
how effectively the member organisations used the study networks.  
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 11  Incentives 
On incentives, our research questions were: 
RQ7a: What effects are produced by incentives to cooperate (or not 
to)? 
RQ7b: What match is there between incentives and network 
structures? 
RQ7c: In NHS networks for example, how will the shifts to practice 
based commissioning and payment by results affect network 
processes? 
 11.1  Incentives and network structures 
The match between incentives and network structures was investigated by 
SNA: 
1. comparing the density, isolates and pendants of the links for money 
and the links for help-in-kind. This showed which type of 
'motivational' or co-ordination link predominated in the network. 
2. testing whether each link with a 'real side' content was matched by a 
link which transmitted money (in exchange) between the same pair of 
network members. This showed whether market-like exchanges of 
money for real-side benefits might be occurring. 
By 'help in kind' we meant use, loan or sharing of equipment, premises, 
consumables, staff time, information and other similar forms of practical 
help. 
The comparison between the financial and help-in-kind structures is already 
reported above (RQ5). In three networks, the help-in-kind layer was 
considerably and significantly more dense than the money layer. Help in 
kind was a more important medium of co-ordination than financial links in 
these three, hence a more important medium of co-ordination than financial 
incentives. In one programme network (Urban CHD Network) and the 
project network, the money layer were not significantly different in density. 
Where money is absent as a linkage medium at all, it must also be absent 
as an incentive. Hence financial incentives were less important than help-in-
kind as a medium for collaboration in the three networks, and no more 
important than help-in-kind in the other two. The difference between the 
group of three and the group of two networks was neither in function nor 
care group, but in size. These were the same two networks that showed the 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         175 
strong pattern of associations between internal links, external links and 
innovation-related activities reported above. 
To explain the differences between these two patterns we turned to our 
qualitative data. Possible reasons why in these two networks the money-
mediated links were as dense as the help-in-kind links were: 
 Setting: Both relevant networks both served large urban populations. 
In general, direct links between members (density) were lower in 
these two networks. So a possible interpretation is not that money-
links were more important in these two networks than elsewhere, but 
that help-in-kind links were less important because other kinds of 
direct contact were fewer. For in these networks there was less 
everyday working contact between organisations at the clinician and 
junior-manager levels than in the more localised care networks. 
 Preponderance of NHS organisational membership, with its 
implication of common policy norms and performance management 
systems, does not seem a good explanation of the observed patterns. 
For these factors might be expected to make money links relatively 
less, not more, important as a linkage medium in the larger, 
mandated networks. 
 The fact that the networks were mandated and co-ordinated by an 
NHS commissioner (SHA in one, PCT hosting a SHA-wide network in 
the other) which allocated substantial budgets and resources to 
supporting the network. Thus, money-links were relatively more 
important in these networks simply because in the other networks, 
the co-ordinating body (and perhaps other members too) could not 
bring much money to the network. 
There remain three other layers (direct patient care; patient care 
administration; and general administration) to compare with the money 
layer. Table 31 shows the proportions of links in each network and for each 
network layer, where a 'real-side' link had a matched 'money-flow' link. The 
higher these proportions, the greater the role of financial incentives in the 
collaboration between network member organisations. The denominator in 
these fractions is the number of reported links, which reflects network 
density not the (much lower) number of network members. 
Table 31 shows a a similarity across all four networks in regard to direct 
patient care, where the proportion of links in which direct money-incentives 
operated could not have exceeded 25% of the total (and because of our 
data-cleaning methods these figures are maxima; possibly the actual figures 
are lower). For patient care organisation and general administration there is 
an apparent difference between Urban CHD Network and the other four 
networks. On comparing the matrices showing the matched money-plus-
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real-side links, we found that in three of the networks (Small CHD Network, 
Self-Care Network, Children's Hospital Project Network) none of these 
matched links involved the co-ordinating body and in the fourth (Child 
Mental Health Network) only two (out of 34) did. The matched links were 
between other member organisations, and showed no obvious pattern. Such 
links were also present in the atypical network but there, in addition, 
matched links were reported between the network co-ordinating body and 
every other network member organisation. In this network, therefore, it 
appears that the structure for financial incentives to operate was present. 
Even so, these money-mediated links distributed only monies allocated 
through the network (that is, in network Urban CHD Network from the co-
ordinating body's own budgets for network co-ordination), not monies 
allocated through parallel (e.g. contractual) relationships outside the 
network. The latter transmitted amounts of money orders of magnitude 
larger than those transmitted within the study networks. 
Table 31. Proportions of matched 'real-side' and 'money-flow' links 
Proportion of matched links in money-layer and layers for:  Network 
Direct patient care Patient care 
organisation 
General 
administration 
Child Mental Health 
Network 
27/616 (4%) 34/616 (6%) 34/616 (6%) 
Children's Hospital 
Project Network 
57/318 (18%) 63/318 (20%) 43/318 (14%) 
Small CHD Network 3/25 (12%) 7/25 (28%) 4/25 (16%) 
Urban CHD Network 23/93 (25%) 59/93 (63%) 70/93 (75%) 
Self-Care Network 8/ 52(15%) 8/52 (15%) 5/52 (10%) 
Similarly, in terms of density of layers, the contrast was between one 
network and the other four. In the group of four, the money-layer was 
substantially and significantly less dense than the other layers, and had 
more isolated and more pendant nodes (for details see RQ5). 
In Child Mental Health Network the difference between the density of the 
money layer and the density of the other three layers was more than 
threefold and the differences were highly statistically significant. The 
structure of the financial flows differed markedly from the other network 
structures. Indeed the map of financial layer was a somewhat star-shaped 
network centred upon the joint commissioner and the new children's centre, 
whilst the other layer maps had a more web-like appearance. We therefore 
infer that financial flows played little part in the co-ordination of this 
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network. The money layer in Children's Hospital Project Network did not 
significantly differ in density from the administration layer. It was less than 
half as dense as the direct client care and client care organisation layers and 
this difference was highly statistically significant (p=0.0002). The latter two 
were the layers reported to be most important to the network's activities. In 
this network too, therefore, the structure of financial allocations did not 
closely match the rest of the network structure. In the small CHD network, 
the density of the money layer was less than half that of any other layer, 
and less than one-third that of the help-in-kind layer. All these differences 
except one were statistically significant at a level of p= 0.02 or below, and 
the difference in density between the money layer and the direct patient 
care layer was just below the declared threshold for significance (p=0.055, 
but p=0.02 for a one-tailed test). We infer that the structure of these flows 
differed markedly from the other network structures, hence that financial 
flows played little part in the co-ordination of this network either. Except for 
the administration layer, from which the money layer did not significantly 
differ in density, the money layer in Self-Care Network was less than a third 
of the density of the other layers, and the difference was highly statistically 
significant. 
For the other network where data were available, these differences in 
density were not found. As for a structural match between the money layer 
(financial incentives) and the other layers in Urban CHD Network, there 
were no significant differences (in effect matching densities) between these 
layers except for direct client care. The money layer was denser than the 
client care layer, a pattern not found in the other study networks. 
Across all the networks, the client care and client care organisation layers 
were the two most densely connected layers. There were no isolates in the 
direct client care layers; and only a single pendant in all five of the client 
care organisation layers. These two layers were the most connected. In 
three out of the five networks, the direct client care and client care 
organisation layers were closest in density, but not in the two programme 
networks. 
Social network analysis thus suggested that financial incentives did not play 
a dominant role in co-ordinating the study networks. The case studies 
suggested why this was so. 
Within some general policy guidelines, NHS network co-ordinators had 
discretion in how they used the networks' co-ordination budgets,: 
The heart improvement team have financial responsibility …. the money comes from 
them and we then organise the network with that money so how we do that is up to us. 
… but each network can set itself up in how it wants because each network will then 
use that money how locally their directors [decide to] do it so the city tells us that they 
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want us to go and commission which none of the other city cardiac networks do. So 
we're all slightly different so how we use that pot of money is up to us. 
(Network director, Urban CHD Network) 
However NHS networks did not themselves finance their own core activity. 
Clinical care is notoriously costly. Such cost for care networks' care groups 
were met by the networks' member organisations themselves without any 
cash passing through the network's hands. Rather, payments for patient 
care were settled directly between their member organisations and the 
relevant commissioners through PBR, PBC and (residually) the earlier 
commissioning systems (see below). But the care networks did have a 
budget to pay for the co-ordinating body's co-ordinating work and 
(especially in Child Mental Health Network and Urban CHD Network) to 
make ad hoc grants and project payments to its member organisations. 
Even the co-ordination work however did not depend entirely on financial 
contributions. Programme networks produce rather intangible outputs 
requiring few inputs other than the time of the individual network members 
and office services (IT support, office space) which were also provided in 
kind by the networks' member organisations. Apart from the co-ordinators' 
salaries and office accommodation other inputs were with a few exceptions 
negligible in financial cost. Thus even the co-ordinating body's budget was 
relatively small except in the large project network and the largest CHD 
network. Programme networks' and the project network's budgets were 
likewise used mainly to support the network infrastructure. The costs and 
work of co-ordination (as opposed to the costs of care) were similar in the 
programme and project networks. They too did not directly control any 
considerable budgets for payments to network members. At most (Regional 
CHD Network), they were the most influential advisor to the budget-holders 
who did allocate capital development monies. Thus, even in the NHS 
network whose structure came closest to that required for direct financial 
incentives to operate within the network, the co-ordinating body could not 
rely heavily on financial incentives to co-ordinate the network because it did 
not control the most salient budgets or contract payments. 
In contrast, the user-experience network did finance its own core, self-care 
activities. Its income was used to pay expenses for food or other 
consumables, travel and stationary costs for organising network events. 
These amounts were however modest, certainly not enough to pay financial 
incentives, still less a salary or contract payments, to any of its members. 
Indeed it took one of the two small voluntary member organisations some 
time to realise that the costs they bore from photocopying and other 
sundries (which a volunteer met from her own pocket) were legitimate 
expenses they could claim from grants to the co-ordinating body. At most, 
the latter reimbursed members' direct expenses for stationary or similar 
costs, or for food or other consumables for network events. Instead, Self-
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Care Network also contributed to a local time-bank and skill-swap scheme 
as a mechanism for rewarding network members in kind (not money) for 
helping each other.  
In summary, the network structures necessary for the co-ordinating body to 
apply direct financial incentives within and through the networks were 
largely absent in four of the networks for which we have data, and partially 
absent in the fifth. Even in the fifth network, though, linkages based on 
help-in-kind were equally prominent. Such financial incentives as did exist 
were project payments to enable the network members to take on new 
activities rather than personal incentives or fees to organisations. Inside all 
five networks financial incentives played only a marginal role as a medium 
of co-ordination. Help-in-kind (resource sharing) was more important, and it 
inherently tends to involve closer collaboration than financial transactions do 
(10). 
 11.2  Incentives to cooperate 
The near-absence of direct financial incentives raises the questions: what 
other incentives, then, had the effect of motivating network members to 
collaborate? We answered this question by a qualitative investigation of 
networks' members' own accounts of why they participated in the networks 
i.e. what benefits they were seeking. The effects which these incentives 
produced, in terms of network artefacts and referral patterns, are described 
in the following chapter (RQ8). 
Our case study informants suggested three main reasons: the prospect of 
practical benefits which would enable them to undertake clinical work more 
effectively; it was a requirement of their employment; and because 
participants found it personally rewarding to realise benefits for other 
network members and for patients. 
Belief in prospective practical benefits to clinical work were most evident 
among CHD network members. When asked why people were motivated to 
join a CHD network interviewees commented 
that's just what sensible people do to improve the service they provide for their patients, 
and it's a way to do that. 
(Small CHD Network cardiologist) 
There was an assumption here that participation by clinicians would lead to 
influencing the design and commission of local services. For network 
membership in general, 
I think the only motivational, the main motivational factor is the old business about, 
what would you want if it was you, or it's your relative, what would you want to 
happen, and people know, when they're honest and they look at their systems that the 
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delays that are involved, the hand-offs that go on, we shouldn't be doing it, and I think 
those are the driving factors behind it [participation in the network], to do what's right, 
but sometimes, you see it occasionally, you see that staff sometimes think about what's 
best for them as far as the shift systems, their working patterns, what's best for them as 
opposed to what's best for the patient. And I think those are the biggest motivations. 
(Ambulance rep, Small CHD Network) 
Another informant in this network stated that his motivation to participate 
was that things 'actually get achieved', and that there was real, active 
cooperation between the member organisations rather then just token 
efforts at collaboration. Interviewees in Small CHD Network assumed that 
people were motivated to join a CHD network because 'that's just what 
sensible people do to improve the service they provide for their patients'. 
Similarly in City Children's Network an important motivator was a passion to 
do the best for local children. The same applied in another programme 
network, Regional CHD Network: 
I really believe in the concept, I think it is a really good idea, and I think the people they 
have appointed thus far have got conviction and I think it could be a success, and that is 
why I am still very keen on doing it. I think if we can just engage the commissioners and 
understand what the network's for, then I think actually it will be an invaluable tool. 
(Cardiologist, Regional CHD Network) 
Informants often also told us that the value of network meetings lay simply 
in the linking of different organisations and viewpoints. 
For the voluntary groups which were its member organisations, Self-Care 
Network was one means of furthering the services they can offer to local 
people and for strengthening their relationship with each other. Child Mental 
Health Network had a handful of individual members, some of long 
standing, who did not represent any organisation or profession, but just 
contributed out of a personal interest in developing mental health services 
for young children. For example, a consistently active health visitor member 
was included not because she represented anyone but herself, but because 
she had been a founder member of the network and well understood local 
child care organisations and their relationships. Some of the third-sector 
organisations which were network members also relied partly on volunteers. 
Network co-ordinators were in a different position. The incentives and 
accountabilities of those employed in statutory organisations related to their 
work implementing national and local policy mandates. The individuals who 
held a network manager (co-ordinator) post were salaried, but the 
incentives which these arrangements set up – in this case, for making the 
network function effectively - were the same as for any other NHS manager. 
Standard NHS pay-scales and performance review arrangements applied. 
The same applied to a minority of medical managers; to cooperate through 
the network was simply part of one's job: 
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Oh it is, it is a kind of, it just feels like a compulsory thing. 
(PCT public health doctor, Urban CHD Network) 
A minority of informants said they found it rewarding to benefit other 
network members. Informants also saw more immediate practical benefits: 
I think again what motivated me is I thought I may be able to share knowledge and 
support. 
(Director of Public Health, Urban CHD Network) 
In Self-Care Network, the members employed by statutory organisations 
were in part motivated by personal commitment and by the attitudes of 
professionals and service users. A PCT worker described her personal 
satisfaction and stimulation from working with the least-resourced member 
organisation with its responsive members and observing their personal 
growth, in addition to perceiving a public health benefit. Of two of the most 
active user-volunteers' drive and motivation she said: 
Their motivation is so heart felt isn't it, and I just think they're got a sincerity that most 
professionals could never claim to have, it's just from the heart. 
(PCT community development worker, Self-Care Network) 
For the members of Self-Care Network, its activity was among other things 
a means of social contact and of strengthening their relationships with each 
other. Indeed, volunteers participated in this network even at some 
(practical) cost to themselves. 
The partial exception to these patterns was Children's Hospital Project 
Network. Although the veto was never actually used, the powers which the 
secretary of state had given to the Children's Hospital Project Network were 
always present as a motivator in the background. These powers were an 
addition, not an alternative, to the patterns of incentive reported above. 
Values such as improving patient care thus had a greater influence over 
network formation, membership and participation than financial incentives. 
The predominance and nature of the non-financial motivations differed only 
in detail between sites. This pattern of motivation made evidence-basing a 
persuasive motivator and unifying ideology of the NHS networks (but it was 
not relevant to the experience network). 
Within the networks, financial incentives to collaborate were largely absent, 
so no effects can be attributed to them. The absence of these incentives 
meant that instead, networks were co-ordinated through non-financial 
incentives and motivators. The main non-financial incentives to cooperate 
were an ethos of improving services for patients and for high-quality care 
and clinical practice. Of the governance mechanisms noted above, prudent 
reciprocity (help in kind), technical persuasion (EBM) and – to the extent 
that information exchanges allowed – governmentality were all in evidence 
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in the study networks. Contractual and juridical mechanisms were not. The 
effects which these non-financial incentives produced upon network 
performance (artefacts and referrals) are reported under RQ8. Financial 
incentive structures outside the network did however have effects within the 
networks. 
 11.2.1  Practice based commissioning and payment by results 
Extension of practice based commissioning and payment by results both 
called into question the roles, indeed the survival, of some of the study 
networks. Not only did these developments extend quasi-market 
governance structures, an alternative governance structure to networks 
(see chapter 1). Some of the study networks themselves became 
externally-commissioned much as (other) NHS providers were. The result 
was to shift networks' core processes from those of care networks towards 
those of programme (i.e. commissioning support) networks. 
During the study period three networks were not much affected by practice 
based commissioning (PBC). For the other four practice-based 
commissioning consortia ('groups') constituted parallel, indeed alternative, 
commissioning networks. 
The impact of practice based commissioning on the user-led Self-Care 
Network during the period of this study can swiftly be described. There was 
none. Members of one of the voluntary organisations in the network 
reported that in 2007 membership of group was low and there was a risk of 
the group folding. The rest of Self-Care Network helped prevent this by 
revitalising energies and helping get more people in. Although at the time of 
writing the group still needed new members the GP surgery was not 
referring anyone to them and the group said they felt a lack of 
communication between doctors and the group. This relationship was 
problematic. The group met in the GP surgery and took care of the surgery 
garden but did not get any financial contribution from the practice even 
though they requested it. Not even this practice, let alone others, used the 
mechanism which in theory PBC creates to pay the Self-Care Network for 
helping people with long-term mental health problems. Similarly, PBC and 
PBR had little effect on the care network for young children with mental 
health problems (Child Mental Health Network) because at the time of this 
study patient choice policies had not yet been applied to mental health 
services, and these services were not yet the prime object of attention for 
the practice based commissioning consortia in the city. The same largely 
applied to the city in which Children's Hospital Project Network worked. PBC 
consortia neither duplicated nor threatened its core activity. It took 
cognizance of likely local impacts of PBC on the services it was remodelling, 
but this signified at most relatively small adjustments to its wider service 
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re-profiling project. Where it was implemented, PBC had little effect (during 
the period of this study) on relationships between primary and social care 
members of the children's services networks. 
Limited effects of PBC were more evident in the CHD networks Small CHD 
Network, Regional CHD Network, Urban CHD Network and CHD pilot site. 
Insofar as PBC was actually implemented (see below) there arose a parallel 
structure of networks (consortia of general practices) apparently to manage 
some of the same inter-organisational relationships that the care networks 
had been intended to co-ordinate, for PBC consortia would be an obvious 
home for a network-like approach to managing the problems of local service 
co-ordination across organisational boundaries. Granted, the PBC consortia 
focussed on commissioning and the study networks on referrals and clinical 
practice. But the rationale for a quasi-market, and in particular for primary-
care based commissioning, is that commissioning decisions should reflect 
good referral practice and good clinical practice (51,203). At best one 
network would therefore be superfluous, and at worst the two networks 
might advocate different policies such as care pathways, although the 
spread of EBM reduces the likelihood of this. We found that in practice two 
facts mitigated these potential problems. In our study sites PBR 
implementation had generally been less extensive at the time of this study 
than policy-makers had anticipated, a pattern also reported elsewhere (204-
206). Secondly, PBC activity tended to focus more on CHD than many of the 
services with which the children's services study networks were concerned. 
Payment by results had essentially similar implications for the networks. For 
the children's services project Children's Hospital Project Network they were 
marginal, for the user-experience Self-Care Network they were non-
existent, and for the CHD networks more immediate. 
During the study period payment by results had only partially been 
implemented for the services involved in the children's services networks 
(City Children's Network and, especially, Child Mental Health Network) 
because PBR had not yet been extended to mental health services, the main 
focus of Child Mental Health Network's activity. For the CHD networks, the 
impact of PBR came partly through the connected policy of patient choice. 
In Urban CHD Network an effect of the patient choice policy was that there 
began to develop different referral patterns and routes than those the 
network had advised upon. For example, there was an increase in patients 
choosing referral to tertiary centres in the city centre even for relatively 
minor procedures, in contradiction to Urban CHD Network policy. Indeed, 
one consultant in the network also changed his employment arrangements, 
dividing his time between two sites, out of line with network policy. Because 
PBC and patient choice were also policy mandates (although NHS-wide 
mandates, not specifically for the network), the members of Urban CHD 
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Network felt they could not challenge them but would just have to 
accommodate these consequences of PBR and patient choice. Incipient 
conflict between the patterns of activity proposed by the networks and 
those emerging from the new commissioning systems were more 
immediately evident in the case of patient choice than practice-based 
commissioning. These problems were not reported in the other two CHD 
networks, although Regional CHD Network was out of action for much of the 
study period. The remaining CHD network served a population which, for 
geographical reasons, had a choice of just two hospitals for CHD treatment 
unless patients were willing to travel more than the 50km for planned 
treatment. Both PBR and PBC were intended to, and to some extent did, 
widen the range of service providers in the study sites. This created the 
problem, for networks, of how to respond to new-entrant providers who 
were not network members. This problem arose particularly in Small CHD 
Network when CHD care provision through Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres was extended. In City Children's Network different voluntary 
member organisations also found themselves competing for contracts from 
the same statutory commissioners. A similar phenomenon has been 
reported in US mental health care networks (207). 
The study networks adapted in two ways to these changes in NHS 
commissioning. These responses can be regarded as the effects which PBC 
and PBR had on the study networks. 
First, managers and policy makers responded by encouraging the networks 
(in our study, Small CHD Network, Regional CHD Network's antecedent CHD 
networks;CHD pilot site; City Children's Network, Urban CHD Network) to 
reconstitute themselves as commissioning support networks (i.e. a specific 
kind of programme network) with the consequences described above. In 
that way these networks could actively influence how PBC developed (in the 
areas of the network's interest) rather than just respond – or passively 
decline – whilst alternative, quasi-market governance structures developed 
alongside them. Thus the former care networks would advise the PCT(s) 
about commissioning, and the PCTs would feed this advice into their own 
and their local PBC consortia commissioning decisions. As a manager 
(dissemination conference participant) from a non-study site put it, 
networks would in future function as mediators for commissioning purposes; 
this was a distinctive and valuable new role because some PCTs and NHS 
providers were interpreting NHS commissioning policy, including PBC, as 
proscribing direct relational contacts between commissioners and providers. 
In future, clinical and professional networks would fill that role. 
For the care networks this was (so to speak) a natural transition. Even 
before PBC and PBR they had relied partly on commissioner adoption of 
network policies and decisions to get those policies and decisions 
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implemented (especially in Child Mental Health Network and Small CHD 
Network). The care networks tried to influence PCT or SHA commissioning 
decisions and practice, and thus indirectly influence providers' clinical 
practice and service model. During their time as care networks this method 
of implementation was however ancillary to the more direct approach of 
influencing providers via their representatives in the network, with these 
representatives acting as 'boundary-spanners' transmitting network 
decisions into their own organisations' 'hinterland'. The effect of PBC and 
PBR was not to eliminate the latter approach but it did shift the balance 
towards the former. PCT, and therefore network, mergers had the same 
effect. Nevertheless the study networks did not all adapt willingly or with 
equal speed. Small CHD Network had tended to resist and delay this 
change. CHD pilot site network had recognised it and adapted after initial 
misgivings. Urban CHD Network had been, so to speak, an early adopter of 
this changed role and of our study networks was the one which had gone 
furthest in developing it, with Regional CHD Network following. Child Mental 
Health Network also responded radically, in effect sloughing off the 
membership and activity not directly germane to commissioning support 
into what might yet (the position remained undecided when this report was 
being written) become a care network functioning as a single networked 
care provider. 
Second, NHS providers were exposed to the incentives of payment by 
results (PBR) and practice based commissioning (PBC), and to the policy 
mandates described above (chapters 5-6) irrespective of their network 
membership. Some of the networks adapted by helping provider member 
organisations achieve nationally-set targets to which other governance 
structures independent of the network had attached incentives and 
penalties: 
there are no monetary incentives, we can't, we can't give them [those] but we can help 
them [providers] like for instance those who are not doing so well on 18 weeks [access 
time target], there are some real sanctions for them from other bits [of the NHS] if they 
don't achieve 18 weeks and at least if we can make sure cardiac achieve 18 weeks then 
that's one bit that they can tick the box for so I suppose there are incentives for using our 
staff for helping them manage. 
(co-ordinator, Urban CHD Network) 
One might describe this as the network harnessing external incentives to 
create an incentive for collaboration inside the network. The more powerful 
those external incentives, the stronger the reasons network members had 
for implementing network policies that would help the member gain those 
incentives. In principle a network could harness any incentives that bore 
powerfully upon its member organisations. A network could only harness 
external incentives to the extent that the latter were compatible with the 
network's own objectives. Where PCT chief executives had no explicit 
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targets (e.g. around children or partnership working) there were no 
powerful external incentives for the networks to harness. But since both the 
networks and their member organisations were subject to the same sets of 
NHS-wide policy mandates (see chapters 1,5,6) the external and internal 
incentives often did converge. Although it was most clearly reported in 
Urban CHD Network this harnessing mechanism is available to all NHS 
networks whose core processes might be of value to providers because of 
any ulterior incentive that is compatible with the network's own objectives. 
However, external incentives also had some negative effects on a network's 
ability to implement its decisions. In Child Mental Health Network across the 
occupational groups (although not uniformly within each) our informants 
showed some reluctance to enter the 'dangerous territory' of diagnosing, 
providing or referring children for mental health care. This was partly 
because they were aware of the legal and administrative complexities of 
doing so, but more importantly because they were acutely aware of the 
stigmas attached to parent and child from such a step, and the opprobrium 
visited upon professionals who make serious errors in such decisions. The 
child P case, both the fate of the child himself and the repercussions for the 
Haringey organisations involved, made the member organisations in 
children's programme City Children's Network, and hence the network itself, 
become more cautious in proposing changes to services of the 
commissioning thereof. 
Even when networks had evolved into commissioning support networks, it 
was sometimes argued that the new commissioning structures made the 
networks redundant. We were told an informant in a nearby CHD network 
(and by some of the network managers concerned) that SHA managers had 
expressed doubt about whether Regional CHD Network had any useful 
future. About six months after fieldwork finished, PCT mangers elsewhere 
took a similar view and closed down the commissioning-support remnant of 
Child Mental Health Network. Thus PBC and PBR both posed serious 
questions for the future of some of the networks studied. 
 11.3  External commissioning of networks 
Another effect of the changes in commissioning policy was that some of the 
study networks themselves were drawn into the commissioning process as 
providers rather than as commissioner-support networks. By the end of the 
study period only two of the study networks were directly involved in care 
provision: the provider half of Child Mental Health Network and the user-
experience Self-Care Network. Extension of the NHS quasi-market into 
primary care meant that these care networks now relied upon being 
commissioned by a PCT and/or local government. Although within the 
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networks financial incentives were absent, the incentives produced by 
external commissioning had the following effects. 
Both Child Mental Health Network as a whole and some of its member 
organisations were now jointly commissioned by the local Primary Care 
Trust (PCT) and the city council. Short-term service contracts, project and 
policy 'initiative' funding meant that collaboration with local government and 
NHS commissioners became preoccupations in a hitherto mainly practice-
oriented network. The network commissioned formal evaluations and began 
collecting data to legitimate its activities and recent impacts (e.g. the 
aforementioned children's centre). More formalised, documented self-
definitions of the network, its remit and working practices began to appear. 
When the kernel of Child Mental Health Network separated off as a 
commissioning support network, it continued to develop some of these 
artefacts (e.g. care pathways). 
Whilst future development of Self-Care Network depends on gaining funding 
from external commissioners, the largest member organisation was anxious 
about the impact of tendering and its effect on continuity of service 
provision, having seen services elsewhere disappear because of tendering. 
They thought that tendering was divisive; it might work with waste 
collection services but not services for vulnerable people. Commissioning 
systems had strained relationships between the council and the third sector 
in the past. For instance the main co-ordinating network for voluntary 
bodies in the city had lost its contract. The network therefore began 
discussing with the city council whether they could be exempted from the 
requirement to tender competitively for further funds. Nevertheless the 
largest member organisation of Self-Care Network made a two-year 
contract, with the City Council under the Supporting People programme. The 
contract stipulated that the voluntary organisation would deliver, through 
Self-Care Network: four drop in services a week for 12-15 people per 
session; two art sessions a week for three people per session; one cookery 
class for four people each week; 14 minibus trips a year; and four exercise 
events a year. 
It also stipulated the collection and reporting of some basic performance 
data, and led to closer and more frequent contacts between the network 
and the city council than before. A PCT informant predicted that becoming a 
commissioned provider would change the dynamics of Self-Care Network. 
Currently 'what makes all those groups successful is that they're driven by 
people who are passionate about what they're doing' (PCT worker, Self-Care 
Network). City council managers are also aware of this possibility, and have 
therefore preferred 'light touch' commissioning; the council do not take an 
active role in running, organising or closely monitoring Self-Care Network 
activities. The council also made a workforce development grant to increase 
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the skills of the main member organisation's staff in order to develop Self-
Care Network and similar services. The council also made small grants to 
the two smaller member organisations to fund trips and activities. Whilst the 
council did not expect the same kind of relationship as it enjoyed with the 
main member organisation to develop with these other two member 
organisations, the council did see the value of making small grants to all 
voluntary groups working to promote social inclusion, mental health and 
physical well being. 
The Public Health Development Unit (of the PCT) helped the three non-
statutory member organisations to set up the pilot and helped secure a 
£5,000 grant from the National Institute for Mental Health in England 
(NIMHE) 'Let's get physical' initiative, to assist the network's participation as 
a Lets Get Physical pilot scheme. One might have predicted that external 
funding by NIMHE would make Self-Care Network dependent upon accepting 
the concomitant mandates. However the funding was relatively small and 
(we were told informally) the network members largely ignored NIMHE 
guidance. Within Self-Care Network, which had hitherto produced almost no 
substantial managerial documents, a tangible effect of seeking this funding 
was the creation of their first (managerial) artefact which was markedly 
atypical of that network's impacts in general. Self-Care Network later 
completed a long and complex (but unsuccessful) funding application to the 
National Lottery. 
In both these networks, participation in commissioning produced a 
formalisation of the networks' management (e.g. evaluations, 
documentation of activity). The networks became more dependent on 
professional and managerial help in dealing with the commissioning system. 
External commissioning thus had a bureaucratising effect on the networks 
which were already – or wanted to become more – publicly funded, 
especially upon the voluntary 'third sector' network. 
The effects of payment by results and practice based commissioning were to 
realign the study networks' functions and activities. NHS managers in three 
study sites interpreted these policies as requiring networks either to become 
commissioning support networks; or to be regarded as a networked 
provider and therefore to be commissioned much as a (single) provider-
organisation would. Commissioning policy changes created incentives 
outside the networks which network members could exploit within the 
networks (see RQ6), but which also threatened to duplicate the networks' 
activity or even make the networks redundant. Paradoxically, the new 
models of commissioning made the NHS networks both more powerful and 
less necessary as agents of their local PCTs. 
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 11.4  Summary 
Network members' main incentives to cooperate were the expectation of 
practical help-on-kind and the persuasive power of evidence-based practice 
which appealed, in the NHS networks, to the individual members' intrinsic 
motivations and professional interests. Financial links and therefore 
incentives played little part within the networks. Network co-ordinators were 
however able to 'harness' the more powerful targets and incentives 
originating outside the networks. These external incentives originated partly 
from payment by results. At the time we collected data, practice based 
commissioning had had little effect on the study networks.  
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 12  Performance 
Our last research question was: 
RQ8a: What determines the performance of mandated and non-
mandated network structures? 
RQ8b: Are there systematic differences in the performance of 
mandated and voluntary networks? 
We interpreted RQ8(a) as a general question about what the determinants 
of network performance are in general and RQ8(b) as asking what 
distinguishes the determinants in mandated and voluntary networks. We 
defined network performance in terms of intermediate artefacts and of 
apparent impacts upon the increase (or decrease) in volume of referrals 
preventable by close primary-secondary care co-ordination. The non-
availability of policy-outcome indicators for certain kinds of network has 
already been noted. Such outcome indicators and SNA data were available 
for three of the study networks. Against this, two sets of indicators (AHRQ 
and Closer to Home) were available for the Children's Services Projects 
Network. In the latter case we first analysed the combined data for both 
indicators, then the data for each set of indicators separately. We only 
report findings from the separate analyses where they differ from those for 
the combined data. 
 12.1  Connectedness and performance 
A fundamental test of the impact of networking was to test (H8A) whether 
more intensively networked providers (both hospital and primary care trusts 
in their provider capacity) would have superior service outcomes. That is, 
whether organisations with more numerous links to all organisations in the 
rest of the network (i.e. higher 'degree') will report better outcomes in 
terms of admissions preventable by primary-secondary care co-ordination. 
Data from Urban CHD Network support this hypothesis. On the Spearman 
test, the association between actor degree (the number of links to other 
network members which a given member organisation had, whether 
measured in raw or normalised (percentage)) terms, was strongly 
correlated with declines in admissions preventable by primary-secondary 
care co-ordination (r= -0.81). Around 64% of the variation in these 
admissions was associated with variations in organisation connectedness. A 
similar but more moderate correlation (r= -0.56) between actor degree and 
declines in admissions preventable by primary-secondary care co-ordination 
was also found in the Children's Hospital Project Network. In Urban CHD 
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Network but not Children's Hospital Project Network, fall in referrals was 
also correlated with what we have called the 'depth' or multiplexity of links: 
that is, the decline in referrals was greater, the more 'layers' of link existed 
between a given member organisation and the other member organisations. 
These Children's Hospital Project Network findings emerged when we tested 
the combined referral data for the AHRQ and the Closer to Home indicators. 
The association between referrals and actor degree was just below the 
threshold for significance when we repeated the test using the AHRQ 
indicators alone. 
Against this, the Small CHD Network's larger, better connected hospital 
achieved a smaller reduction in admissions preventable by primary-
secondary co-ordination than did the smaller hospital with fewer links to its 
local CHD network. 
When we made a basic OLS regression analysis of pooled data across the 
three networks for which both outcome and SNA data were available, actor 
degree showed only a small correlation with changes in referral rates and in 
the opposite direction to that predicted. We conjecture however that this 
finding may partly be an artefact of merging data from one network with 
strong correlations with data from a larger network with weaker 
correlations; and of the use of multiple regression analysis which makes 
stronger assumptions about data properties than the Spearman test does. 
The latter is more likely to be valid for tests where – as in the present study 
– there are relatively few data-points and the data are not necessarily 
parametric. On balance we conclude that our findings are evidence, albeit 
equivocal evidence, for cautiously accepting H8A. 
More specifically we hypothesised (H8C) that outcomes should be best when 
each member organisation relies on a few strong relations for most of care 
delivery whilst a few weak ties are maintained for information search. The 
'stong+weak' for an organisation was scored as 1 if a quarter or fewer of 
that organisation's links to other organisations were 'strong', meaning that 
the organisations were linked on at least four of the network layers 
previously discussed, and the rest of its ties to other organisations were not. 
In three networks we were able to test the association of this 'strong+weak' 
variable with proportionate changes during the study period in admissions 
sensitive to primary-secondary care co-ordination. In Urban CHD Network, 
no significant association was found (r = -0.44, NS at alpha = 0.025). A 
significant association was found in Children's Hospital Project Network, but 
in the opposite direction to that predicted (r = +0.51, alpha = 0.025). 
Testing the AHRQ indicator data on their own showed no association. All 
organisations in the Small CHD Network did not differ in their 'strong+weak' 
score. A regression analysis pooling data across the sites also showed no 
correlation between that score and rate of change of the relevant 
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admissions. We therefore conclude that, in the study networks, a 
combination of a few strong with many weaker links is not correlated with 
network effectiveness in the senses defined for this study. H8C is not 
supported by the data from the study networks. 
We also had predicted (H8D) that teaching hospitals will report better 
outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-
ordination (because their links to academic medicine will result in more up-
to-date and evidence based working practices, including those which allow 
stronger primary-secondary care liaison and integration of services to allow 
substitution). The hypothesis that, being more widely networked outside 
their local clinical and professional networks, teaching hospitals would be 
more effective (in the terms defined for this study) was not testable in 
Urban CHD Network because all the hospitals there had been designated as 
teaching hospitals during the study period. One hospital in the Urban CHD 
Network was a long established (19th-century) teaching hospital, whereas 
the others had been so designated only in the past 10 years, and it did have 
a noticeably greater reduction (56% over four years) of co-ordination-
preventible admissions than the others (in the range 13% to 24%). Because 
there was only one old teaching hospital, this was not a statistically testable 
pattern. Another study in another site would be needed to test this 
hypothesis more thoroughly. 
As a concomitant of finding that organisations with a high degree of linkage 
to other member organisations appear also to be the most effective at 
reducing co-ordination-sensitive referral, one would expect to find that 
these organisations are also more central to their network (hypothesis 
H8G). Examining the relationship between connectedness and the 
aforementioned types of referral it transpired that in Urban CHD Network, 
reduction in these avoidable referrals was significantly and quite strongly 
associated with:  
1. normalised degree centrality (what proportion of the theoretically 
possible links a given organisation actually has): r= -0.74) 
2. normalised reach centrality (how directly member organisations are 
linked to one another): r= -0.81)  
3. normalised flow centrality (proportion of indirect links between other 
member organisations that involve a given member organisation): r= 
-0.73)  
4. normalised flow betweenness centrality: r= -0.67.  
These was no such association between the changes in those referrals and 
either betweenness centrality (on Freeman's measure) or brokerage. Also in 
the Children's Hospital Project Network the rate of decline of the relevant 
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referrals was moderately but significantly associated with reach centrality 
(r= -0.57) and with (normalised) flow betweenness centrality (r= -0.59). 
Against this, changes in admissions in the Children's Hospital Project 
Network were not associated with normalised degree centrality, 
(normalised) Freeman betweenness centrality or with (normalised) flow 
centrality. That finding may reflect the more moderate correlation between 
connectedness ('actor degree') and referrals in the Children's Hospital 
Project Network compared with the Urban CHD Network. The association 
between referrals and reach centrality degree was just below the threshold 
for significance when we repeated the test using the AHRQ indicators alone, 
but the association between referrals and Freeman's betweenness centrality 
was now significant (r= -0.58) (in contrast to the tests using the combined 
data for both indicators). Otherwise, the patterns of correlations were 
unchanged. The changes in patterns of association that occurred when we 
separately tested the data for the two sets of indicators suggest that the 
tests were sensitive to the relatively small numbers of data-points in our 
SNA data-set. Nevertheless, a consistent pattern of moderate support for 
hypothesis H8G emerges. 
A basic OLS regression analysis of pooled data across the three networks for 
which both outcome and SNA data were available showed that whilst actor 
degree was correlated with changes in referral rates, the correlation was 
small and in the opposite direction to that predicted. However the 
correlation between referrals and flow betweenness centrality was both 
small and in the predicted direction, that between referrals and reach 
centrality was moderate and in the predicted direction. This is evidence, 
although weak, that changes in referral patterns reflect member 
organisations' centrality in their network. (Actor degree is another matter.) 
Brokerage was associated with falls in the selected admission rates in 
neither the Urban CHD Network nor the children's project network, although 
in the latter a significant association (r= -0.62) between normalised 
brokerage and referrals did appear when we tested the data for the AHRQ 
indicators separately from the data for the Closer to Home indicators. As 
previously noted, the observed measures of brokerage were all low; 
brokerage played little part in the study networks. In none of the study 
networks was there any association between the referral changes and power 
(Bonacich measure). The Bonacich measure of power measures how far 
organisations which are highly-connected are also connected to other 
organisations which are not highly-connected (hence, depend on the first 
organisation for links to the rest of the network). This condition also did not 
generally obtain in the study networks. 
These patterns of association and non-association are mostly as one would 
predict if, in a non-hierarchical network, the connectedness of member 
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organisations were indeed associated with reductions in referrals susceptible 
to primary-secondary care co-ordination. On balance they give weak, 
somewhat equivocal support to the hypothesis that organisations which are 
more central to the network will report better outcomes in terms of 
admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination. 
As the converse of some of the above hypotheses about connectedness and 
centrality, we also hypothesised that (H8B): simpler (whole) networks with 
fewer interfaces are more likely to succeed (In terms of our chosen 
outcomes) than complex ones. To test this hypothesis, we compared the 
number of network interfaces (measured by the number of links present) 
and the proportionate change during the study period of admissions 
avoidable by primary-secondary care co-ordination, the latter calculated for 
the network as a whole. Since both sets of data were only available for 
three networks we made a direct, non-statistical comparison of the data. 
The observed pattern did not support hypothesis H8B. The smallest network 
(Small CHD Network), which was also the most dense, had a growth rate for 
referrals avoidable by primary-secondary care co-ordination in between the 
rates for the other two networks for which relevant outcome indicators 
existed. 
 12.2  Hinterlands and key actors 
The association between connectivity and referral rate changes raises the 
question of what mechanisms within network member organisations are 
involved. We hypothesised (H8E) that organisations with an internal climate 
favourable to collaboration between professions and between organisations 
will report better outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by primary-
secondary co-ordination. This hypothesis received some support in the 
largest CHD network. In Urban CHD Network we found a significant 
association between our measures of climate in the member organisations 
and the change in referrals (to or from them) susceptible to primary-
secondary care co-ordination. Half the variation in such referrals was 
associated with variation in the respective climate score (r= -0.72, R2 = 
0.52). However the hypothesis was not supported by the data from the 
Children's Hospital Project Network project network, where no significant 
relationship between climate and referrals was found. 
No correlation at all was found between innovation-related activity and 
reduction of admissions preventable by primary-secondary care co-
ordination. Data from our study sites did not support our conjecture (H8F) 
that organisations with high levels of innovation-related activity will report 
better outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by primary-secondary 
co-ordination. 
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Conceivably some innovation-related activities but not others are associated 
with reductions in referrals susceptible to primary-secondary care co-
ordination. We therefore tested whether each innovation-related activity, 
taken separately, was associated with reductions in those referrals. At the 
level of individual innovation-related practices some correlations did emerge 
in Urban CHD Network , but only for participation in committees (both inside 
and outside the member organisation) that were evaluating and modifying 
service delivery and processes (r = -0.61 and r = -0.85 respectively). 
Analogous associations were found for site visits to other organisations to 
see how they organize service delivery and processes and for dry runs to try 
out new ways of providing services (for both r = -0.75). (The negative 
values appear because we were testing whether innovation related activity 
would tend to reduce the level of preventable admissions.) However it 
should be noted that the number of data-points was small, so these findings 
should be taken with caution. Other innovation-related activities were not 
significantly associated with changes in the referral rates studied. The 
presence of the associations that were found raised the question of whether 
these innovation-related activities, at least, were associated with network 
connectivity. However, the correlations were either absent or negative, so 
we conclude that no such correlations existed. No correlation between any 
of these innovated relation activities and referral rates was found in the 
other two networks. 
Together the above findings raise the questions: 
1. Was the correlation between connectedness and referral changes 
evidence of causality, or was network connectedness a marker for 
some other characteristics of member organisations that really was 
the cause of the fall in preventable referrals? 
2. If network connectivity did reduce the volume of referrals avoidable 
by good primary-secondary care co-ordination, through what 
mechanism did this occur if not through the innovation-related 
activity, moderated by organisational climate? 
An obvious response to the first question is to consider whether 
connectedness was a marker for mandated status, which was really the 
cause of the changes in referral levels. 
 12.3  Performance: mandated versus voluntary networks 
Previous sections explained that we found systematic differences between 
mandated and voluntary networks in terms of: 
1. What the networks performed. In mandated networks, national policy 
targets replaced internally generated goals as the objectives of 
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network activities, although both kinds of networks included 
implementation of 'best' evidence-based practice. 
2. Harnessed Incentives. Policy mandates imposed on the networks the 
same targets that their member organisations faced severally. The 
corresponding incentives and targets operated outside the networks 
and in parallel to them. The study networks were able to 'harness' 
these external, parallel incentives and targets by offering member 
organisations the incentive (for engagement with the network) of help 
in satisfying these targets. Then policy mandates were implemented 
in a dual way: through the network and through the internal line-
management regimes of the member organisations. 
3. Infrastructure available to support network co-ordination tended to be 
greater in mandated networks because these could call upon 
dedicated resources from the network's host PCT or SHA. 
However the mandated networks in this study did not show significantly 
greater internal connectivity than non-mandated ones did. 
Since whole networks were mandated (or voluntary), only between-network 
and not within-network comparisons were available as evidence of whether 
mandated status made a network more or less likely to be effective in terms 
of the kinds of preventable admissions we had measured. The three 
networks for which the relevant outcome data existed were of interest 
because one was voluntary at the time of the study, one was mandated in 
the usual way (its host PCT and member organisations all subject to 
common national policy mandates) and one mandated in a special way, 
possessing special powers delegated by the secretary of state. However we 
saw no difference between the mandated and voluntary networks. The 
voluntary network showed a rate of change in the relevant referral rates in 
between the rates for the two mandated network. We therefore do not 
conclude that the differences in the method of mandating contributed to the 
differences between these referral rates in the other two networks. 
It remains to explain the process by which that occurred, since innovation-
related activity seems to have played little part. Another line of enquiry is 
therefore to consider what the networks actually did; that is, what artefacts 
they produced and transmitted into their member organisation so as to 
change the behaviour change on key actors in their local health economy. 
The requisite artefacts differ, for different types of health network (see 
chapter 2). 
 12.3.1  Artefact production 
Appendix 8 lists the artefacts which each network reported to us, showing 
which network function (from the list proposed by Southon et al.) each 
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artefact is relevant to and whether the artefact was practical, symbolic or 
both. Only activities reported to us as completed by the end of fieldwork 
(late 2008) are shown, not planned but uncompleted activities. We counted 
the regional transfer centre in Regional CHD Network as being (also) a 
symbolic artefact because of the way in which it was publicised. However 
appendix 8 does not differentiate artefacts made by the networks and any 
which each network subcontracted an external body to produce to the 
network's requirements (e.g. research on the evidence base for care 
pathways in Child Mental Health Network, consultancy support for public 
consultations in Children's Hospital Project Network, an information system 
in CHD pilot site). Appendix 8 counts revision of national services to local 
conditions as both practical (for its intended influence on clinical practice) 
and symbolic (because it demonstrated the network taking local control of 
how the guidance was interpreted, and showed the network putatively 
'adding value' to national guidance). Similarly, training and education 
events had both a practical use and symbolic ones of demonstrating the 
value of the network and promoting its policies and culture. The same 
applies to artefacts produced in order to comply, or to demonstrate 
compliance with, external mandates (contractual obligations; national 
policies and targets). 
Until c.2007 artefacts from Child Mental Health Network were conspicuous 
by their absence. For instance, there was no statement of the network's 
remit and few written working procedures. Although by the end of the study 
period, Regional CHD Network had produced quite a large number of 
artefacts, similar to those which other CHD networks had produced, it was 
noticeable that these artefacts had appeared at the beginning and the end 
of the study period, with a long interruption in the middle whilst the PCTs 
and SHA involved were restructured. Elsewhere, interruptions to the 
networks' core activity (processes) were much less evident. 
Condensing appendix 8, Table 32 shows which network functions (and sub-
categories thereof) each study network produced artefacts typical of. 
 
 
Table 32. Functional classification of study networks' artefacts 
 Children CHD Self-
care 
Site  A B C D E F Z G 
Function as referral (care) network         
Revisions to existing working practices (e.g. clinical guidance, 
demand management, resource reallocation)  
• • • • • • • • 
New kinds of services (including pilot projects)   • • •   • 
Changes to care-giving staff (e.g. recruitment, training, deployment)  • •  •     
Information materials provided by providers to patients (e.g. health 
promotion materials, websites)  
 
• 
 • •   • 
Function as experience network         
Mutual assistance activities (e.g. accessing or dealing with formal 
health services)  
       • 
Patient information materials assembled by patients or informal 
carers (e.g. health promotion materials, websites)  
       • 
Therapeutic provision (including pilot projects)         • 
Function as programme network         
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 Changed service specification (e.g. quality standards, new care 
pathway)  
• •  • • •   
Recommendations to commissioners / planners   • • • • •  • 
Changed financing or incentives (e.g. new contracts)  •  •  •  • • 
Formal evaluation of network (including patient surveys) •      • • 
Function as project network          
New physical infrastructure (e.g. buildings, IT systems, transport) • •  • •    
Project management (e.g. schedules, costings)   •       
Response to major public health events or crises   •       
Interest network         
Policy statements (e.g. policy documents, briefings)          
Campaign activities to promote single-issue policy         
Function as expertise network         
Training of professionals  • •  • • • •  
Benchmarking of current practice     • •  •  
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Disciplinary activities (e.g. ethical codes, penalising deviant 
members)  
        
Research  •    • •   
Policy statements (e.g. policy documents, briefings)          
Campaign activities to promote professional interests         
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Table 32 shows presence, not the quantities, of artefacts of each kind. It 
elides, for instance, the fact that the Self-Care Network produced a number 
and variety of pilot projects for patient care which easily bore comparison 
with the other, often much larger and in every case better-funded networks. 
In that network the balance between service changes and intangible 
artefacts was markedly towards the former. In that sense we did find that 
smaller, simpler core processes are more likely to work effectively than 
more complex or extensive ones (168). 
Statistical comparison of artefact production across the networks would be 
spurious because the numbers are (for statistical purposes) small and the 
term 'artefact' is broad, covering intangibles such as decisions and 
knowledge, physical objects ranging from leaflets to buildings. It also covers 
both simple and complex outputs in all these categories. Nevertheless some 
gross patterns appear. 
None of the networks failed to produce artefacts of the kinds which, given 
their stated objectives and hence functions, one would have expected them 
to produce. All the programme networks produced artefacts in at least one 
of the sub-categories attributable to programme networks, and so on. 
Indeed the networks produced a plenitude of artefacts. For each network 
also produced artefacts relevant to other functions besides its main function. 
Networks which described themselves as being in effect programme 
networks (even though they did not use the word) also produced artefacts 
typical of referral networks (e.g. revisions to working practice in existing 
services), artefacts typical of expertise networks (e.g. professional training) 
and even (but to a lesser extent) artefacts typical of project networks 
(above all, new infrastructure). The project network also produced artefacts 
typical of referral, programme and expertise networks, and the care 
network artefacts typical of programme, project and expertise networks. 
The experience network produced artefacts typical of referral networks (e.g. 
it distributed health promotion materials produced by health care providers) 
and of a programme network, although nothing typical of a project network. 
We infer that this pattern reflects the networks' history of originating as 
care networks, then through mandate and merger acquiring the role of 
programme networks (or, for the project network, originating as a project 
network but then being mandated to function additionally as a care and as a 
programme network). In terms of artefact production, there was a 
sedimentation of activities from the different health policies which had been 
mandated during the networks' life. In practice, however, these different 
patterns of artefact production were not 'messy' to the extent of frustrating 
one another. 
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Only the CHD networks undertook benchmarking. We infer that this 
difference reflects the stronger evidence base and data availability for CHD 
treatment than for the other care groups, not the operation of any mandate. 
Contemporary policy documents, above all the National Service Framework 
for coronary heart disease, described benchmarking as desirable in the 
future but, pointing out the technical obstacles, did not mandate it. This 
benchmarking was also the only artefact produced by mandated, but not by 
voluntary, networks. The only category of artefacts produced by voluntary 
but not mandated networks were the artefacts typical of an experience 
network. It was hardly surprising that the user-controlled experience 
network produced such artefacts, but striking that no other networks did 
despite their overlapping ranges of artefacts of other kinds. We therefore 
find that the hypothesis that mandated networks produce a more limited 
(narrower) range of activities (hence artefacts) than non-mandated 
networks (H8H) is supported, but only in a narrow sense. The experience 
network produced some artefacts typical of the other kinds of network, 
except the project network, but the converse was not true. No other 
network produced the kind of artefacts typical of an experience network. In 
the same narrow sense, our findings also support the converse hypothesis 
that voluntary networks show more flexibility and openness to innovation 
(both organisational and technical) (H8J). However, the user-experience 
network's artefacts were invented or promoted by grass-roots enthusiasts 
rather than introduced by boundary-spanners across structural holes within 
and between networks (113). 
Artefacts were predominantly practical rather than symbolic (or both 
symbolic and practical). Whilst the voluntary networks did produce symbolic 
artefacts, so did the mandated networks and the voluntary networks did not 
produce symbolic artefacts in obviously greater proportions or quantities. 
We thus found no support for the hypothesis (H8I) that voluntary networks 
are more likely than other networks to produce symbolic artefacts 
(163,164). Furthermore, our findings challenge as empirically simplistic any 
assumption of mutual exclusivity between network artefacts' practical and 
social functions, or that network artefacts have either a practical or a 
symbolic character. It is not only that the same artefact (e.g. a patient 
information leaflet bearing a network logo and name) can serve both 
practical and symbolic purposes at once; nor that the same artefact (e.g. an 
exercise class) can serve both practical and social purposes at once. Self-
Care Network expressly defined one its practical functions as being to 
provide social contact between its members; and another as being to re-
define its members' self-image. These are symbolic, 'non-rational' social 
outcomes. 
Network artefacts were predominantly what we have called 'intermediate' 
artefacts. They were such things as technical guidance and software, 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         203 
intended to influence the behaviour of key actors outside the network. In 
the NHS networks, only a minority of artefacts directly changed what 
services were provided and what physical resources were available to 
patients and health care professionals. The Self-Care network showed the 
opposite pattern. Its artefacts were nearly all direct services to its members, 
who were also service users, and these artefacts were mainly ones which 
would have a direct impact on health and self care (e.g. exercise groups, 
days out, cookery classes). 
 12.4  Network layers and artefact production 
Patterns of artefact production also provide a further test of the association 
between network effectiveness and connectivity in networks (i.e. greater 
network density and greater 'degree' of nodes within networks). According 
to our theoretical model, artefacts are the intermediate network products 
which stimulate key actors in the networks' hinterlands to make the service 
(or other output) changes that produce the networks' intended outcomes. 
Because network artefacts are collective products it is not possible to 
correlate numbers of artefacts with the characteristics (e.g. degree, 
centrality) of single member organisations. However it is possible to report, 
network by network, which layers were the most dense; the function of 
each layer (in terms of the Southon et al typology); which functional 
categories of artefact each network produced most and least of; and hence 
whether the most dense layer(s) were also the most productive of artefacts. 
Table 33 makes the comparison. 
Table 33. Layer density and artefact production  
Network Density of layers 
(descending rank) 
Categories of artefact 
(descending number of 
artefacts) 
Densest 
layer 
produced 
most 
artefacts? 
Child Mental 
Health 
Network 
1=. Direct client care 
1=. Client care organisation 
3=. Administration 
3=. Help in kind 
3=. Money 
1. Referral-related 
2. Programme-related 
3=. Expert-related 
3=. Project-related 
5. Experience-related 
Y  
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
1=. Direct client care 
1=. Client care organisation 
3=. Administration 
3=. Help in kind 
3=. Money  
1. Project-related 
2. Referral-related 
3. Programme-related 
4. Expert-related 
5. Experience-related 
Y (see 
comment 
below)  
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City 
Children's 
Network 
No data.  1=. Referral-related 
1=. Programme-related 
3=. Project-related 
3=. Expert-related 
3=. Experience-related 
? 
Small CHD 
Network 
1. Client Care Organisation 
2. Help in kind 
3=. Direct client care 
3=. Administration 
5. Money 
1. Referral-related 
2. Programme-related. 
3. Expert 
4=. Project 
4=. Experience  
Y 
Regional 
CHD 
Network 
No data 1. Referral-related 
2. Programme-related 
3=. Expert 
3=. Project 
5. Experience  
? 
 Urban CHD 
Network 
1=. Direct client care 
1=. Client care organisation 
1=. Administration 
1=. Help in kind 
1=. Money 
1. Referral-related 
2. Programme-related 
3=. Expert 
3=. Project 
5. Experience 
Ambivalent  
Self-Care 
Network 
1=. Direct client care 
1=. Client care organisation 
3=. Administration 
3=. Help in kind 
3=. Money 
1. Experience-related 
2. Programme-related 
3=. Project 
3=. Expert 
3=. Referral-related 
Y (see 
comment 
below) 
CHD Pilot 
Site Network 
No data.  1. Referral-related 
2. Programme-related 
3. Expert-related 
4=. Project 
5=. Experience 
? 
The rankings of layer densities ignore statistically insignificant differences of 
density (see RQ5). Our qualitative evidence suggests that the project-
related artefacts were produced and distributed through Children's Hospital 
Project Network through the same layers of links (to the same people, at 
the same times, for the same meetings, by similar media) as its 
programme-related artefacts. The client care organisation layer in Children's 
Hospital Project Network thus generated both the project and the 
programme artefacts, making it easily the most productive network layer. 
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Layer densities did not significantly differ in Urban CHD Network, so the 
finding for that network is ambivalent. Since Self-Care Network was a self-
care network, it used experience-related artefacts (not referrals) for direct 
client care. These artefacts were produced and distributed through its direct 
client care layer of links, and the latter was its densest layer. We therefore 
conclude that for four of the five networks where we had data, the densest 
network layer was the most productive of artefacts, hence that network 
connectivity was in that sense associated with network effectiveness. That 
said, two caveats apply. 'Numbers of artefacts' is a crude measure, counting 
a new, staffed building equally with a short policy document. Although one 
layer tended to produce the most artefacts, the NHS networks were 
nevertheless multi-functional in terms of the artefacts they produced. The 
independent experience network came close to being a single-function 
network. 
We therefore infer that the production and transmission of artefacts to key 
actors within their member organisations is the apparent explanation of how 
networks contributed to producing the observed changes in admissions and 
the other observed service changes. member organisations, and key actors 
within them, made use of these artefacts for three main reasons. One was 
the persuasive legitimacy of evidence-basing practice, an activity which 
many of the network artefacts embodied. A second was that the networks 
provided help-in-kind (practical help) in meeting the targets and incentives 
that their members, both organisations and individuals were exposed to 
independently of the network. That is, the network artefacts were harnessed 
to parallel incentives that (thirdly) operated outside the networks 
themselves. This explanation fits our data better than our original 
hypothesis that networks helped to stimulate innovation-related activities 
within their member organisations. 
 12.5  Summary 
Voluntary and mandated networks differed in terms of some of their 
objectives and core activities (i.e. what the networks performed). These 
differences reflected the occupational composition of their membership at 
individual level and their ability to 'harness' incentives and mandates 
operating in parallel outside the networks themselves. Mandated networks 
tended to have a more elaborate (because better-resourced) co-ordinating 
infrastructure. Network performance was achieved by producing artefacts 
for use in the hinterlands of the member organisations. These artefacts 
were predominantly intangibles (guidance, policies etc.) but some tangible 
service changes were also produced, especially by the user-controlled 
'experience' network. In the CHD networks we found some evidence that 
the organisations which were more connected to the rest of the networks 
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also displayed larger reductions in the admissions avoidable through strong 
primary-secondary are co-ordination. These findings bring us to the 
explanatory (theoretical) implications of our empirical findings.  
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 13  Discussion and conclusions 
 13.1  Summary of empirical findings 
In summary, the empirical findings above suggest that in respect of the 
networks studied, the answers to our research questions are as follows. 
1. How do networks emerge as rational co-ordination structures? What 
determines the formation of both mandated and non-mandated 
networks?  
We observed two modes of network creation. Voluntary networks 
emerged 'from below' as groupings of individuals and organisations 
interested in performing common tasks, which might include 
producing relatively intangible artefacts such as information or 
guidance, or more tangible tasks such as changing service provision. 
Mandated networks were created 'from above' by (in this case) NHS 
management, typically by taking control of pre-existing emergent 
networks and then, in some cases, re-structuring them. 
2. In mandated networks, what prior social networks pre-exist and how 
do they affect the operation of the new, mandated network? Does 
re-organising network structure disrupt or enhance network 
processes, or not affect them at all? How does the inclusion of 
additional occupational groups and other network members (e.g. 
users) affect performance?  
As noted, mandated networks were typically created by NHS 
management taking control of pre-existing emergent networks. 
Often this involved merging existing networks. An effect of mandate 
was that network membership tended to include a higher proportion 
of managers, network objectives shifted, hence new activities were 
added. Re-organisation of networks themselves was not necessarily 
very disruptive but the restructuring of their member organisations, 
especially PCTs, did disrupt the NHS networks, sometimes severely 
and for a considerable period. Inclusion of users in the NHS 
networks did not have much effect on network activity but in the 
non-NHS experience network users played a decisive role because 
they controlled the network. 
3. What determines the way in which member organisations use 
relational co-ordination structures (or fail to)? What determines the 
effectiveness of member organisations' use of these structures?  
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Members' engagement with networks depended upon whether 
participation in the network appeared to benefit the members, either 
in terms of meeting targets, mandates and incentives generated 
outside the network (for organisations) or in terms of their personal 
interests and opinions (for individuals). Member organisations used 
the networks partly by linking directly to each other. Brokership was 
not very evident. There was some evidence that the more highly-
connected organisations showed a greater reduction in referrals 
susceptible to primary-secondary care co-ordination. But there was 
no evidence that network connectedness stimulated innovation-
related activity. Neither was network connectedness associated with 
organisational climate. 
4. What types of co-ordination activities mediate the above effects?  
For co-ordination purposes the networks had a central steering group 
(or equivalent; different names were used) with specialist sub-
groups for particular tasks. Although the network co-ordinating 
bodies were well-connected to most members in the study 
networks, they were not uniquely well-connected. To a large extent 
network co-ordination occurred through direct links between 
network members in pursuit of specific tasks. Co-ordination links 
between members were generally dense (most member 
organisations dealt directly with most of the other member 
organisations) and deep (on multiple levels). Network co-ordination 
was non-hierarchical. Activities involving the evidence-basing of 
clinical and care practice were an important means of co-ordination 
in the NHS networks. 
5. How do the different layers of network, dealing with different media 
or contents, co-exist and influence each other?  
The network layer(s) carrying out the core activity of the network 
tended to be the most dense. Network links mediated by money 
were never more dense than other layers of links, and usually much 
less dense. The structure of the financial incentives did not match 
other network structures. 
6. How are member organisations within a network tied to 
organisations outside it, how are these relationships structured, and 
what effect do these relationships have on how effectively member 
organisations use relational co-ordinating structures?  
Member organisations had relatively few and weak links to bodies 
outside the network. These external relationships therefore had little 
perceptible effect on how effectively the member organisations used 
the study networks. The member organisations' links to other 
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organisations within the networks were more numerous and 
stronger than their links outside the networks. Such links outside 
the networks as were present tended to be with inter-disciplinary 
bodies rather than with (uni-) professional networks. 
7. What effects are produced by incentives to cooperate (or not to)? 
What match is there between incentives and network structures? 
That is, to what extent are links mediated by money homologous 
with links mediated in other ways? In NHS networks for example, 
how will the shifts to practice bed commissioning and payment by 
results affect network processes?  
The main incentives to cooperate were the expectation of practical 
help-in-kind and the persuasive power (and legitimacy) of evidence-
based practice. As noted, financial links and therefore incentives 
played only a small part within the networks. Network co-ordinators 
were however able to 'harness' more powerful targets and 
incentives originating outside the networks. These external 
incentives originated partly from payment by results. At the time of 
this study practice based commissioning had little effect on the 
study networks. 
8. What determines the performance of mandated and non-mandated 
network structures, and are there systematic differences in the 
performance of the two kinds?  
Voluntary and mandated networks differed in terms of some of their 
objectives and core activities (i.e. what the networks performed), 
reflecting the occupational mix of their memberships (see above); in 
their ability, created by the mandate, to 'harness' incentives 
external to the networks; and in having a more elaborate (because 
better-resourced) co-ordinating infrastructure. Network artefacts 
were predominantly intangibles (guidance, policies etc.) but some 
tangible service changes were also produced, especially by the user-
controlled 'experience' network. In two of the largest networks we 
found (somewhat equivocal) evidence that the organisations which 
were more connected to the rest of the networks also displayed 
larger reductions in the admissions avoidable through strong 
primary-secondary are co-ordination. 
To operationalise the research questions in greater detail we developed 
supplementary hypotheses. Table 34 summarises how these hypotheses 
withstood empirical testing in our study sites. 
 
Table 34. Summary of empirical findings about the supplementary hypotheses 
Hypothesis Supported, qualified or refuted for study networks? 
RQ1. Origins of networks 
H1A: Voluntary networks have occupationally more diverse 
membership 
Qualified. Voluntary members tended to have more diverse clinical and 
carer membership, but mandated networks had greater managerial 
representation.  
H1B: Networks emerge in pursuit of common policy goals Supported.  
H1C: Non-mandated networks are created as by-product of other, de 
facto relationships and organisational structures, as the (future) 
network members pursue shared economic interests using shared 
technology. 
Supported. Non-mandated networks emerge in pursuit of common 
tasks. 
H1D: Voluntary networks' processes are more likely to emerge to 
serve non-rational and irrational needs 
Supported, but on evidence of a single case study of a small network.  
H1E: Mandated networks are created by one or more of: 
1. legal requirement for practice, hence collective agreement between 
profession and state; 
2. 'closed shop' or cartel; or by managerial direction. 
Qualified. Mandated networks in this study were created by 
managerial direction only.  
RQ2. Mandated networks 
H2A: Mandated networks include involuntary members. Refuted. Dissident individuals left mandated networks.  
H2B: Mandated networks are 'enclaves' in the sense of having a 
formally defined and closed membership. Voluntary networks have 
Supported.  
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fluid membership, mandated ones more stable membership.  
H2C: Mandated networks are (structurally) uniform (within the 
economic sector).  
Refuted. Network membership varies by network function.  
H2D: Prior voluntary networks persist within subsequently-mandated 
networks.  
Supported. 'Sedimentation' of objectives and activities occurs.  
H2E: Mandated networks are more comprehensively, systematically 
managed across the whole network than are voluntary networks.  
Qualified. Mandatory networks had more resources for their co-
ordination activity, but were not more densely linked.  
RQ3. Participation in and use of networks 
H3A: Connectedness will correlate with innovation-related activity.  Refuted.  
H3B: Organisations whose internal climate is more favourable to 
collaboration will have more (hence denser) network links.  
Refuted.  
H3C: Service user involvement in voluntary networks is more 
extensive but uneven than in mandated networks.  
Supported.  
RQ4. Co-ordination 
H4A: In mandated networks, the co-ordinating body will 
1. have the highest brokerage score in the network 
and; 
2. be topmost member of any hierarchical relationships present.  
Refuted (in full).  
H4B: Compared with voluntary networks, mandated networks are: 
1. more 'hierarchical' 
Qualified. Points (1) and (2) are refuted.Mandated networks were 
more centralised (points 3 and 4) but all the study networks generally 
had low centralisation.  
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2. lower density 
3. prone to have flows from core to periphery 
4. more consistent in separation (all members relate directly to the 
core, and to each other mainly via the core) 
H4C: Voluntary networks will have more relational, trust-based 
internal co-ordination and roles than mandated networks.  
Qualified. Financial relationships were not dominant in any network 
but mandated networks 'harnessed' external incentives and mandates.  
H4D: Voluntary networks have negotiated allocation of roles.  Supported. 
H4E: Voluntary networks deal with conflicts by exit, mandated ones by 
negotiation and voice. Power distribution is more fluid and shifting in 
the voluntary network. In mandated networks, because exit is not 
possible oppositional activities occur, both passive (self-isolation, non-
compliance) and active.  
Refuted. Voluntary networks dealt with conflicts by negotiation, voice 
or peaceful co-existence, the mandated networks by exit.  
H4F: Mandated networks show uniformity and formalisation of 
organisational processes and flows than voluntary networks do.  
Refuted.  
RQ5. Layering  
H5A: Network layers through which the core process of a network are 
delivered will be denser than the other layers. 
Supported 
RQ6. External Links 
H6A: [Alternative hypotheses] Individuals with greater local, regional 
and national links outside the study network will have 
1. more extensive links within the network (because they obtain 
resources from outside the network to share within the network). 
Refuted (both alternatives). There was neither positive nor negative 
correlation between internal and external linkage.  
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Alternative hypothesis: 
2. fewer links within the network because non-network links substitute 
for the network.  
H6B: More strongly professionalised occupations (i.e. doctors) are 
more likely than other professions to have contacts outside the 
network.  
Supported, but differences not great.  
H6C: Each profession is more likely to have contacts outside the 
network with fellow-professionals than members of other professions.  
Refuted.  
H6D: Networks with more external links report higher level of 
innovation-related activity. 
Refuted.  
H6E: Providers with more external links will report better outcomes (in 
terms of admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination).  
Refuted  
RQ7. Incentives 
See above, RQ4/H4C on co-ordination and RQ5 / H5A on network 
layers.  
 
RQ8. Performance 
H8A: Organisations with more extensive network links will have lower 
rates of growth of admissions for conditions where admissions are 
preventable by strong primary-secondary care collaboration.  
Supported, but evidence somewhat equivocal.  
H8B: Simpler networks with fewer interfaces are more likely to 
succeed (in the above terms) than complex ones. 
Refuted 
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H8C: Outcomes should be best (in the above terms) when each 
member organisation relies on a few strong relations for most of care 
delivery whilst a few weak ties are maintained for information search.  
Refuted.  
H8D: Teaching hospitals will report better outcomes in terms of 
admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination.  
Qualified. Valid (and in this study testable) only for 'long-established' 
teaching hospital(s).  
H8E: Organisations an internal climate favourable to collaboration will 
report better outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by 
primary-secondary care co-ordination.  
Supported  
H8F: Organisations with high levels of innovation-related activity will 
report better outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by 
primary-secondary co-ordination.  
Refuted 
H8G: Organisations which are more central to the network will report 
better outcomes in terms of admissions preventable by primary-
secondary co-ordination. 
Supported  
H8H: Mandated networks show swift, relative uniform implementation 
of mandated policy but a narrower range of activity than non-
mandated networks.  
Qualified. The experience network produced some artefacts typical of 
the other kinds of network, except a project network, but the converse 
was not true.  
H8I: Voluntary networks are more likely than mandated networks to 
produce symbolic artefacts and function as social networks (in addition 
to their stated practical goals) 
Refuted.  
H8J: Voluntary networks will show more flexibility and openness to 
innovation, especially innovations coming from grass-roots enthusiasts 
or introduced by boundary-spanners of structural holes.  
Refuted.  
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 13.2  Theoretical findings 
 13.2.1  Network origins, participation and mandate 
Our longitudinal case studies suggest how, in light of the circumstances of a 
network's original formation (RQ1), the acquisition of additional members 
(RQ3) with a new mandate (RQ2) affects networks development and indeed 
the network's whole life cycle in a publicly managed health system. That life 
cycle has the following phases: 
1. Emergence: Enthusiasts set up a voluntary network (see chapter 5) 
2. Recognition: Public bodies 'validate' and resource the network (see 
chapters 5,11) 
3. Capture: Public bodies try to mandate and manage the network (see 
chapters 5,6,10). 
4. Contestation: Other governance structures start duplicating the 
network's functions (see chapter 11). 
5. Abolition, possibly through official de-recognition and loss of 
membership, leaving either a residual network or none (chapters 1,2). 
All networks experience the first stage but continuing to the second and 
later stages is not inevitable. Stage 3 can (and did in four of our study 
networks) involve a change in the network's function. 
Of network emergence it has been claimed that in general individuals tend 
to network with others who are like them (homophily) (112-114); in 
particular, with those with whom they share common 'values' (103). Our 
findings about the foundational role of core processes in networks (see 
below) suggest that homophily of tasks is of greater importance than 
homophily of persons. To be sure, a common task might well imply 
homophily of persons and of 'values', except that different members can use 
the same task for different purposes (e.g. research into evidence-base of 
treatment for therapeutic use versus cost control versus research). 
Emergent collaboration did not require a coherent, explicit set of collective 
objectives or 'values'. 
Explanations of network emergence in the market contexts were found not 
to be relevant to health networks, in terms either of who forms the network, 
the objectives (hence function) of the network, or its main activities (core 
processes). Analyses of how business alliances form or the New Institutional 
Economics accounts of network formation say that members form networks 
form to gain access to commercially valuable resources, technical know-
how, marketing resources, economies of scale or vertical integration (90); 
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or to manage demand uncertainty, asset specificity, frequent transactions, 
risk and competition, for instance through flexible use of agencies, 
outsourcing and subcontracting (77,95-97,91-94). Our findings show that 
these scenarios are special cases that apply to specific settings (commercial 
firms in markets) and not to others; in particular, not to NHS-like health 
systems. 
During the recognition phase, the network acquires more members and 
resources. It develops in size and complexity, but not in its goals. If core 
process is what holds a network together, that explains why new 
membership per se does not necessarily affect network function. The effect 
of network expansion depends, our findings suggest, upon whether the 
additional members have similar reasons for joining the network, and bring 
similar resources, to those of existing members. If they do, our experience 
network showed, this addition simply enlarged the existing network without 
qualitatively changing its core process. If they do not, either a 
sedimentation of new objectives and core processes onto the old ones 
occurs; or, if the new members are powerful enough (sufficiently numerous 
or well-resourced or authoritative) 'mission drift' occurs. We found that 
voluntary networks became involved in implementing central policy and 
guidance through either of two mechanisms. First, public-sector member 
organisations, especially NHS bodies, became obliged for reasons 
extraneous to the network to try to implement current policy imperatives, 
guidance and targets, then use the network to help them do so. Second, 
public bodies offered grants or practical support to the network, or to 
commission it, but on conditions which included help in implementing 
current policy. 
The networks' objectives changed. The networks experienced capture. A 
radical change in objectives implies a change in core process, with a new 
core process either: 
1. replacing the original one (as when four of our study networks 
evolved from referral to programme networks). Concomitantly the 
network's internal balance of power, co-ordination and governance 
regime change (116). Then, the effect of a mandate would indeed be 
'distortion' (37) of the original function of a clinical or professional 
network. 
2. supplementing the original one (as in the study site which began as 
project networks but acquired referral and programme network 
activities). The result is a dense, because sedimented, network with 
two or more concurrent functions. This sedimentation of core processes 
explains why networks at times involve collaboration on different 
levels: service provision, policy-making and so on (10). 
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Whether or not a network is captured, however, our findings confirm (208) 
that for networks to function effectively requires relative stability in their 
function, membership and co-ordinator. 
Contestation of the network when other governance structures were created 
to implement the same policy mandates as the original network. In one of 
the study sites a parallel, overarching network co-existed with the study 
network. In another site, a larger network was created and the study 
network absorbed into it. Across all the study sites, though, quasi-market 
structures (payment by results; practice based commissioning; patient 
choice) were being set up during the study period. Many of our informants 
saw these quasi-market structures as doing similar co-ordination work to 
the professional and clinical networks, or even as doing that work instead of 
the study networks. Either way the core process of the network was 
duplicated and contested. 
Abolition or collapse of networks was explicitly debated in Regional CHD 
Network during the study period, and actually occurred soon afterwards in 
Child Mental Health Network. In both cases the reason was that senior 
managers within the network co-ordinating body considered that the 
network's core activity (core process) had, or was about to, become 
redundant. However the persistence of the original task and its core process 
would cause the persistence of network 'rumps' and residual support 
networks even after the network co-ordinating body was officially de-
recognised or abolished. 
 13.2.2  External links and openness 
'Structural holes' are points where the links between network members, 
between sub-networks or indeed between whole networks, are few. The 
minority of network members who bridge these structural holes then act as 
a link or 'tie' transmitting new resources – in particular, knowledge and 
innovations – from one network (or sub-network) to another. These 'weak' 
external ties enable networks to generate and disseminate innovations. 
Such ties have been described in other empirical studies and attributed to 
networks generally (3,96). 
Our study networks contrasted with this picture. A consequence of 
becoming a mandated network was that the NHS networks focused on 
bridging any structural hole between the network (and especially the 
network co-ordinating body) and policy makers rather than upon bridging 
structural holes to other external sources of innovation, knowledge or other 
resources (see RQ6). The NHS networks were embedded within an 
implementation structure rather than a wider 'community'. However, the 
experience network was also largely inward-looking, despite having no 
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mandate. In particular, three bridges over external structural holes were 
absent from the study networks: 
 1. To users: In six of the study networks user participation, though 
regarded as legitimate, was slight in scale or effect. These networks 
remained at the third or fourth of the eight rungs on Arnstein's 'ladder' 
of participation model. Users 'hear and are heard – but are not heeded' 
(209). These conditions tended to falsify the policy assumption (see 
chapter 1) that the addition of user-representatives would substantially 
increase user 'voice' (210,211) in the management or monitoring of 
NHS services. The stark contrast with the experience network suggests 
the explanation (theory) that two conditions were necessary for a high 
and influential involvement of users in health networks. It is necessary 
that users: 
(a) dominate the co-ordinating body and; 
(b) are technically integral to the network's core process. 
The second of these conditions is likely to produce the first because 
condition (b) would make it difficult, even impossible, for a network to 
function without the active involvement of those service users. The 
second condition, however, depends on the technical character of the 
core process. It is feasible to involve users in self-care but not (or at 
least, not actively) in, say, technically complex surgery. 
 2. To uni-professional disciplinary networks. Latour (212) and others 
(213) emphasise the persistence, not least in medicine, of personal, 
educational and social networks formed during the professional's 
training into her subsequent working relationships. In our study sites, 
professional solidarity appeared to operate through other means: 
either through social networks independently of clinical and 
professional networks (but our ethical approval did not permit the 
present study to collect such data about personal or informal social 
networking); or through organisations such as professional 
associations, including informal organisations within member 
organisations and not visible at whole-network level. 
 3. To network hinterlands within member organisations. In our study 
sites, network linkage was not associated with innovation-related 
activity (which is anyway not quite the same thing as innovation). 
Instead, we infer that the production and transmission of artefacts to 
key actors within their member organisations is a possible explanation 
of how networks contributed to producing the observed changes in 
admissions and the other observed service changes. Member 
organisations, and key actors within them, made use of these artefacts 
for three main reasons. One was the persuasive legitimacy of evidence-
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basing practice, an activity which many of the network artefacts 
embodied. A second was that the networks provided help-in-kind 
(practical help) in satisfying motivations, targets and incentives that 
their members, both organisations and individuals, were already 
exposed to. Among the targets and incentives were (thirdly) parallel 
incentives that operated outside the networks themselves. This 
explanation of how networks produced their effects fits our data better 
than our original conjecture that networks helped to stimulate 
innovation-related activities within their member organisations. In 
contrast to the account of 'receptivity' to innovation proposed by 
Newton et al. (214) we therefore propose an account – which applies 
only to externally-generated innovation – of receptivity to innovation 
as requiring all of: 
(a) linkage to sources of innovation outside the organisation in 
question. These links which convey into it artefacts which represent 
or embody an innovation; and 
(b) an organisational climate favourable to the adoption and 
application of the artefacts (indeed of new working practices in 
general), reflecting relationships of trust between different 
occupational groups. 
(c) Incentives for key actors within the receiving organisation to 
make use of the artefacts. 
Conversely, earlier studies report that network closure (129) or very dense 
or homogeneous network structures (130) prevent external 'weak ties' 
being a source of innovations. We found both closure and dense ties in the 
study networks. 
Mandate does not explain these conditions because a similar pattern was 
found in the two non-mandated networks. Neither does long duration of 
stable relationships between the member organisations because the 
experience network was newly-established at the start of the study period. 
A more likely explanation is that this form of network closure results when 
network members: 
 1. do not perceive any actual shortage of resources which external 
bodies could remedy (or, legitimately remedy). They regard their local 
health economy as closed and (collectively) self-sufficient. 
 2. do not perceive external resources as potentially exploitable. (For 
instance, they do not know how to exploit new service providers or 
sources of funding.) 
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 3. implicitly regard the network as an implementation structure (69) 
for particular policy mandates rather than as a means for producing 
non-mandated innovations in service co-ordination. 
However we did find networks acting as inventors in their own right, not 
only as innovators finding, transmitting and implementing inventions or 
discoveries made outside the network. How invention occurs within 
networks also requires further research. 
 13.2.3  Co-ordination and incentives 
Internal co-ordination (see RQ4) of the study networks conformed in many 
ways to the widespread view of network governance as non-hierarchical, 
relatively egalitarian and democratic structures. That was most obvious in 
the increasing importance of knowledge management as a co-ordinating 
mechanism, the more heavily medicalised the networks were (see chapter 
9) and in the networks reliance on help-in-kind and intrinsic motivators (see 
chapters 9, 11). 
Like Sowa (10) we recognise that network links can vary in terms of the 
closeness of collaboration they represent. The present study takes this 
argument one step further by operationalisation that idea in terms of the 
'depth' (multiplexity or multidimensionality) of links between pairs of 
network members. 
In apparent contrast to some other networks (35,111), hierarchy-like 
structures in the sense defined by Krackhardt (161) were absent in the 
present study networks. So was brokerage. Both the network co-ordinating 
body and the other network member organisations were simultaneously 
subject to direct mandates from central bodies, instead of the other network 
members being indirectly mandated via the co-ordinating body ('network 
administrative organisation') as in some US networks (179,215,216). In 
those of our study networks which were mandated, the rewards and 
sanctions for collaboration, and against free-riding, operated outside the 
network. They were not mediated by the network co-ordinating body. Little 
trace was found of the 'soft coercion' reported in predominantly uni-
professional networks in English primary care (110) . More generally, and 
unlike Walker et al (120), Pope and Lewis (121) and Huxham and Vangan 
(122), who identify the brokers within networks as key components of 
network effectiveness, we found little evidence of brokerage in the formal 
sense of the co-ordinating body or another subset of network members 
mediating between all the rest. Network members tended to deal directly 
with one another. The role of the co-ordinating body was co-ordination not 
brokerage. It promoted consistency of content in these multiple direct 
interactions: that network members all followed the same policies, used the 
same information or applied the same guidance (as the case might be). 
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Institutionalist theory lays great weight upon values as explaining how 
institutions generally, including networks, remain cohesive and able to carry 
out their collective activities. We found however that voluntary networks 
dealt with value conflicts not by resolving them but by peaceful co-existence 
rather than voice or exit. One in particular, Child Mental Health Network, 
functioned stably for many years even though there were value-differences 
between and within the participating occupational groups. What mattered to 
members of this network was the legitimacy of the (organisational or 
professional) source of other members' practical contributions to the 
network's work, not ideological or programmatic adherence to a particular 
set of values. In that large, long-established network, a unified set of values 
was clearly absent but it continued to function as a network because, each 
for their own different reasons and beliefs, its members all wished to 
contribute to its main process (making and co-ordinating client referrals). 
Contrary to one of our initial hypotheses, voluntary networks dealt with 
value-conflicts more by 'peaceful co-existence' than by 'voice' (i.e. debate) 
or by 'exit'. Conversely the presence of relatively unified value systems 
(supplied by policy mandate) was not sufficient to prevent long periods of 
quiescence in two other, large networks. A unified value-system was 
therefore neither necessary nor sufficient for a network to continue to 
function. Under the external impact of health system reform, artefact 
production changed first, followed by espoused values, and lastly (and least) 
by changes in the network members' underlying value-assumptions (202). 
We infer that the 'glue' in these networks was not shared 'values' but 
shared activity, that of producing network artefacts. This explains why, like 
other studies (143,145,146,217), ours found that knowledge management 
(technical persuasion) and authority based upon scientific knowledge 
embodied in guidelines and formalised clinical pathways was an important 
medium for network governance. 
 13.2.4  Layers and performance 
Our findings tend to confirm the contrast (152) between network 
'sociostructure' (what we have called 'core process') and 'cultural 
superstructure' (the co-ordinating body and its resources). Together these 
findings suggest that a network's core process is the explanatory key to 
understanding health networks of the kinds studied. Network members' 
perceived need for a given set of core activities (process) explained why 
networks formed, when and why the addition of new members affected 
them and why networks expired. It explained when and why external 
resources were used, and the conditions under which users played a central 
role. Also it explained what artefacts networks did (and did not) produce. 
The nature of the core process also explained which network layers were the 
most dense. The network's core process was in all but one case the most 
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dense layer of links (RQ5). In the remaining network new functions had 
supplemented the original core process, replacing it as the network's de 
facto main function. Network effectiveness (RQ8) in changing services 
depended on how far the network's core process either extended into the 
hinterlands of its member organisations or (in the experience network) did 
not need to rely on those hinterlands. 
Our comparison of networks suggests that for certain networks the core 
processes is impersonally determined and for others it is chosen. In the 
referral and experience networks, the scientific ('evidence') basis of the 
programmes which the programme networks sought to implement drew 
attention to the fact that in these networks (as in certain organisations) the 
core process is 'impersonally' patterned (109). It arises from and is 
constrained by the physical requirements of a process of production, 
independently of which individuals operate the processes and independently 
of individuals' or policy-makers' personal decisions. The activities required 
to prevent or treat CHD are biologically determined. At most, policy choices 
can be made about which of these natural processes to exploit. In contrast 
the necessary formulation of a service contract depends on regulatory, legal 
and policy decisions. But they are chosen by national policy makers rather 
than local health managers and so from the perspective of a programme 
network are also externally given. The more distant a health network's 
practical function is from the actual provision of care, the more its core 
process is determined by policy choices rather than impersonally. 
 13.2.5  How professional and clinical networks work: explanatory 
models 
These theoretical findings can be combined into an integrated model of how 
professional and clinical networks work. Figure 3 presents a theoretical 
model to explain how mandated networks in health systems such as the 
NHS produce changes in complex services, that is in services whose delivery 
is distributed across multiple organisations. 
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Figure 3. Mandated professional and clinical networks: an explanatory model 
 
For simplicity only two member organisations are shown but additional 
member organisations would be pictured in just the same way. The 
sequence by which a mandated network produces complex service changes 
begins with the inputs (on the left of the diagram) that member 
organisations bring to the network. Fundamental among these resources are 
the member organisations' own engagement in the network, for the network 
only originates because these organisations collaborate in pursuit of 
common goals (see RQ1). Via the 'boundary spanner' individuals who 
represent them in the network, the member organisations contribute 
resources (shown by the cross-hatched arrows in Figure 3) to the network. 
Studies of non-mandated networks describe how, by virtue of their 
involvement in other, external networks, member organisations can also act 
as 'weak ties' for the introduction of further, external resources into a given 
network. Such ties were weak or absent in our study networks (see RQ6). 
Their nearly-empty places are shown by dotted lines in Figure 3. Similarly, 
the nearly-empty place for user inputs into the activity of mandated clinical 
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and professional networks (see RQ3) is also shown by dotted lines in that 
figure. In contrast, the external influence which central policy makers (the 
'mandators') simultaneously have upon all the network members and upon 
the network itself via its co-ordinating body is very much present and shown 
by the shadowed lines in Figure 3. The effects of this influence are described 
in earlier chapters (see RQ2, RQ7). Attached to many of the mandates and 
targets are incentives and penalties directed at the network's member 
organisations to compel compliance. 
The resources which the networks do obtain then enter the 'core process' by 
which the network members collaboratively transform these input resources 
into network artefacts. This core process involves distributing and 
redistributing these resources, as they are gradually transformed, among 
the network members. The links between network members, through which 
these transfers occur, lie within the 'black box' (for legibility shown as light 
grey) in the centre of Figure 3. The links themselves, their characteristics 
and structure are more fully described in the network maps in the 
appendices and the social network analyses of preceding chapters, as are 
the different 'layers' of links (see RQ5). The resources which are so 
distributed include but are not necessarily limited to: help-in-kind; patients 
(i.e. referrals); physical goods and services; administrative information; 
knowledge about how to organise and provide patient care (e.g. technical 
guidance, EBM, models of care); money; and such intangibles as 
authorisations, decisions, property rights and moral obligations to 
reciprocate past help in the future. 
Network co-ordination (see RQ4) of the core process also takes place 
through these links, in particular the links between the network's co-
ordinating body (if there is one) and the other network members. 
The result is the production of network artefacts, tangible or intangible as 
the case may be (see RQ8). Our findings also suggest an important 
distinction between final outcomes and intermediate artefacts. Final 
outcomes more or less closely approximate to the network's objectives, 
such as cured or healthier patients, legislation, complex service changes, or 
the completed execution of a policy mandate. Intermediate artefacts are 
those intended to produce the final outcome, but are only means to that 
end. Staff re-training, building schemes or new budgetary systems might be 
examples. Similarly, networks produce both tangible and intangible 
artefacts. The former are such things as new services, re-trained staff, 
buildings, IT systems and the like. Intangible artefacts are such things as 
decisions, plans, and recommendations for clinical practice which only exist 
concretely in the form of documents. 
Network member organisations so to speak 'take delivery' of these 
artefacts. As a 'boundary-spanner', each member organisation's 
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representative(s) to the network transmits these artefacts (or in the case of 
large physical artefacts such as new buildings, rights of access to them) 
back into their own organisation. Solid black arrows in Figure 3 represent 
this stage. How receptive other members of the receiving organisation are 
to these new, external artefacts depends upon that organisation's climate, 
as we have defined it. The more favourable the climate, the more likely that 
the artefacts will reach and be used by the 'key actors' in that organisation. 
These key actors are not necessarily (indeed, not usually) members of the 
network itself. They are the 'front-line' clinicians, care staff or other 
employees who, if anyone does (see RQ3), apply in everyday working 
practice the artefacts which the network has produced (grey arrows in 
Figure 3). 'If anyone does' is an important qualification. The extent to which 
key actors within member organisations make use of the network's artefacts 
reflects, inter alia, the strength of the incentives and motivations which led 
that organisation to participate in the network in the first place. It also 
reflects the extent to which these key actors depend (or not) upon the 
artefacts which the network provides. The performance of a network 
depends not so much on its size or complexity as upon key actors in the 
'hinterlands' of its member organisations, outside the network's control. But 
if key actors in two or more member organisations do apply the network 
artefacts in practice, the network will have produced a complex service 
change. 
Figure 3 shows how a network's core process extends outside the network 
itself into the hinterlands of its member organisations. Previous studies 
(62,218) note the importance of 'boundary-spanners' as links between 
network member organisations. Taking that argument one step further, our 
findings add that equally important for the implementation of network 
decisions are the relationships between boundary-spanner and hinterland 
inside each member organisation. Previous chapters (10,11,12) suggest 
that this influence depends upon networks' ability to: 
1. 'harness' the incentives or motivations which are most salient to the 
key actors the hinterlands of its member organisations. 
2. produce artefacts which assist the key actors in pursuing these 
incentive or motives. 
3. produce artefacts of these kinds which are useful or necessary to the 
key actors, and not obtainable from within the member organisations' 
hinterlands. 
With its higher proportion of individual members and lower proportion of 
member organisations, a simpler variant of the above model also applies to 
the independent, user-controlled experience network that we studied. The 
mandators' influence over the member organisations was weak and the 
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corresponding incentives absent. The mandators had no influence to speak 
of over the individual network members. The network members were also 
mostly (but not all) the users of the services which the network provided 
and co-ordinated.  
Using similar symbols to the previous figure, Figure 4 shows the explanatory 
model for the user-controlled experience network. The model in Figure 4 is 
closer than the one in Figure 3 to the models of networks described in 
studies of networks in other health systems and in market settings, but is 
still distinct from them. 
 
Figure 4. Voluntary user-controlled experience network: an explanatory 
model 
The contrast between the Figures 3 and 4 suggests why the Self Care 
Network was comparatively successful in producing a range of artefacts and 
services for patients. Its members undertook the network's core process 
themselves. In contrast, Figure 3 shows the case where much of the 
network's core process lay outside the network itself, in the hinterlands of 
the member organisations. The more complex and indirect the links are 
between boundary-spanner (network representative) and key actors (clinical 
staff, contract negotiators, building contractors etc. as the case may be), 
the more fragile was this part of the network's core process, for the more it 
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lay beyond the network's direct influence. Our initial hypothesis (H8B) that 
simpler networks with fewer interfaces are more likely to succeed than 
complex ones was therefore on the wrong track. Rather, networks are more 
likely to succeed when the parts of their core process which lie within the 
member organisations' hinterlands are simpler in the sense of being more 
directly influenced by the boundary-spanning network representative; and 
most likely to succeed when the network directly operates its whole core 
process within the network itself. 
The distinctive theoretical contribution of this study is thus to explain health 
networks as being, at their core, a process of production. 
 13.2.6  Implications for network theory 
Mandated clinical and professional networks in health systems are a specific 
kinds of network. Certain governance mechanisms and the corresponding 
network structures which would have facilitated their operation, and have 
been reported in other networks, were conspicuous by their weakness or 
absence in our study networks. In particular, market-like financial incentives 
and links were absent. Unlike business alliances, professional and clinical 
networks in NHS-like health systems were not a sub-market or even a cartel 
within a wider market. Their origins, objectives and structures were 
correspondingly different. The 'special case' character of clinical and 
professional health care networks has implications for network analysis 
more generally. The structures of brokerage, bridges across structural holes 
(and structural holes themselves), centrality (of a co-ordinating body) and 
'hierarchical' network structures are not empirically universal, still less 
defining, features of networks per se. The analytic value of these concepts is 
rather that they identify structural characteristics whose absence would 
define the character of one network just as much as their presence would 
define the character of another. 
The taxonomy by which Southon et al. differentiate types of network (169) 
turned out to have face validity and to be readily usable for empirically 
analysing networks. Moreover it proved to be a way of differentiating 
networks in theoretical (explanatory) terms of core process. We can now 
develop and qualify the typology by observing that 
1. It is not exhaustive. It ignores (say) policy networks even within the 
health sector, for instance the 'policy 'communities' of organisations 
which governments choose or are compelled by force majeure to 
consult (71) about health policy development. Networks outside the 
health sector have further functions again (e.g. as cartels or business 
alliances). 
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2. As other studies also describe (179,71,19,37,219,220), health 
networks can in practice serve more than one function and therefore 
fall into more than one of the Southon categories. Thus the typology of 
Southon at al. identifies conceptual ('ideal') types of health network 
function which can be combined in practice. Table 35 shows the 
functions of the study networks by the end of the study period, 
showing the main function of the network in black and the secondary 
functions in grey. 
3. It implies a classification of network artefacts in terms of what uses 
(functions) the artefacts serve. Because of their different functions, 
each type of network typically produces different kinds of artefacts 
(table 36). As previously noted artefacts may serve symbolic besides 
practical purposes but table 36 focuses on the latter. 
 
Table 35. Multiple functions of the study networks 
 Child 
Mental 
Health 
Network 
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
City 
Children's 
Network 
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CHD 
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Regional 
CHD 
Network 
Urban 
CHD 
Network 
Self-Care 
Network 
Pilot CHD 
Network 
Care network  
       
Expertise 
network  
 
       
Project 
network  
 
       
Programme 
network  
 
       
Experience 
network  
 
       
Interest 
network  
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Table 36. Health network types, functions and artefacts  
Network 
type 
Function (type of goal) Typical artefacts  
Care network Cross-organisational 
patient care  
Referral routes; physical inputs to care; recruit and train care-giving staff; patient and carer 
recruitment; patient information exchange; clinical and social care knowledge-sharing; 
funding for services; information from providers to patients and carers; clinical audit against 
internally-generated norms; demand management; support groups (clinicians and/or 
patients) for specific diseases or services; recruitment of, or decision to exclude, providers; 
guidance on when, how, to access and use existing models of care or technologies.  
Expertise 
network  
Occupational control of 
work  
Policy documents and other materials and activities promoting occupational group's interests 
to government, media, public; credentials for entry to profession; disciplinary structures to 
exclude deviant members from it; ethical codes; recruitment of professional members; 
materials and activities promoting solidarity within occupational group; lobbying or 
campaign activity; norms of professional practice; research, including critical 'benchmarking' 
scrutiny of practice.  
Project 
network  
Capital project, complex 
innovation or re-profiling 
of services.  
Project design, timetables, division of labour; budgets; project planning and management 
systems and documentation; consultation, lobbying or campaign activity in support of the 
project; project planning and modelling; responses to sudden, large-scale health problems 
(e.g. SARS) or controversies.  
Programme 
network  
Implement pre-defined 
model(s) of care for a 
specific care group.  
Rules of working practice; policy and managerial guidance; evidence-basing and translation 
into practice; data-bases, IT and research to monitor and evaluate compliance with 
programme; evaluation of existing working practice against programme norms; technical 
guidance and policy for new models of care or technologies; care pathway mapping and 
revision; formulation of interests of community representatives; provider contracts and 
other incentive systems.  
Experience Patient control over care Resources or activities for patients and carers to use; mutual support and help; policy 
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network  and services  decisions; policy documents and other materials and activities promoting care group's 
interests to government, media, public; lobbying or campaign activity; funding for self-care; 
recruitment of members; personalised treatment options; therapeutic impact (e.g. in mental 
health).  
Interest 
network  
Official adoption of specific 
policies 
Policy documents and other materials and activities promoting specific policies to 
government, media, public; supporting technical information; recruitment of new supporters; 
lobbying or campaign activity.  
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Some artefacts appear in more than one row in Table 36. Depending on the 
use to which they are put, two apparently similar artefacts – an evidence-
based clinical guideline, say - might serve the function of referral 
management, a programmatic function (revision of care pathways), or the 
project function (e.g. specifying a completely new service). Similarly, 
experience, interest and professional networks all produce policy 
documents, campaigns and lobbying activities, but supporting different 
substantive policies and promoting different social interests. The de facto 
function of a clinical and professional network, and if its artefacts, has 
therefore to be inferred from how it is observed to operate in its health 
system context. We found one network (Children's Hospital Project 
Network) which had accumulated so many additional activities as to shift 
the balance of its activities away from its original mandate. 
 13.3  Qualifications to the findings 
Certain qualifications and 'health warnings' attend the above findings and 
the theoretical conclusions drawn from them. We have to a certain extent 
relied upon self-reported data about network activities and outcomes. The 
risk that informants will tend towards self-justification makes this source 
second-best to observational data on behaviours (221). Collective memories 
of the origins of the networks tended to disappear with membership 
changes (which NHS re-organisations accelerated). Similarly, collecting data 
on patient experience retrospectively rather than prospectively (in 'real 
time') involves risk of recall errors (but the reasons usually adduced for 
preferring prospective to retrospective data collection in epidemiological 
studies are obviously irrelevant to the present study). Triangulation against 
other data sources reduces these limitations. 
Our social network analyses abstracted from the directionality of links and 
was conducted only at the levels of links between member organisations not 
at the level of links between individuals except in the case of one user-
experience network (Self-Care Network). We assumed that respondents 
simultaneously represent both their employing organisation and their 
occupation, but this assumption is empirically defensible. We treated certain 
non-responses in the data as indicating the absence of network linkages. 
Any resulting bias in the findings is therefore likely to be towards 
understating the connectedness of the study networks. Because we 
symmetrised some network data, our analysis for the (Krackhardt) 
hierarchical properties of networks could not test for the presence of 
unidirectional links but our findings from the other elements of Krackhardt's 
tests were already conclusive without this element. By using a simplified 
'short form' data collection instrument the resulting binary matrices showed 
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the presence or absence, but not the strength, of links in each layer of each 
network. 
Responses to questions about links to organisations or networks outside the 
study network sometimes elicited a simple 'yes' response without further 
details. In these cases we assumed the respondent had just one such 
external link, so our findings may tend to understate the number of external 
links. Our findings on referrals are not standardised for age-sex profile, nor 
for case-mix (severity) except where we have taken the analysis down to 
individual ICD level. The above SNA analyses may also tend to under-report 
the relationships that existed. Lack of association (correlations) may reflect 
low numbers of respondents with correspondingly low power to detect 
correlations or associations. On the other hand, the associations or 
correlations which were found were strong enough to be detected even 
under these conditions. 
As to empirical limitations, the study sites included no policy, interest or 
professional networks. Our sample included only one instance of a project 
network and of a user-experience network, and so we could not include 
comparative data about the way in which other instances of those kind of 
network might instead form. Eastern England is not represented among our 
study sites, but there is no a priori reason to suppose that networks there 
would function much differently to others purely on account of their 
location. Our study includes a mandated network created by merging and 
mandating existing networks, but no example of a mandated network 
created ex nihilo. It was beyond the scope of this study to demonstrate what 
health outcomes the observed changes to artefacts and referrals produced or to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis. 
Generalisation from the study networks to others requires caution in view of 
the small numbers of study networks. Routine service outcome data could 
be matched to SNA data only for three networks. Comparisons of children's' 
networks are limited by different age-cut-offs (5 years versus 18) and 
breadth of care group (mental health problems only versus all health 
problems). Nevertheless our study networks do appear qualitatively fairly 
typical of their kinds. For example. the deputy co-ordinator of one of our 
CHD study sites (Small CHD Network) was also active at national level in 
CHD work and said 'I know that the experience of the [Small CHD Network] 
improvement is not unusual in terms of the country' (deputy co-ordinator, 
Small CHD Network). There is circumstantial evidence that other networks 
similar to our user-experience one may exist. A survey of physical exercise 
schemes for people with mental health problems in seven of the 40 English 
counties (222) found 102 projects, although without differentiating those 
based on a single organisation from those which were networks. 
Our findings may not generalise so fully to cancer networks (37): 
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At the moment [2007], the managed function of these cancer networks represents a novel 
and distinctive structure that is not present to the same degree in networks in other 
clinical areas. 
(p.96) 
By omitting cancer networks which, having been the first NHS programme 
networks are likely to be more fully elaborated and have longer-established 
relational links, and therefore be more effective than our study networks the 
present findings may err towards understating the effectiveness of NHS 
clinical and professional networks under favourable conditions. 
 13.4  Further research needs 
Notwithstanding these 'health warnings', the present study makes a number 
of additions to knowledge. So far as we are aware, it is the first attempt to 
trace how the positional characteristics of the member organisations within 
health care networks might impact upon the types of referral patterns which 
those networks might reasonably be expected to influence. The present 
study is not unique in making cross-network comparisons based on social 
network analyses, but such studies remain scarce, especially for health 
networks. 
Our evidence for an apparent correlation between connectedness and 
referral changes (chapter 12) raises the questions and consequent 
suggestions for the further research: 
1. Would the correlation be confirmed in studies of larger networks with 
more member organisations? A possible setting for such a study 
would be the emerging GP commissioning consortia, although the 
present study has also highlighted the difficulty of collecting sufficient 
data to make social network analyses in general practice settings. 
2. Is that correlation evidence of causality, or is network connectedness 
a marker for some other characteristic (e.g. the internal managerial 
practices) of member organisations that really was the cause of the 
fall in preventable referrals? 
3. If network connectivity did reduce the volume of referrals avoidable 
by good primary-secondary care co-ordination, through what 
mechanisms did this occur if not through innovation-related activity 
(as we defined it)? 
4. We found that in one network but not the others, network 
connectedness was correlated with innovation-related activity. 
Although we speculated as to why Urban CHD Network was distinctive 
in this respect, further research would be warranted to explain this 
finding or, more generally, the mechanisms through which 
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connectedness within and between health networks stimulates 
innovation. 
5. We revised hypothesis H8B to state that networks are more likely to 
succeed when the parts of their core process which lie within the 
member organisations' hinterlands are simpler in the sense of being 
more directly influenced by the boundary-spanning network 
representative. This revised hypothesis now needs testing. 
Our finding that many NHS managers regarded quasi-markets as a partial 
(and in the view of some, a complete) substitute for networks calls attention 
to the lack of studies which empirically compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of networked, hierarchical and contractual, management for 
similar groups of services (above all primary and social care, though not 
only them). Commissioning bodies appear, our findings suggest, to need to 
apply different approaches in commissioning networks of users and 
voluntary organisations than they would apply in commissioning public, 
commercial or social enterprises. This area is also in need of research. 
Neither did the present methods allow us to test whether hospitals with 
stronger links to the network co-ordinating body in particular (as opposed to 
stronger links to the network as a whole) perform better in terms of 
reducing admissions preventable by primary-secondary co-ordination. 
Further empirical research would be required to test that conjecture. 
None of the study networks used a management infrastructure 'bought in' 
from the private sector, in contrast to the FESC scheme and the recent 
white paper's suggestions. What effect this has on a network remains 
unresearched. For the English NHS, a larger research question is how the 
characteristics of GP commissioning consortia, as networks, compare with 
those of existing professional and clinical networks. Such a study would help 
define how far findings from the present generation of health network 
studies, and indeed from network studies outside the health sector, could 
also be applied to GP commissioning consortia. 
This study also made three methodological inventions. We compensated for 
the lack of data on the strength of networks links within each layer of each 
network by measuring the strength of links in terms of the multiplexity or 
multi-dimensionality of relationship between pairs of network nodes; that is, 
in terms of what we have called the 'depth' of linkage. This between-layer 
measure of strength of links is a new contribution. We also devised (so far 
as we are aware for the first time) and applied an index of uni-professional 
versus multi-professional linkage. As an intermediate output of networks, 
we have developed and applied the idea of the network 'artefact'. This 
concept is applicable to network studies in general. As a methodological 
discovery, our findings also reveal a limitation to the uses of social network 
analysis in health care. For mandated networks, the mandators are not 
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network members but, rather are 'off-stage' outside network as dominant 
but so to speak absent or virtual 'members'; and invisible to social network 
analyses which are limited to the network itself. We also discovered the 
absence of a most important research tool. Although we could compare 
mandated with voluntary networks in terms of activities and artefacts, we 
could not compare them in terms of outcomes because no commensurable 
outcome indicators exist. To create and test them would require further 
primary research. 
Ethical approval for the project excluded questions about friendship and 
social links. We explored the idea of collecting from the relevant file-servers 
anonymised data on volumes of e-mail traffic between network members. 
Technically this method is feasible but the tasks of gaining ethical and 
research governance approvals, and then informed consents for some 340 
individuals, made it an unrealistic prospect within the time and resources 
available. Both these aspects of network structure and operation in health 
care await further research, as does the comparative cost-benefit analysis of 
such networks. 
 13.5  Policy and managerial implications 
Three main sets of policy and managerial implications follow from the above 
findings. 
 13.5.1  Effective management of networks 
A set of implications and recommendations follow, firstly, for the 
management of existing professional and clinical networks such as those 
described above. From the above findings we infer that: 
1. The culture and quality of relationality in networks influences 
whether and how potential network members participate. Network 
identity does not emerge automatically. Network managers have to 
nurture and develop it, and make it explicit. A particular role of the 
network co-ordinator is to identify and involve the less-connected 
members, so as to increase the connectedness and therefore 
effectiveness of the network. This implies that network management 
requires specific skills and approaches, those of relationship-
maintenance, diplomacy, consultation and negotiation. Networks 
should be managed in the same ways as other kinds of implementation 
structures, not as quasi-markets or as quasi-hierarchies. 
2. We found that networks can function effectively without all their 
links and activity being mediated and directed by the co-ordinating 
body. For the reasons stated below, networks do need a co-ordinating 
body but not necessarily as a broker or mediator. For many core 
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processes (e.g. those of a referral or a self-care experience network) it 
is no less important to establish and conserve direct links between 
network members. For the network's core process is constructed of 
such links. 
3. When networks cannot directly produce their intended objectives but 
rely on key actors in the 'hinterlands' of their member organisations, it 
is necessary that the member organisations select as their 
representatives to networks 'boundary-spanners' with sufficiently high 
status, power and authority within their 'home' organisation to 
champion and implement network decisions. 
4. The task of engaging potential members (including influential 
boundary-spanners) becomes easier if the network can 'harness' the 
existing incentives which these members already face; that is, by 
ensuring that the network's core processes also contribute to realising 
goals which are also strategic and salient to the network members' 
interests and professional motivations. Another argument for 
negotiative styles of network management is that such approaches are 
likely to aid the network co-ordinators in understanding what external 
incentives her network might harness. 
5. Comparing the user-controlled networks with the NHS networks 
suggested that user influence requires a strong user presence on the 
network board (or equivalent). But when users are marginal to the core 
processes of the network, greater user involvement will increase the 
network's managerial 'overhead'. In such networks there may be a 
trade-off to be made between practical effectiveness and user 
participation. 
6. Mandated enclave networks are liable to become closed to outside 
resources. An important role of the network co-ordinator is to 
encourage network members, and the network collectively, to develop 
and exploit external linkages. 
7. Knowledge-management (in health care, evidence-basing) of the 
network's core process is the most important medium of network co-
ordination. The more medicalised a health network's activity is, the 
more important is knowledge-management as a medium of co-
ordination. 
8. Stability in networks' member organisations and their personnel is 
required for links, trust, and network culture to be nurtured and 
sustained. Frequent health system re-structuring is detrimental to 
networks, but seemingly a fact of life in the English NHS. Indeed Equity 
and Excellence raises the possibility of further disruption to existing 
professional and clinical network as public health responsibilities are 
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transferred to local government. Maintaining stable network 
membership and roles gives networks the best prospects of 
withstanding such changes. 
9. On the basis of the above explanatory models, a general strategy for 
network monitoring is to monitor not only the network's policy 
outcomes, but as intermediate outputs its knowledge-management; 
what artefacts are produced and who they are distributed to; how far 
into the hinterlands of the member organisations the use of these 
artefacts penetrates; and what use is made of them there and for what 
purposes. 
10. As we discovered when they were absent, network co-ordination 
requires certain basic, generic managerial tools. They include 
formulation of common and agreed network objectives and a clear 
articulation of the criteria of membership, a reliable system for keeping 
membership lists up to date, and strategies in place to reduce the 
damage when a network co-ordinator changes post. Networks need to 
be alert to changes in key network actors and establish an early 
warning system of membership changes. Obvious, even mundane, as 
this recommendation may seem, it is not always followed in network 
practice. The role of the co-ordinator or network manager is critical in 
sustaining health networks. 
 13.5.2  Role of networks in the health system 
Secondly, some important implications and recommendations for the role of 
networks in a health system such as the NHS appear to emerge. In our view 
they are: 
1. The NHS networks were productive of artefacts useful to their 
members and member organisations and, in a few cases, with direct 
impacts on patient care. There is some evidence they helped reduce 
referrals to secondary care. They promoted evidence-based practice. 
The NHS networks served several practical functions simultaneously 
and the self-care network compensated for weaknesses in NHS health 
promotion for an important care group. The networks thus made a 
positive contribution to the health system. 
2. It has been known since the 1950s that even middle-sized 
commercial organisations require a planning function. The co-
ordinating activity of the larger NHS programme and project networks 
appeared to fulfil service development and planning functions which, in 
past years, planners at Health Authority and Regional levels fulfilled. It 
has also been known almost equally long that a purely juridical 
interpretation and enforcement of commercial contracts is impractical, 
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even counter-productive. 'Relational' contracting is also required 
(223). The NHS networks also provided the 'relational' counterpart to 
complement contractual relationships in the NHS quasi-market. These 
are less obvious, but in our view still worthwhile, contributions to the 
health system. 
3. Voluntary referral networks and self-care networks can function also 
as service providers. In a quasi-market it may appear that the obvious 
way of funding such networks is to commission them as one might a 
public or commercial organisation. We found (see chapter 11) that in 
the case of the small self-care network especially, this approach 
promoted a bureaucratisation of network and a diminution of what 
originally made it so valuable as a provider; its flexibility and 
responsiveness to the users who controlled it. In our view, a way to 
avoid this 'denaturing' effect would be to fund small voluntary provider 
networks through grants rather than contracts. If nevertheless 
contracts are used, we suggest that the commissioners need both to 
help and to trust the users who co-ordinate such networks, exercising 
a 'light touch', assisting and providing information or resources but 
leaving decision-making and the bulk of organising work to the users 
and their organisations. 
 13.5.3  Future networks: GP commissioning consortia 
As chapter 1 explained, Equity and Excellence proposes a major extension 
of the role of new networks in the NHS. Our findings also appear to have 
implications for the development and management of GP commissioning 
consortia. These implications should be taken with caution because so many 
details of the consortia have yet to be finalised at the time of writing. 
However it does appear that GP commissioning consortia will be mandated, 
enclave (closed-membership) networks. They will have a dual function of 
commissioning secondary and co-ordinating complex primary care. Then, in 
our opinion: 
 1. Because network co-ordination depends heavily on relationality 
(which takes time and continuity to develop), and because shared 
activity is what networks emerge from and what gives them cohesion, 
it would be prudent wherever possible to set up the consortia as 
developments of existing PCB consortia and other existing local 
networks among GPs. 
 2. Because the GP commissioning consortia will serve the function 
both of a programme and of a referral network, they will face the 
prospect of co-ordinating two core processes (not just one). To us, this 
suggests the need for the network's (consortium's) co-ordinating body 
to have a correspondingly bipartite internal managerial structure and 
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resources. The skills required for managing existing health networks 
(see above) would also appear to be required for managing GP 
commissioning consortia. 
 3. Our findings about existing mandated networks suggest that unless 
steps to the contrary be taken, the GP commissioning consortia may be 
liable to become somewhat: 
(a) closed to outside resources of knowledge, information and other 
'real-side' inputs to their activities. As with existing NHS networks, it 
might be argued that one function of the network co-ordinators is to 
anticipate and reverse this potential tendency. 
(b) impervious to patient and carer voice and influence. If that is in 
the nature of networks where patients and carers do not play a 
large part in the network's core process, it may be necessary to rely 
on other institutions or structures to give patients and carers a 
strong voice in the new commissioning systems. 
(c) Sedimented with a gradual accumulation of mandates and 
activities, leading over time to the risk of 'mission drift'. 
 4. It is obvious that the effectiveness of the GP consortia as 
commissioners will depend on their ability to influence key actors 
(consultants, ward managers etc.) in the 'hinterlands' of secondary 
care providers. Less obvious, but an implication of the explanatory 
model we developed and tested above, is that their effectiveness will 
also depend on their ability to influence the 'hinterlands' of their 
member general-practices. That is not necessarily an easier task, and 
one likely in turn to necessitate the review of managerial work and 
structures within general practices. 
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Appendix 1 Case vignettes with SNA maps 
This appendix contains a narrative case vignette for all the study sites, each 
with a summary social network map for the five sites where sufficient data 
were available. The map shows the presence of links (in any layer). The 
network nodes (member organisations) have pseudonyms constructed on 
using the following system: 
1. First initial is study site; 
2. Second group of characters shows the organisation; 
3. Third group (where used) shows department within that 
organisation. 
Case A: Child Mental Health Network 
This care network co-ordinated services covering the period from conception 
until a child's time of entry to full-time education (i.e. up to the child's 6th 
birthday). It emerged from long-standing informal cooperation between the 
relevant service providers in a small provincial city, which informal 
collaboration led to a conference for sharing knowledge and guidance. This 
led to the foundation of a managed network whose role became the 
development of care pathways for infants with mental health problems. An 
NHS manager who became the Director of the Child and Adolescent Mental 
Health Services (CAMHS) set up a Child Mental Health Network steering 
group of interested organisations in the city. At this stage, the group was 
provider run and led. Its membership came to include the commissioner 
(PCT) for children's and maternity services for the city, the city council (and 
its services), NHS and third sector providers, and the city council's 
Children's Service. The city council was for many years low-ranking in the 
local government league tables. 
There were two main types of service providers in the network. The first are 
the services in the city (a number of Children's Centres, CAMHS) whose core 
activity was to meet the care needs of young children with mental health 
problems or mental health related problems (above all those of their 
parents, including alcohol or drug misuse). These services, in particular a 
new children's centre which the network established, mainly provided early 
and short-term interventions. Specialist CAMHS provided longer term 
treatment, though not necessarily as intense as those provided by the new 
children's centre. Most young children with mental health problems were 
seen by one or both of these services. The other group of services were 
services whose core activity was not infant mental health and had many 
other responsibilities beyond mental health. These included health visiting, 
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midwifery and speech and language services. Their responsibilities for child 
mental health were for prevention, identification and referral. 
Under the lead NHS manager's direction Child Mental Health Network 
commissioned the local university to describe the nature of services to 
infants with mental health in the city and to identify any need and potential 
for service re-design. The university reported in late 2007. They found, inter 
alia, that the network of infant mental health services in the city had 
evolved piecemeal over many yeas and specialist services especially were 
fragmented and complex. Network members did not understand the 
network's structure and had divergent views about the purpose of, and 
practice in, mental health services. Subsequently the network's activity has 
focussed on designing an infant mental health care pathway with various 
members of the group given the tasks of designing its components. This 
task was still under way at the conclusion of the study, with a care pathway 
almost designed and ready to be implemented. 
In March 2008 the network agreed that the chair would be transferred to a 
representative of the PCT as commissioner and the lead NHS manager 
formally handed over this role at the May meeting. Agreement was also 
reached that the focus of the group would be to influence the commissioning 
process, rather than simply act as a forum for interested (and mainly 
provider) organisations. This focus was to include the aim of co-ordinating 
services, helping the commissioning process to avoid gaps in provision and 
helping organisations to share information about policy, best practice and 
care pathways. Membership of the re-incarnated network was largely a 
continuation of its existing membership. Somewhat divergent views about 
the role of the group emerged. The chair and PCT representative's position 
seemed to be that once the group has designed and implemented the 
pathway, its work should cease. Others thought that it should continue with, 
for example, the role of monitoring the implementation of the care pathway. 
In 2009 the network was wound up. 
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Figure 5. Network map: Child Mental Health Network 
 
Case B: Children's Hospital Project Network 
The Children's Hospital Project Network was in a large city, where it 
undertook the project of re-profiling children's hospital services, including 
services for children with long-term complex conditions. In the early 1980s 
the (then) District and (then) Regional Health Authorities decided to 
rationalise children's services, then dispersed over a number of sites 
including old, small and unsuitable hospital settings; and to concentrate 
future service developments on a few well-developed sites, adapting 
primary, community and social care to permit these changes. The 
consequence of closing two children's hospitals was hotly and publicly 
debated in the city and several times re-negotiated between the NHS 
organisations involved. For these reasons, and because the local media from 
time to time headlined various proposals, the project became politicised. 
Eventually (1997) the Secretary of State intervened to break the deadlock 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
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of staff made redundant from closing services into the new ones). 
by mandating the broad objectives of the project, a time-scale for achieving 
them, and a project network structure for doing so. Hospital sites providing 
children's services were to be reduced from twelve sites to eight, the latter 
including a new children's hospital for tertiary services near the city centre
His decision mandated not only the network but also all its member 
organisations severally. Even so, consultations about re-profiling had
resume when PCTs were restructured in 2006, and then three local 
authority Overview and Scrutiny Com
independent review overruled them. 
When the time came to write the business case for the new children's 
hospital building, a Network Supervisory Board was established. ad h
working parties and committees were formed into a project network 
formally charged with implementing this re-profiling project. The network's
objectives applied to all specialities relevant to children including chil
with complex long-term conditions such as mental health problems, 
emphasising both the consolidation of children's services an
to treat children at home or as close to home as possible. 
The network membership was formal representatives of member
organisations, which included children's service commissioners, 
predominantly from the NHS (seven PCTs and the SHA) but also including 
some of the local government bodies in the city (which did not then have a 
unitary local authority). Of service providers, NHS organisations were again 
predominant, in particular the hospitals (both secondary and tertiary) bu
also PCTs in their capacity as community health services providers. The 
representatives of these organisations were senior figures; they included 
PCT chief executives, hospital medical directors (mainly paediatricians) a
local government representatives. In 2003 its remit widened and so t
network acquired sub-groups for paediatrics, CAHMS, obstetrics and 
neonates. The sub-groups' membership was predominantly clinical. 
Also the network had a 'very vocal' public partnership board (PPB) 
2006 the network began an extensive public consultation with the 
assistance of an external 
service re-configuration. 
A most important output from the network was a document explaining how 
the extremely complex service changes that children's services would occur,
and how the transition from the old to the new profile of services would be 
made. The strategy necessitated required quite detailed mapping of patient 
flows and demand modelling for the service changes which would follo
reconstruction or relocation of hospitals. The plans required constant 
updating and necessitated re-budgeting of the new services; and planning 
for their human resource implications (e.g. redeployment of large n
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Whilst the objectives of consolidating children's services were gradually 
being achieved, although it was too early to know what the impact on 
service quality and safety would eventually be. However the network 
regarded its main achievement as having broken out of the years of stasis 
and deadlock about how children's services in the city should be 
reconfigured, and progressed to actually re-modelling the services. 
Figure 6. Network map: Children's Hospital Project Network 
 
Case C: City Children's Network 
City Children's Network has complicated origins, beginning with the local 
PCTs and then transforming itself into a Sure Start programme. Earlier 
studies there had given the researchers a background knowledge of the 
network's organisational character and development, in particular its links 
with social services and education, besides facilitating access. 
The Children's and Young Persons (CYP) Trust network was the largest and 
most complex of the cases studied in the project. It is both a network and a 
strategic partnership and we joined it at its inception and nascent design 
stage. The governance structure was being articulated throughout the study 
period. It is a highly mandated network – more so than the other cases in 
that there is a duty for the constituent agencies to co-operate under the 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
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Children's Act 2004 and to do within the philosophical and strategic ethos of 
Every Child Matters and the Children's National Service Framework. The 
case is located in a large conurbation of over a million people where 
285,000 are under 19 with significant socio-economic and cultural diversity. 
As in other study sites, previous professional relationships and networks 
existed, in particular the city had developed a geographical network of 
Children's Resource Centres, which themselves had grown out of Sure Start 
initiatives. This meant that there was some bottom-up network knowledge 
which was mobilised at the time of the establishment of the Trust and that 
the voluntary sector had a clear and accepted presence. The conurbation 
has a long history of civic provision of public services and contrasting 
political parties within its local authority. The local authority had a well 
established cabinet system with lead members and a specific lead member 
for children's services. The Partnership/Trust is structured in terms of an 
Executive Board whose partners were drawn from the following 
organisations: 
 Children's Safeguarding Board 
 Strategic Health Authority 
 Primary Care Trusts 
 Hospital Trusts 
 Learning and Skills Council 
 Probation Service 
 Police 
Board members each had dual accountability to the network partnership and 
to their respective host organisations. The network had to balance, 
comprehend, integrate and be fully up-to-date with over twenty-five pieces 
of guidance, legislation and advisory statements at any one time. It 
articulated the complexity in an overarching Children's Strategy Document, 
and then localised this strategy through a 'Futures' document. It then 
further articulated these strategic statements into a service issues matrix 
which explicated outcomes and performance levels by locality and 
neighbourhood. In this way the network linked its local priorities with 
national priorities. Conceptually, the organisational arrangements for the 
Trust are at once a matrix (partners and spatial axis); centralised (in regard 
to reporting and performance levels), and networked (distributed but 
integrated involvement). The strategic objectives of the partnership were 
articulated as a vision to: 
 Use research and evidence about prevention and early intervention 
and the provision of specialist interventions. 
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 Be needs driven, and ensure that children, young people and their 
families are engaged in service development. 
 Make sure that the workforce has the necessary training, skills and 
information. 
 Help more people to value children and young people. 
 Integrate the services where appropriate. 
 Protect children from harm and make them feel safe. 
 Support parents to bring up their children, go to work or contribute to 
communities. 
These were further synthesised into six priority areas which mirror the five 
national Every Child Matters outcomes: 
 physical health; 
 behaviour; 
 emotional health; 
 literacy and numeracy; 
 social literacy (the ability to get along with people); and 
 job skills. 
At locality or neighbourhood level, these were then converted into 
performance indicators (PIs) with specified targets for achievements in, for 
example, a reduction in childhood obesity, domestic violence and bullying. 
Each area of achievement had lead partners identified with it. The Trust 
made full use of a 'logic model' approach which is designed around 
outcomes. In order to achieve these outcomes, activities, policies, services, 
programmes were specified at a very detailed level as is the subsequent 
sharing of decisions about investment and performance measurement that 
impact upon such activities. 
The activities in the Trust were characterised by a great deal of attention to 
the planning mechanisms and understandably to the governance design. 
This was designed in terms of a functional analysis which encompassed: 
 Strategic directions; 
 Availability of effective interventions; 
 Tracking progress against interventions; 
 Commissioning; 
 Integration of activity; 
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 Oversight of financial and workforce arrangements; 
 Communication of assurances. 
The governance design activities and the process of governance were 
further refined during the lifespan of the project by a series of reviews and 
discussions about terms of reference and membership. The sub-tier below 
the Executive Board focuses on delivery, joint commissioning and what is 
called a CYP Summit whose aim is to widen network inclusion. 
During the study period City Children's Network was itself subject to an 
Ofsted review, some incorrect and inflammatory publicity, and special 
discussions as part of the Annual Performance Assessment. With a network 
of this size and complexity, it was not possible to identify any single 
reticulist there. The network was supported by sophisticated websites and 
an e-document store which provided a sense of cohesion, as did the 
governance structure and service matrix. It is perhaps too early to assess 
and evaluate the impact of the network in respect of achieving its targets. 
One gets a sense of strong governance, accountability and scrutiny which is 
further reinforced by the presence of written, specific and measurable 
targets in the form of KPIs in the service matrix by which the network holds 
itself open to evaluation and scrutiny. 
The network served a politically most sensitive client group with a high 
public profile. As such it was buffeted by a myriad of initiatives in policy and 
CYP guidance, the latest of which, the Apprenticeship, Skills, Children and 
Learning Bill, issued more guidance, making further demands of Children's 
Trusts and their boards. These demand are re-printed below from the 
Government Office (for the area concerned) to indicate the range of 
activities which had to be met for the production of a CYP Plan. In City 
Children's Network the structural and governance arrangements appeared 
to be in place to achieve these aims. 
Table 37. City Children's Network: activities mandate for production of CYP 
plan 
Preparing the 
plan 
Each plan must have a statement on how the CTB will make 
improvements in the ECM outcomes with specific reference to:- 
Integrating services provided by the CTB partners to improve the well-
being of children and young people. 
Arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. 
Arrangements for early intervention and preventative action through 
universal services. 
Arrangements for reducing child poverty. 
It will also have to include: 
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A list of those consulted in preparing of the plan. 
A joint needs assessment for children, young people and families against 
the ECM outcomes. 
An outline of the main improvement priorities, especially for children and 
young people with special educational needs, disabled children and 
looked after children, for the five ECM outcomes. 
All relevant targets to improve well-being across the outcomes. 
An outline of the strategic actions planned by each of the CTB partners to 
achieve the improvements. 
An outline of how the plan will be performance managed and monitored 
by the CTB. 
A strategy for the local workforce to deliver the priorities in the plan. 
Arrangements for strategic commissioning of services for children and 
young people specifying the proposed spend and resourcing 
commitments of each CTB partner on each of the plan's key priorities. 
Consultation The CTB must consult:- 
(a) People or bodies included in Children's Trust arrangements under the 
Children Act 2004. 
(b) Relevant partners prescribed in regulations that are not represented 
on the CTB. 
(c) Children, young people, families and carers as the CTB consider 
appropriate, with an emphasis on the hard to reach. 
(d) All Sure Start Children's Centre Advisory Boards in the area. 
(e) Persons or bodies representing children, young people, families or 
carers as the CTB considers appropriate. 
(f) Other faith groups as the CTB considers appropriate. 
(g) Schools forum and schools admission forums. 
CTB = Children's Trust Board. ECM = Every Child Matters. 
Case D: Small CHD Network 
This network originally centred on a PCT which has tended to be an 'early 
adopter' of organisational and policy innovations. The city has areas of 
economic and social deprivation, and a sizeable Asian population. CHD was 
therefore likely to be a substantial health problem. PCT mergers also gave 
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this PCT a rural hinterland. Earlier studies there had given the researchers a 
background knowledge of the PCT's organisational character and 
development. 
The CHD network was established in 1998 before the publication of the 
National Service Framework (NSF) for Coronary Disease. The original 
network was established as a clinical (i.e. care) network whose aim was to 
improve services and access to services in an area with a very high 
incidence of heart disease. There was an existing tradition of close working 
relationships between primary and hospital based clinicians (both for 
secondary and tertiary care). The network's membership consisted of 
commissioners, senior hospital and primary care clinicians and managers. 
The local network was nested within a sub regional CHD collaborative which 
was also tasked with implementing the cardiac NSF. Although the 
commissioning agencies went through a series of reorganisations from 
Health Authorities to smaller Primary Care Groups (PCGs) to Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs) and then merged PCTs, there was continuity of the leadership 
and facilitators of both the local and sub regional networks. 
Both the local and sub regional networks were organised using a structure 
of steering group and sub-groups. The sub groups would address specific 
issues such as primary angioplasty, hospital transfer and diagnostics. The 
network's co-ordinating body had managed to establish the network's 
reputation as being an efficient, well-organised network. It was at the 
subgroup level that patients were engaged in the network's activity although 
the technical and professional language typically used was at times a barrier 
to their full participation. 
Key outputs from the local and sub regional network included detailed 
guidance which tailored the NSF for CHD for local use. The network adopted 
the commonly used 'technology' of service improvement and redesign, for 
example process mapping existing patient routes through care and then 
redesigning those pathways. The redesigned pathways were then 
commissioned across the organisations within the local and sub-regional 
networks. The benchmarking of the performance of services against others 
was also cited as a standard technique for evaluation and development. The 
network claimed credit having developed a new primary angioplasty service 
for the sub region and for increasing the uptake of cardiac rehabilitation 
services. 
The stated values and objectives of the network included the valuing of 
collaboration itself as a means of improving services; the pursuit of clinical 
excellence; an explicit valuing of clinicians' contributions to the design and 
commissioning of local CHD services; equity in access to CHD services; and 
an explicit valuing of the continuity in network membership despite the 
mergers and restructuring of PCTs; and change from which the network 
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wished to insulate itself. From 2008, however, this attempt at insulation 
broke down and the network entered a period of hiatus whilst, following the 
merger and restructuring of local PCTs and sub-regional cardiac network, it 
awaited its own reconfiguration. 
Figure 7. Network map: Small CHD Network 
 
 
 
Case E: Regional CHD Network 
The development of Regional CHD Network can broadly be divided into 
three phases. 
Phase 1: Co-existence and merging of local networks 
At the time of PCT restructuring (from 2006) two main CHD networks, 
former collaboratives, covered the wide area (population around 4 million) 
which Regional CHD Network subsequently served. Each collaborative 
covered about half the region, each half-region containing a number of 
counties and unitary authorities. In 2006 the SHA carried out a consultation 
exercise about the future of these and other networks which resulted in the 
existing networks being amalgamated. In April 2007 the SHA established 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
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cardiac, stroke, renal and diabetes networks across the entire region under 
the umbrella of the Regional CHD Network. This merged the existing two 
sub-regional CHD networks and incorporated other clinical specialities such 
as stroke. The SHA also established other new networks across the entire 
region for other care groups including for cancer and children. Regional CHD 
Network thus inherited a large catchment population, about twice that 
recommended in some policy guidance. 
Concurrently with the two sub-regional collaboratives there also existed 
more local, PCT-level cardiac networks including one on which we initially 
focused our case study and which we label 'local CHD network E1'. It was 
set up in about 2000 by the then director of public health as a means of 
implementing the NSF for Coronary Heart Disease. It was organised across 
three PCTs (which subsequently merged) and its membership included 
health care professional and patient representatives from five main towns in 
the merged PCT. Its professional members were from general practice, 
primary care and specialist nursing, pharmacy, public health, cardiology, 
rehabilitation, cardiology administration and tertiary care. The focus of local 
network E1 was service improvement and it appears to have been 
successful in its early years. It helped to establish four local consultant 
posts, an angioplasty unit, a coronary care unit and well supported clinics. 
They also introduced integrated care plans in local network E1 for all levels 
of cardiac care and developed treatment guidelines on heart failure, angina 
and other coronary conditions. 
Phase 2: Decline of the local CHD network and a hiatus for 
Regional CHD Network 
Local CHD network E1 effectively ceased to function by 2007 and possibly 
much earlier, although it continued to meet irregularly during the course of 
the fieldwork. The exact causes and dates of its demise are not clear. The 
2006 re-organisation of PCTs meant that the three PCTs that created local 
network E1 were merged into one. This increase in size seems to have 
caused a loss of local focus which meant network members dropped out. It 
is also possible that Practice Based Commissioning consortia replaced some 
functions of local network E1: it is hard to be absolutely certain that these 
developments influenced the demise of local network E1 but the timing is 
remarkably close. Our approaches to key informants to discover what had 
happened nearly all met with initial agreement but subsequent withdrawal 
from being interviewed or that phone calls and emails were not returned. 
Meantime difficulties with staff recruitment frustrated the work of Regional 
CHD Network. The original network manager left her post in November 
2007. It was not until June 2008 that a permanent network manager was 
appointed but her scope for action was constrained by the SHA's difficulties 
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in recruiting other key staff to support this and the other networks. Four 
service improvement manager posts were filled by the autumn of 2008, but 
two by secondments. At this stage Regional CHD Network had 0.4wte of a 
service improvement manager allocated to it. Staff recruitment was 
frustrated by uncertainty about the location of the network's co-ordinating 
body. It had always been intended that the network's host organisation 
would change from the SHA to one of the PCTs but a final decision remained 
unmade throughout much of 2008. A work plan was agreed but the lack of 
network support staff constrained its implementation. At this point the 
staffing plan was changed so that Regional CHD Network (like other care 
group networks) would have a full time dedicated manager, a deputy, a 
service improvement or project manager and administrative support. By the 
end of the year the Regional CHD Network had a full – indeed enhanced - 
compliment of a network manager, a deputy, a service improvement 
manager, a project manager and administrative staff. 
Phase 3: Regional CHD Network re-animated 
The appointment of a network manager in June 2008 enabled Regional CHD 
Network's work to begin effectively begin. The network now consisted of a 
steering group of five managers (including dedicated network managers) 
and six clinicians, including a nurse. It works through 36 liaison 
representatives from the region's provider and commissioning services. 
There is a roughly equal split between the number of clinicians and 
managers. Like other networks in this region, Regional CHD Network is 
accountable to a Board of Commissioners whose members included PCT 
CEOs and SHA executives. Until recently, Regional CHD Network's staff were 
employed by the SHA under the aegis of the head of service improvement 
and the director of clinical standards but management of network staff has 
now been transferred to a PCT acting as host for the network. 
By the spring 2009, the network and its sub-groups had become 
progressively active in implementing work plans, developing guidance, 
standards, care pathways and other projects directly bearing upon clinical 
practice for CHD. Meantime Regional CHD Network staff were also involved 
in re-organising the network by, for example, identifying names of network 
members, creating contact lists and identifying clinical leads for stroke. 
During this period Regional CHD Network developed two main roles. One of 
the main early tasks of the new network manager was to get a work plan 
agreed by the board in July 2008. The work plan identified among the 
priorities for Regional CHD Network work on angioplasty provision, vascular 
surgery and demand for stroke services. One early activity was therefore to 
host an expert conference that resulted in proposals on care pathways, 
clinical practice and other components for angioplasty treatment. The 
network produced detailed commissioning options for its Board regarding 
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the location, volume and costs of these services. Network also produced 
detailed recommendations about pace-maker use with patients who fall 
outside NICE criteria. Its work plan specifies that Regional CHD Network is 
to have both a service provider and improvement function and a 
commissioning development function, although (lead clinicians were clear) 
Regional CHD Network would in due course shift focus towards 
commissioning support. 
Case F: Urban CHD network 
The network's precursor was a CHD Collaborative that had emerged 
between 2001/2002, and which in 2003/2004 developed as a full 
administrative network as a result of the amalgamation of the Collaborative 
and the Local Cardiac Modernisation Board. This history was still 
represented in the Network's present form in that it was very collaborative 
in its approach and had high levels of innovation – seeking to operationalise 
the modernisation ethos, and purposefully change and improve both the 
organisation and practice of cardiac care. The network served a large 
conurbation with a planning population of about 2 million people; however, 
it had porous boundaries on all sides and the planning population was only 
one indicator of its work-flow because historical clinical referral patterns at 
both primary and tertiary levels of care spread beyond its immediate 
planning population. 
The network served seven PCTs and five acute Hospital Trusts (with multiple 
sites within each Trust), which included tertiary centres. The network served 
eight local authority boroughs and, prior to 2008, was part of a strategic 
health authority arrangement which later merged into a city-wide authority. 
The network's burden of disease in respect of cardiac mortality was high, 
representing five of the worst six boroughs in the whole city. 2001 census 
data showed similar patterns exist for circulatory disease and coronary heart 
disease mortality. It is important to note that to members of the network, 
none of the operating conditions and epidemiology which they were working 
with were new. The patterns had existed and endured for decades, and one 
of the clear objectives of the network was to improve the health status of 
the area with a focus and drive which was stimulated by the combination of 
the overall National Service Frameworks for Coronary Heart Disease, the 
previous Heart Improvement Programme, and the performance mechanisms 
of Public Service Agreements (from HM Treasury) with performance 
management and scrutiny requirements of the SHA. 
Throughout the period of the study, this overall innovation and performance 
agenda changed – in fact it was in a state of perpetual development. Partly 
this was because in clinical terms it was not possible to separate the CHD 
NSF from other ones, particularly those for blood pressure, COPD, stroke 
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and vascular. In fact, midway through the study period the network took on 
the extended responsibility for the stroke and vascular NSFs. There were 
further complexities in the network's environment: the wider NHS 'reform' 
agenda, practice-based commissioning and Payment by Results. For the 
later, second tranche of interviews, the respondents articulated how the 
publication of Chapter 8 of the NSF CHD – on arrhythmias and sudden 
cardiac death – was serving as further stimuli to action resulting in the 
modification of local work plans. 
The network was organised around a highly functional Cardiac Network 
Board which was fully chaired and serviced, with an 'above' and 'below' 
structure; the 'above' structure being the representational engagement and 
service delivery/accountability part of the network, and the 'below' section 
the full time, permanent administrative and managerial structure of the 
network. Much of the work of the 'below' section was fed and driven by 
Service Improvement Teams who 'worked in the field', so uniting the 'above' 
and 'below' structures very effectively. Our interviews confirmed the mixing 
and blending of these structures in that relationships existed between the 
network core and its hinterland. The administrative and managerial core of 
the network had a designated physical location and office facilities which 
added to the sense of a tangible network both in effect and structure. The 
sense of innovation was strong with administrative staff encouraged to 
further develop both personally and professionally, and internal 
communication networks were short and dense with daily contact between 
members. The clinical leads and directors were seen as the boundary 
spanners and network reticulists and the functionality of the network was 
further enhanced by examples of highly collaborative behaviour. 
The main activities of the network were to co-ordinate, steer, direct where 
appropriate, bring together and facilitate the improvement of cardiac health 
care and access to such services as achieve this, for its local population in 
line with the requirements of the NSF CHD by working with all the 
component stakeholders. It did this by providing evidence, information, 
liaising, educating, innovating, advising, introducing all stakeholders, 
sharing, and perhaps above all, by taking a holistic view of the whole 
patient journey in cardiac care and identifying where, in that journey, each 
interfaces with each service, and then bringing all these interfaces together 
in a network and when required to participate in the commissioning of 
services. 
Its artefacts have been written strategies and directional guidance about 
prevention, angina, revascularisation, heart failure, cardiac rehabilitation, 
arrhythmia and cardiac palliative care. The network achieved particular 
impact with the initiation of a Heart Attack Centre and the commencement 
of primary angioplasty which involved intensive and complex negotiations, 
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leading to service changes at a strategic and operational level, e.g. from 
implementing the broad requirements of the NSF to agreeing detailed 
schedules of the ambulance service that fit in with the new Heart Attack 
centre. Further impacts were achieved with workforce development, 
particularly around catheterisation, laboratory staff, movements toward the 
18 week waiting target from GP referral to hospital treatment, and also in 
respect of cardiac rehabilitation. 
The network was helped by its pre-existing network relationships; the 
presence of a single administrative unit, both physically and in terms of 
staffing; the skills and commitment of its members; its location amongst a 
highly innovative, clinically renowned set of tertiary centres; the support of 
the DoH, plus effective and strong leadership. Its demanding environment 
and structural changes to the NHS locally required the network's constant 
re-adaptation. 
Figure 8. Network map: Urban CHD Network  
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Case G: Self-Care Network 
This was a small voluntary network which works towards supporting and 
improving the physical well being of adults with mental health difficulties. It 
was initiated in 2006 by a group of these adults whose initial common link 
was activities at a social club in one district of the city. Although one 
interested local GP and a social service manager also participated, this 
network was above all a self-help and mutual support network. Self-Care 
Network consisted of three voluntary groups located in the north west of a 
small city, providing physical activities to local people with severe mental 
health problems. The voluntary groups are supported by the local PCT and a 
city-wide voluntary group. The main input from these organisations was 
through a local GP, a public health manager, public health workers and a 
physical activity promoter. NIMHE provided £5, 000 funding to Self-Care 
Network over three years. 
The largest voluntary member organisation in Self-Care Network was a 
partnership between a Baptist church and the city Mental Health Partnership 
promoting activity and group work for people with severe mental illness. Its 
running costs of £80,000 pa were funded by the city council and covered 
the salaries of a full-time co-ordinator, a part time administrator, sessional 
workers and overheads. The second voluntary member organisation was a 
self-help group of people with long term mental health problems, based in a 
nearby suburb. The third voluntary member organisation operated a weekly 
drop-in centre providing a range of physical, educational and social 
activities. The two smaller voluntary organisations got occasional small 
grant funding but were entirely voluntary run, supported by small fund 
raising activities such as raffles. 
Before Self-Care Network was established, all three of what were to become 
its voluntary member organisations had already been organising regular 
physical activity sessions. The objectives of Self-Care Network were to: 
 Develop a network of health promoting activities to be used by people 
with long-term mental health problems 
 Increase the number of people with long-term mental health 
problems eating healthy food, doing moderate exercise, stopping 
smoking and with an increased sense of well-being 
 Develop confidence and capacity of third sector providers to engage 
in health promoting activities 
 Increase links between health and other sectors 
The age range of those attending Self-Care Network events was very wide 
(20 to 81 years old), yet all participated irrespective of age. The participants 
reported feeling more capable, confident and a sense of achievement as a 
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result of taking part in Self-Care Network activities. They felt that such 
success owed a great deal to Self-Care Network and the largest voluntary 
member organisation providing a social network to those that would not 
otherwise find it given that many live on their own and become very 
isolated. Self-Care Network activities provided social interaction and, we 
were told, relief from anxiety and depression. Self-Care Network won a 
regional health and social care award for Improving Health and Reducing 
Inequalities. Self-Care Network have also learnt to start recording their 
achievements. This is has enabled them to make funding applications for 
small grants, some of them successful. Self-Care Network organised a wide 
range of activities for its members, such as food preparation courses, 
exercise and sports events, and trips out. A public health professional 
provided health advice to Self-Care Network members and made referrals to 
GPs to deal with high blood pressure, obesity and smoking. A practice nurse 
visited the groups to give health checks (which also raised the nurse's 
awareness of how to deal with people with mental health problems). 
Figure 9. Network map: Self-Care Network 
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Appendix 2 Data grid for case studies 
version = 11 June 2006 
NR89 Phase 1 fieldwork - Data Grid 
One column per network, row headings shown below: 
* = data required to set up quantitative analysis. 
Environment of the network 
 1. Policy context role of national-level institutions (DH, DEnv, NICE etc.) 
(a) Mandation (if applicable) – by whom, for what purpose, what incentives 
and/or sanctions 
 2. Legal and regulatory framework: 
 3. Professional bodies – nature and extent of regulation of network members 
 4. Whole-network external resource dependences and their institutional 
structure (volunteers? market? public budget? gift? grant? etc.). (These 
identify the possible network 'layers'.) 
(a) users (patients, clients or equivalent)* 
(b) staff (including volunteers) * 
(c) money (all sources)* 
(d) knowledge / information * 
(e) legitimation i.e. legal/regulatory/professional recognition/permission * 
(f) physical resources (equipment, consumables, accommodation) * 
(g) others? * 
 5. Stability of environment 
(a) main changes during past 3 years 
(b) main changes foreseen in next 3 years 
(c) in/stability of workload 
 6. Any similar networks: 
(a) earlier, that anticipated (or became) the present network? 
(b) elsewhere – non-competing 
(c) competing / substitute 
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Structure of the network 
 1. Membership ('stakeholders') – who are they? 
(a) organisations * 
 i. inclusivity and any exclusions * 
 ii. individuals who 'boundary span' to each other network member 
organisation* 
 iii. boundary-spanner's prior role, accountabilities and incentives faced 
within his/her home organisation 
(b) individuals* 
 i. inclusivity and any exclusions * 
(c) sub-networks 
(d) embedded within any other 
 i. network(s)? 
 ii. larger organisation? 
 2. Division of labour – any specialist roles or contributions of 
(a) organisational members 
(b) individuals 
(c) service clients or users (including proxy users such as carers) 
 3. 'Technology' by which the network undertakes its core activity i.e. 
(a) nature of the common activities which the network undertakes * 
(b) who directly interacts with whom, in undertaking this activity * 
(c) how far the core activity takes place within member organisations, how 
far it results from interactions between them * 
(d) its resource requirements i.e. external resource dependencies above 
plus internal resources supplied by the network members. Same 
categories as above i.e.: 
 i. users (patients, clients or equivalent) and their inputs* 
 ii. staff (including volunteers) * 
 iii. money (all sources)* 
 iv. knowledge / information * 
 v. legitimation / authority / permission * 
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 vi. physical resources (equipment, consumables, accommodation) – 
their asset specificity * 
 vii. others? * 
 4. Infrastructure: Relational co-ordination structures 
(a) network core? 
 i. membership of core * 
 ii. how core selected / elected 
 iii. functions * 
 iv. resources 
 A. nature and quantity 
 B. property rights 
 C. who provides these resources and how 
 D. who controls what budgets 
 v. incentives or sanctions of 
 A. core upon (other) network members 
 B. other network members upon core 
(b) standing committees or working groups * 
(c) ICT infrastructure, in particular e-mail and its role * 
Organisational processes of the network 
In each case, note any benign and any dysfunctional aspects, implications, 
consequences. 
 1. Formation of network: how members are recruited 
(a) recruitment mechanisms and criteria – open or closed network? 
(b) organisations' reasons for supporting the network 
(c) individual members' reasons for supporting the network 
(d) How members are lost / expelled (criteria, mechanisms) 
 2. Objective setting – what is the stated purpose of the network, its core 
activity and intended outcomes? 
(a) who sets network objectives 
(b) by what processes 
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(c) what objectives does the network have 
(d) degree of consensus, support or opposition among network members 
for these objectives 
(e) leadership styles – shared vs. distributed. 
 3. Relational co-ordination processes and who participates in each of these 
'layers' of network processes? * 
(a) Resource allocations and flows: 
 i. help in kind e.g. loan of materials, staff secondments; and which 
members are involved? * 
 ii. referrals: and which members are involved? * 
 iii. gifts / grants: and which members are involved? * 
 iv. transactions / contracts: and which members are involved? *. 
 v. delegation of budgets / staff / decisions from member organisation: 
and which members are involved? * 
(b) information exchange: and which members are involved? * 
 i. Which information is shared, and which is not? * 
 ii. How data are collected 
 iii. How data are analysed and the information flows following 
(c) joint learning / training / self-development among network members: 
and which members are involved? * 
 4. How network activity is jointly assessed. 
(a) transparency and surveillance – e.g in regard to clinical governance 
(b) compliance with network objectives and activities - incentives or 
sanctions 
 5. Social capital; trust, affiliation and conflict 
(a) shared assumptions, beliefs, value – network 
 i. 'culture' 
 ii. 'climate' 
 iii. 'ideology' 
 iv. Are contracts a source of stress for voluntary organisations? 
(b) socialisation into the network 
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(c) mutual support vs. any conflicts or disputes, dissident members, active 
or passive resistance from any network members or groups thereof. 
Any conflicts of interest between providers? 
(d) How uniformly do network members participate in its activities? 
(e) Incentives to collaborate and their effects 
 i. negotiations / persuasion: and which members are involved? * 
 ii. legitimation 
 iii. soft coercion? 
 6. How member organisations' internal activities constrain or influence their 
role in the network and the network's activity 
(a) role of boundary spanners – as agents of their 'home' organisation 
acting upon the rest of the network * 
 7. how the network activities constrain or influence what occurs within their 
member organisations 
(a) role of boundary spanners – as agents of the network acting upon their 
'home' organisation * 
 8. How changes occur in network's core activity – openness to innovation 
Outcomes of network activity 
 1. Effectiveness: 
(a) How network activities compare with network's own stated objectives 
 i. implementation surpluses or deficits 
(b) Accessibility to services – range and speed of access. 
(c) New referral routes 
(d) How far minimum standards, including safety standards, apply. 
(e) Any secondary data on services outcomes, quality of life etc.? 
 2. Accountability: 
(a) How network activities compare with mandator's requirements (where 
applicable) 
(b) User involvement in decision-making; types and levels of involvement. 
 3. Outcomes for members 
(a) How network activities compare with member organisations and 
individuals' reasons for supporting the network 
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(b) Differences in different stakeholders' criteria for satisfactory network 
outcomes 
(c) Stress in networks [compared with other work settings] 
(d) Intrusiveness (or not) of networks' monitoring / surveillance methods. 
 4. Costs, opportunity costs. 
(a) Net benefits & marginal costs compared with other forms of 
governance. 
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Appendix 3 Mandated and voluntary networks 
Table 38. Mandated and non-mandated networks: Initial assumptions (A) 
and hypotheses (H)  
 Mandated Non-mandated 
Origins (A) Created by legal 
requirement for practice; 
collective agreement 
between profession and 
state; 'closed shop' or 
cartel; or by managerial 
direction. Some involuntary 
members.  
Voluntary pursuit of common 
policy goals; shared 
economic interests; shared 
technology; network created 
as by-product of other, de 
facto relationships and 
organisational structures.  
Structure (H) 'Hierarchical' in the sense of 
having public organisation 
as a core body; 'enclave' in 
the sense of having a 
formally defined 
membership; low density; 
flow is mainly from core to 
periphery; relatively 
consistent separation (all 
members relate directly to 
the core, and to each other 
mainly via the core). 
Uniform networks (within 
the economic sector). 
Closed membership.  
Negotiated, distributed 
allocation of roles; open to 
new members and liable to 
lose members; more 
external links; patchy 
density and flow; uneven 
distribution of structural 
holes; uneven separation. 
Each network was particular 
structural characteristics. 
'Market' and 'individual' 
substructures. Sub-networks 
emerge; 'lumpy' networks.  
Organisational processes (H) Explicit common goals and 
activities. Uniformity and 
formalisation of 
organisational processes and 
flows. More comprehensive, 
systematic management of 
the whole network. 
Tendency to 'vertical' control 
(from core to other 
members). Oppositional 
processes occur, both 
passive (self-isolation, non-
compliance) and active. 
Dissent by 'voice' or passive 
opposition not 'exit'. Prior 
networks co-exist with new 
Tendency to more 
'horizontal' co-ordination 
between members. More 
'relational' processes and 
flows, more trust-based. 
Conflict dealt with by 
negotiation or exit. New 
members recruited ad hoc. 
Heterogeneity of occupations 
included. Shifts over time in 
the distribution of power 
amongst network members 
(Moody et al 2005). Inter-
group brokerage ('structural 
holes') allow exchange of 
ideas. Social networks' 
processes more likely to 
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mandated network.  emerge to serve non-
rational and irrational needs 
(Kahn et al 2003; Kravitz et 
al. 2003).  
Technical process and 
Outcomes (H) 
Swift, relative uniform 
implementation of mandated 
policy and activities in the 
short term. Limited 
openness to organisational 
innovation, involvement of 
service users. Hence, more 
limited long-term outcomes 
than in non-mandated 
networks.  
Flexibility and openness to 
innovation (both 
organisational and 
technical). Especially those: 
1. invented or promoted by 
grass-roots enthusiasts 
2. introduced by boundary-
spanners / structural 
holes (Burt 1992). 
Service user involvement 
more extensive but uneven.  
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Appendix 4 Co-ordination benefits and disbenefits 
of trusting 
Co-ordination benefits of trusting (82) 
 Avoids costs associated with extensive monitoring and oversight 
 In some contexts serves as a better control mechanism than either 
markets or hierarchies. 
 Can promote openness and sharing of timely and accurate 
information 
 May enhance personal motivation because of increased levels of 
freedom and autonomy 
 Serves as an intangible capital asset which can secure competitive 
advantage. 
 Basis for forging and maintaining partnerships, strategic alliances and 
professional networks 
 Associated with enhanced employee satisfaction and performance. 
 Promotes more rapid innovation and learning in organisations 
 Reduces complexity and information paralysis 
Co-ordination drawbacks of trusting 
 Up front costs of building and maintaining trust can be high. However 
once trust has been established it can be lost or damaged very easily. 
 Difficult to establish who is a trustworthy agent, especially in areas 
where past performance might not be a good indicator of future 
performance. 
 Is a risky investment as the trustee may behave opportunistically by 
exploiting the vulnerability of the truster or fail to perform to 
expectations. 
 Can lead to dysfunctional 'cosy' relationships, which stifle motivation 
and at the extreme may lead to corrupt practice. 
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Appendix 5 Interview schedule 
Instructions to interviewer 
Before starting interview: 
1.Check interviewee has seen PIS. 
2.Invite interviewee to ask any questions about the research and his/her 
role in it. 
3.Ask interviewee to sign consent form (one copy for interviewee, one for 
researchers). 
4.Ask permission to tape-record. 
5.Offer interviewee opportunity to see and correct transcript. 
Checklist of topics 
Interviewer to select ad hoc which of these to pursue with particular 
individual informants, according to the informant's role and what data is 
already available. 
1 Network Aims 
1.1 How did this network originate? 
1.2 What are its stated aims? 
1.3 What aims do you think it actually pursues? 
1.4 Why do you participate in this network? 
2 Network Environment 
2.1 What external organisations does this network have the most dealings 
with? 
2.2 What does this network need or obtain from these external bodies? 
Prompts: (Funds? Referrals? Physical resources? Staff or volunteers? 
Permission to operate? Other resources?) 
2.3 What do these outside bodies demand in return? 
2.4 What are the main risks and uncertainties in dealing with these outside 
bodies? 
2.5 How does national policy impact on this network? 
3 Network structures 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         285 
3.1 What is the main activity of this network? 
3.2 Who co-ordinates and controls this activity, and how do they do it? 
Prompts: Is there a designate co-ordinator or organising group? How 
much discretion do they have? Who do they report back to? How 
does a person become a co-ordinator/organising group member? 
Can they lose that role? 
3.3 Who carries out this activity and how are they organised? 
Prompts: Any 'horizontal' division of labour among network 
members or different parts of the network? Permanent roles or 
specialisations? Specialised work 'teams'? Ad hoc project teams? 
Informal co-operation between members of different occupations? 
3.4 What physical resources does the network have at its disposal to carry 
out this activity? 
Prompts: Buildings, land, tools, equipment? Information systems 
(IT)? Stocks of raw materials or consumables? Place(s) of service 
provision? 
3.5 Does the network use any specialised technical or occupational 
knowledge? 
Prompts: Evidence-based knowledge? Special protocols? Operational 
techniques such as care process mapping? 
4 Network processes 
4.1 What incentives are used to motivate and manage individual members 
of the network? 
4.2 How does the network relate to the non-members (patients, clients, 
customers, general public) who make use of its services? If they participate 
in decision-making, how is this done? 
4.3 What has made this network grow / shrink / remain unchanged? 
4.4 What norms or values predominate within this network? 
Prompt: 'norms or values' could be paraphrased as internal 'climate', 
'culture', 'rules', 'ideologies' 'orientation', 'legitimation', 'authority'. 
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4.5 Have any conflicts occurred within this network during the last three 
years? What were they about? By what process were they resolved? 
5 Network outcomes 
5.1 What does this network provide for the people (patients, carers) who 
use its services? 
Prompts: Access to services? Help in kind? Emotional or 
psychological support? Support in managing their own health care? 
Information? Support for the family or other informal carers? 
5.2 In your opinion, what seems to make people join or leave this network, 
or its activities? What do they seem to like or dislike about it? 
5.3 What do your regard regard as success (or failure) in what this network 
does? 
Prompts: Innovative ways of providing services? Promoting 
evidence-based practice? Spread of knowledge, skills or ideas? 
Patient of carer satisfaction? Health outcomes? Demand 
management? 
6 Are there any other important aspects of this network which you have not 
yet had the opportunity to describe? 
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Appendix 6 Survey questionnaire 
Below is the generic framework for the survey questionnaire, set up with 
dummy organisational names (our ethical approval requires anonymity of 
informants and sites).  
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         287 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         288 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         289 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         290 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         291 
 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         292 
 
 
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         293 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         294 
 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         295 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         296 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         297 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         298 
 © Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2011. This work was produced by Sheaff et al. 
under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for Health. 
Project 08/1518/104         299 
Appendix 7: Project outputs and dissemination to 
January 2010 
Reports 
 Report to CAMHS and City Council on Infant Mental Health network in Child 
Mental Health Network. 
Conferences 
 'Towards an understanding of NHS networks: some implications of pilot 
research.' 1st Annual NHS Networks Conference 2006 
 'Values and Managerial Processes in Clinical Networks in England.' 
European Health Management Association conference, Lyon 2007. 
 'Networks as a Structural Form for the Delivery of Health Care: Evidence 
from the British National Health Service Three Year Study'. Public 
Management Research Association Conference. 
 'The resilience of healthcare networks under conditions of system reform 
and restructuring'. Organisational Behaviour in Health Care Conference, 
Sydney 2008. 
 'Management and Effectiveness of Clinical and Professional Care Networks: 
Lessons from England'. Anglo-Scots network conference 2009. 
Papers 
 Woodcock Ross, J, Hooper, L, Doris, F, Stenhouse E,. Sheaff, R. (2008) 
'What are child care social workers doing in relation to infant mental 
health?: an exploration of professional ideologies and practice preferences 
in an inter-agency network' British Journal of Social Work Advance access 
doi:10.1093/bjsw/bcn029 
 Sheaff R, Benson L, Farbus L, Schofield J, Mannion R, Reeves D (2010) 
Network resilience in the face of health system reform Social Science and 
Medicine 70 (5) 779-786. 
 Stenhouse, E, Hooper, L, Doris, F, Sheaff, R. (submitted) 'A systematic 
review of infant mental health services: help-seeking and service access of 
minority and socially excluded groups'
 Appendix 8 Network artefacts 
Table 39. Descriptive list of network artefacts 
Care-group Children CHD Self-care 
Site Child 
Mental 
Health 
Network 
Children's 
Hospital 
Project 
Network 
City 
children's 
Network 
Small 
CHD 
Network 
Regional 
CHD 
Network 
Urban 
CHD 
Network 
Pilot Site 
CHD 
Network 
Self-Care 
Network 
Artefact          
Common protocols  ●        
Map of existing care 
pathways  
● ●  ●  ●   
Adaptations of central 
guidance to local 
conditions  
●   ●     
Children's centre  ●        
Evaluations of network ●      ● ● 
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 Documentation of 
network remit, plans 
and working practices 
●    ●  ●  
Training conferences, 
workshops 
● ●  ● ● ● ●  
Systematic review of 
models of care 
●        
Service standards  ●   ● ● ●   
Plan for relocation of 
hospital services 
 ●       
Geographical modelling 
of patient flows 
 ●   ●    
Hospital demand and 
capacity modelling  
 ●   ●  ●  
Cost projections for 
member organisations  
 ●       
Public consultation   ●     ●  
Redeploy community 
nursing services 
● ●       
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 Nurse rotation between 
community and hospital 
care  
 ●       
Pilot implementation of 
European working time 
directive  
 ●       
Short breaks scheme 
for parents and children  
  ●      
Joint (LA+NHS) 
commissioning of 
children's services  
●  ●      
New primary care 
angioplasty service  
   ● ●    
Review of referrals from 
primary to secondary to 
tertiary care.  
 ●  ● ● ● ●  
Increased uptake of 
cardiac rehabilitation.  
   ● ● ●   
Compare service 
standards against 
similar services 
   ● ●  ●  
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 elsewhere 
Service review    ● ● ●   
Redesigned service 
pathways  
 ●  ● ● ●   
Pre-hospital 
thrombolysis provision  
   ●     
Specialist heart failure 
nurse post  
   ●     
Experimental patient 
transport to exercise 
classes  
   ●     
Multi-language 
translations of patient 
support manual on 
heart failure  
   ●     
Clinical guidance     ●  ●  
Experiment with 
patient-held medical 
record 
    ●    
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 Extended role for 
regional specialist 
centres  
    ● ●   
Experiment with 
diagnostic testing in 
primary care for heart 
failure  
    ●    
Service strategy 
statement  
 ● ●  ●    
Cross-organisational 
consultant cover rotas  
    ● ●   
Grants for 'targeted' 
service improvements  
    ●    
Pilot project for heart 
improvement (diet and 
exercise) programme  
    ●    
Regional patient 
transfer service (with 
ambulance support) 
    ●    
Dental advice letter to 
pre-operative patients  
    ●    
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 Database     ●    
Website    ●  ●    
Advice and 
recommendations to 
commissioning bodies  
 ● ● ● ● ●  ● 
Re-analysis of existing 
NHS datasets for 
performance monitoring 
    ● ●   
New percutaneous 
coronary intervention 
(PCI) service 
     ●   
Experiment with 
minimally invasive 
cardiac valve 
replacement  
     ●   
Food hygiene and 
preparation training 
       ● 
Exercise sessions        ● 
Volleyball tournaments         ● 
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 Tai chi        ● 
Boccia         ● 
Walks         ● 
Patient trips (to coast 
etc.) 
       ● 
Contributions to time-
bank and skill-swap 
schemes 
       ● 
Display at PCT-
sponsored events 
       ● 
Health education / 
promotion materials  
   ● ●   ● 
Entry to national 
competition for self-
care projects  
       ● 
Patient survey  ●      ● 
Art sessions   
     ● 
Cookery class   
     ● 
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Recruit cardiac 
physiologist 
technicians.  
      ●  
PBR for 
revascularisation  
      ●  
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Addendum 
This document is an output from a research project that was commissioned 
by the Service Delivery and Organisation (SDO) programme whilst it was 
managed by the National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and 
Organisation (NCCSDO) at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine. The NIHR SDO programme is now managed by the National 
Institute for Health Research Evaluations, Trials and Studies Coordinating 
Centre (NETSC based at the University of Southampton.  
Although NETSCC, SDO has managed the project and conducted the 
editorial review of this document, we had no involvement in the 
commissioning, and therefore may not be able to comment on the 
background of this document. Should you have any queries please contact 
sdo@southampton.ac.uk. 
